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This thesis is a collection of essays about political economy, in particular to the 
relationship between the United Kingdom and the European Union. 
The second chapter aims to analyse whether and to what extent negative newspaper 
coverage of topics relating to immigration concerns influenced the percentage of leave votes 
in the 2016 European Union (EU) membership referendum. Using data at constituency level, I 
find that negative newspaper coverage had a small, statistically significant and positive effect 
on the percentage of EU leave votes mainly in constituencies in the bottom quarter of the 
education qualification distribution.  
This work in the third chapter generalises the work of Besley and Prat (2006) analysing 
political media capture by bribing some or all media outlets in the event of an election. The 
most crucial item of generalisation which I introduce is that the challenger politician can 
observe any bribing by the incumbent politician to the media outlets and has an opportunity to 
make counter-offers. The most important novel finding is that under sufficiently general 
conditions, there exists one Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium for which total media capture never 
arises in equilibrium. 
The final chapter decomposes differentials in wages and propensities to work a second 
job of nationals of countries which joined the European Union (EU) in 2004 relative to natives 
to analyse their integration in the British Labour Market, before and after their accession. This 
paper finds that at the mean migrants who arrived at least 5 years prior being better integrated 
in all periods. The Quantile decomposition and finds that joining the European Union improved 
the labour market outcomes of A10 nationals at the bottom of the wage distribution at the cost 
of creating a glass ceiling. The logit Oaxaca decomposition results reveal that migrants are 





This thesis is a collection of essays about political economy, in particular to the 
relationship between the United Kingdom and the European Union. 
The second chapter aims to analyse whether and to what extent negative newspaper 
coverage of topics relating to immigration concerns influenced the percentage of Leave votes 
in the 2016 European Union (EU) membership referendum. Using data at constituency level, I 
find that negative newspaper coverage had a small, statistically significant and positive effect 
on the percentage of EU Leave votes mainly in constituencies in the bottom quarter of the 
education qualification distribution, where a one unit increase in the coverage variable 
increased the Leave vote percentage between 0.003 and 0.005 percentage points depending on 
the analysed type of coverage. The effect decreases the more educated the electorate in the 
constituency is, and the overall effect is small, positive, and statistically insignificant. 
Heterogenous results are observed when separating the coverage by publication type and 
position taken with respect to the then upcoming referendum. A unit increase in the weighted 
articles variable that tabloid coverage supporting Remain decreased the Leave vote between 
0.672 and 0.9 percentage points, while an equivalent increase in the coverage variable for 
Leave supporting broadsheets increased the Leave vote between 0.1 and 0.3 percentage points. 
The coverage effects are stronger in the last six months before the referendum. Anti-EU 
coverage from Leave supporting tabloids also increased the Leave vote by around 0.8 
percentage points per one unit increase in the coverage variable. 
The work in the third chapter generalises the work of Besley and Prat (2006) analysing 
political media capture by bribing some or all media outlets in the event of an election. The 
most crucial item of generalisation which I introduce is that the challenger politician can 
observe any bribing by the incumbent politician to the media outlets and has an opportunity to 
make counter-offers. The most important novel finding is that under sufficiently general 
conditions, there exists one Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium for which total media capture never 
arises in equilibrium. The results also indicate that political interference in media markets is 
welfare reducing only if it is a monopsony. 
The final chapter decomposes differentials in wages and propensities to work a second 
job of nationals of countries which joined the European Union (EU) in 2004 relative to natives 
to analyse their integration in the British Labour Market, before and after their accession. This 
paper finds that at the mean migrants who arrived at least 5 years prior being better integrated 
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in all periods. In the 1994-2003 period, no statistically significant log wage gap is observed for 
migrant men, irrespective of whether they arrived in the UK at least five years prior. However, 
in the period immediately after accession, this study finds a statistically significant gap of 50%, 
whereas in the case of migrants present for at least 5 years the gap is statistically insignificant   
at 4%. In 2009-2013 this gap increases and becomes statistically significant for both migrant 
groups, indicating wage gaps relative to natives of 49% and 36% in the case of migrants present 
for less and more than 5 years respectively. At the bottom of the income distribution, the 
observed wage gap reduced from 59% before accession to 0.14% and 0.12% in the two periods 
after 2004, out of which 50% and 83% are explained by differences in characteristics. At the 
top, the gap increases from 10% and statistically insignificant before 2004 to 60% in both post-
accession periods, whereas the proportion explained by differences in characteristics decreases 
from 53% to 40%.The Quantile decomposition finds that joining the European Union improved 
the labour market outcomes of A10 nationals at the bottom of the wage distribution at the cost 
of creating a glass ceiling. The logit Oaxaca decomposition results reveal that migrants are 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
This thesis is composed of three papers in the spheres of political economy and media 
economics. The first and third papers are concerned with the relationship between the United 
Kingdom (UK) and the European Union, while the first and second are concerned with media 
economics. 
The first paper is concerned with one of the most significant recent political events, 
namely the 2016 UK European union membership referendum, colloquially known as the 
Brexit Referendum.  There is already a rich literature on the plausible factors which caused the 
Brexit vote. Particular attention was paid to economics and social factors. The study of Becker 
et al. (2017) uses a machine-learning method to determine what covariates best predict the 
Leave vote and the results underline that underlying socio-economic factors were important in 
predicting the vote to Leave. On the other hand, the local area’s exposure to the European 
Union was not a significant predictor, but Colantone and Stanig (2016) suggest that import 
competition from China had a causal effect on a region’s propensity to vote Leave in the 
referendum. Fetzer (2018) underlines the influence of austerity policies undertaken by previous 
governments  
Becker et al. (2017) note that there was a ‘disconnect between the key correlates of the 
vote outcome and the topics dominating the political debate’. Considerable attention was 
awarded to the role of media coverage in the period leading up to the referendum in influencing 
individual decisions to vote to Leave. To my knowledge, this paper is the first attempt to 
estimate the effect of media coverage intensity on the local level decision to vote Leave in the 
2016 referendum.  
The important question then becomes: Did the rhetoric used in newspapers by the Leave 
campaign in the six to twelve months before the EU referendum have an effect on the 
referendum result? In this paper I answer this question by evaluating the effects of the two main 
types of newspapers coverage, mainly used by the Leave campaign to portray the EU in an 
unfavourable light, coverage on migration with a focus on either crime or public resources, and 
more in general coverage on anti-EU topics. 
The main hypothesis examined in the first paper is that higher exposure to negative 
coverage about the EU makes the electorate more Eurosceptic and thus more likely to vote 
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Leave. Of particular interest is whether the negative coverage incited higher levels of Leave 
votes in areas more affected by government cuts and/or with lower levels of education.  
To the best of my knowledge, this is the first paper that evaluates the effect of written 
media on the outcome of the EU membership referendum in 2016. People do not generally 
access official statistics on crime and economic conditions related to EU and they usually form 
their beliefs on EU issues through the media. Newspapers are one of the main media sources 
providing such information. Data from the National Readership Survey (NRS) indicates that 
newspapers, although now less popular relative to other news sources, are still a significant 
source of news, with an estimated monthly reach of 47 million adults in the UK, which exceeds 
that of Google. Further literature indicates that newspapers are still one of the main sources of 
information about political and economic developments. Additionally, as argued in Murphy 
(2014), a measure of newspaper coverage can be a good proxy of other types of media 
coverage.  
Newspaper coverage can bias the beliefs of voters by reporting incorrect information, 
or by deliberately over-reporting news and information that support a viewpoint and under-
reporting or omitting to cover specific news and information that support a different viewpoint 
(see Williams and Dickinson (1993), Bjorvatn et al. (2015), Grigorieff et al. (2016), and 
Larreguy et al. (2016)). If newspapers had some information bias against or in favour of the 
EU Leave decision, then this bias might have had an effect on the final referendum result. 
Moore and Ramsay (2017) provide evidence of slanted news coverage in the context of the 
2016 EU referendum. In particular, they note that “both sides engage in mutual accusations of 
lying” and “highly partisan” reporting.  
Additionally, the information presented by news sources can strengthen a reader’s 
previously held expectations via confirmation bias if the message presented matches their prior 
belief. Importantly, theoretical evidence outlined in Rabin and Schrag (1999) indicates that an 
overconfident reader could dismiss evidence that is too different from their prior expectation. 
A voter who has a strong enough preconception could dismiss unbiased news entirely. On the 
other hand, a discerning reader would be able to realise the misleading effect present in some 
publications and update their expectation accordingly, suggesting voter sophistication in the 
news material they consume. 
The first main contribution of this paper is to provide an estimate of the effects of 
newspaper coverage of news about migrant crime, the economic impact of migration, and anti-
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EU topics on the percentage of Leave votes by exploiting variation in the newspapers’ coverage 
across constituencies. I find that newspaper over-coverage (under-coverage) of negative 
migrant related news lead to a higher (lower) Leave vote share, but only in constituencies with 
a low level of education. This seems to suggest a potential effect of over-coverage (under-
coverage) of news in favour of the Leave campaign on voters’ beliefs in low-educated areas.  
The second main contribution of this paper is to provide new insights on the effect of 
availability bias on the EU referendum results. I find evidence that newspaper coverage of 
migration related news in the 6 months before the EU referendum had a larger effect on voters 
than newspaper coverage in the 12 months before the EU referendum. This seems to suggest 
that voters formed their decision about what to vote in the EU referendum by giving more 
weight to most recent news and articles.   
The third main contribution of this paper is to evaluate whether the effect of newspaper 
coverage varies by publication type and stance (in support of or against leaving the EU). I find 
that coverage originating in broadsheets which favoured Remain did not have significant 
effects on the referendum vote. On the other hand, tabloids which supported Remain were 
successful at dissuading voters from voting Leave. I find also that coverage originating in 
broadsheets which supported Leave increased the Leave vote percentage. Anti-EU coverage is 
also found to be positive and statistically significant if originating in Leave-supporting tabloids, 
but the other two definitions are not. 
Given the results obtained in the first paper and those seen in the literature concerning 
the effect of media on electoral outcomes, the second paper in this thesis is focusing with the 
effects of political competition on the effectiveness of media capture. Given that media can 
influence elections, does political competition help or hinder the probability that media is 
captured in the first instance? 
Beginning at the end of the last century, the world experienced a wave of 
democratisation, and, in the context of former Iron Curtain countries, freer media markets. The 
democratisation trend was believed to lead to less censorship and biased media, as they were 
seen as the purview of autocratic regimes. However, Besley and Prat (2006, page 720) note 
that in a modern context, ‘despite the lack of old-fashioned pre-emptive censorship’ economic 
means are increasingly used to restrict media freedom in order to gain favourable coverage. 
Furthermore, Corduneanu-Huci and Hamilton (2018) show that media restriction via both 
censorship and economic means is an increasing trend, ‘affecting both democracies and 
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autocracies, with negative consequences for the overall quality of political institutions and civil 
liberties’. Given these results and the backsliding on media freedom outlined empirically in 
Corduneanu-Huci and Hamilton (2018), it becomes interesting to analyse whether the media 
and political competition together are sufficient to increase media transparency and voter 
welfare. A study analysing the role of potentially biased media in the presence of imperfectly 
informed electorates is a relevant and interesting avenue of research given the recent attention 
to the perceived role of fake news in affecting the outcomes of democratic elections and 
referenda. 
With respect to the origin of bias, two main categories are distinguished: demand side 
and supply side. The overall message is that media market competition hinders supply driven 
bias and exacerbates demand driven bias. There are two types of bias distinguished in the 
literature: (outright) distortion of fact and information filtering. Focusing on media slant, 
Mullainathan and Shleifer (2005), Baron (2006), Rudiger (2013), Sobrio (2013), and Várdy 
and Oliveros (2015) find that media competition does not alleviate bias, which in turn can lead 
to a suboptimal election result. The results of Besley and Prat (2006) and Anand et al. (2007) 
indicate that electoral outcomes improve with competition. Within this category, media slant 
can occur either via the demand side due to audience bias, or via the supply side due to the 
beliefs of the reporter or the reputational concerns of the editor. The closest papers to this study 
are those of Besley and Prat (2006) and Trombetta and Rossignoli (2020), who analyse political 
games of endogenous media capture. Both papers analyse the conditions under which media 
capture is feasible and desirable from the perspective of the incumbent, indicating that political 
media capture can occur despite media freedom. However, neither paper accounts for political 
competition and electoral spending laws, which could help or hinder media freedom. 
How can increased competition, both politically and within media market, lead to media 
suppression, media bias and dual information systems? Is voter welfare negatively affected? 
This paper proposes a novel theoretical approach that analyses the incentives of politicians and 
media outlets to misrepresent information to the electorate.  
This paper analyses whether political competition in capture and electoral standards 
help mitigate these effects and looks at the theoretical incentives of media suppression in more 
democratic settings, with novel results. This study aims to contribute to the burgeoning 
literature on the interplay between media, political outcomes, and the flow of information. The 
proposed model builds on the seminal paper of Besley and Prat (2006) and that of Trombetta 
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and Rossignoli (2020) in two ways. Firstly, it introduces an active challenger in the political 
game, effectively emulating a simple majority democratic election or referendum. Secondly, it 
extends the analysis to account for binding and non-binding electoral spending laws. However, 
unlike Trombetta and Rossignoli (2020) and Besley and Prat (2006), the results indicate that in 
pure strategy Perfect Bayesian Equilibria, media and political competition and electoral 
standards ensure that the true state of politicians is always revealed to a subset of the electorate. 
However, if the proportion of voters who actively seek political news is sufficiently large, full 
disclosure occurs in the media market even if both politicians are bad. The present model can 
be seen as a generalisation of the previous models as it collapses to that of Trombetta and 
Rossignoli (2020) if the politicians’ budgets are highly asymmetrical and there are no 
reputation concerns. With the additional assumption that the share of informed voters is zero, 
it collapses to the analysis of Besley and Prat (2006).  
One of the most contentious issues in the media in the run up to the 2016 referendum 
is whether incoming EU migrants are able to integrate in the British society and whether they 
are a strain on the public infrastructure. The final paper analyses the effect of EU membership 
on the integration of EU migrants, with a particular focus on the 2004 enlargement episode. 
Labour market discrimination and integration of immigrants are contentious issues in the UK, 
which has experienced a migrant growth from 6.4% to 13.4% between 1990 and 2017, 
according to the 2017 edition of the UN’s trend in immigrant stock. Previous literature such as 
Ottaviano and Peri (2012) suggests that migrant and native labour are not perfect substitutes 
and as a result different outcome in the labour market are observed for the two groups, whereas 
Dustmann, Glitz and Vogel (2010) and Clark and Drinkwater (2008) indicate that non-OECD 
migrants in the UK are relatively higher educated and better remunerated than their native 
counterparts. It is therefore important to ask to what extent is it possible for migrants to 
integrate in the UK labour market, and to analyse whether their labour market performance is 
fair given their characteristics. As migrants accumulate experience and social capital in the 
receiving country, their labour market outcomes are also expected to improve. Is this observed 
in the UK? 
In the final paper, I examine differences in labour market outcomes between UK natives 
and immigrants from 10 countries that joined the European Union in 2004 (hereafter also 
referred to as EU10 countries). In this context, the absence of wage gaps can be interpreted as 
a measure of the UK’s efficiency at attracting and integrating successful immigrants, whereas 
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the presence of a gap can indicate discrimination. The presence of wage gaps between natives 
and EU migrants can also give an indication of the extent to which the UK is integrated in the 
EU labour market.  
As a member of the European Union until 2020, the UK was bound by legislation 
surrounding the freedom of movement that outlaws discrimination of workers from member 
states. Therefore, it becomes interesting to analyse how changes in the EU membership in 2004 
for 10 European countries affected the degree of discrimination and integration in the UK 
labour market of immigrants from these countries. To assess such changes, I focus on the 2004 
EU membership enlargement and I carry out an empirical analysis on whether EU migrant-
native wage gaps exist and how they evolve after a country joins the EU.   
. In order to test this hypothesis, I propose focusing on the 2004 EU enlargement 
episode and analyse three periods, namely 1994-2003, 2004-2008 and 2009-2013. In particular, 
I focus on the observed wage differentials between native and EU10 migrants, both before and 
after accession and whether the integration of these migrants improves with time spent in the 
UK. I also analyse whether there is heterogeneity in observed wage differentials at different 
quantiles of the wage distribution in all three periods and whether they are affected by EU 
membership. I also focus on the probability of working a second job, which can be seen as an 
indication of short-term stays and unwillingness to fully integrate in the British labour market.  
Given these questions, the third paper makes the following contributions. Firstly, this study 
adds to the literature of the integration of migrant workers in the British labour market by using 
the Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition to estimate log wage differentials and ascertain to what 
extent they are motivated by differences in characteristics between the native and migrant 
populations. It is therefore important to analyse the explained part of the decomposition to 
understand to what extent the differentials are attributable to different characteristics 
distributions across nationalities. Furthermore, it analyses whether EU10 migrant men 
integration improves as they spend time in the UK, both before and in two periods after 
accession.  Secondly, this study proposes using the Logit-Oaxaca decomposition proposed by 
Fairlie (2005) to split the differences the probability of working a second job into explained 
and unexplained parts. Thirdly, it adopts an extension proposed by Firpo et al. (2007) to 
decompose the wage differentials at different quantiles on the wage distribution to analyse 
which subgroups are better integrated in the British labour market. 
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Chapter 2: An Assessment of the Effect of Migration Media Coverage on the European Union 
Referendum  
Section 2.1: Introduction 
Did the rhetoric used in newspapers by the Leave campaign in the six to twelve months 
before the EU referendum have an effect on the referendum result? In this paper I answer this 
question by evaluating the effects of the two main types of newspaper coverage, mainly used 
by the Leave campaign to portray the EU in an unfavourable light, coverage on migration with 
a focus on either crime or public resources, and more in general coverage on anti-EU topics. 
The main hypothesis examined in this study is that higher exposure to negative 
coverage about the EU makes the electorate more Eurosceptic and thus more likely to vote 
Leave. Of particular interest is whether the negative coverage incited higher levels of Leave 
votes in areas more affected by government cuts and/or with lower levels of education.  
To the best of my knowledge, this is the first paper that evaluates the effect of written 
media on the outcome of the EU membership referendum in 2016. People do not generally 
access official statistics on crime and economic conditions related to EU and they usually form 
their beliefs on EU issues through the media. Newspapers are one of the main media sources 
providing such information. Data from the National Readership Survey (NRS) indicates that 
newspapers, although now less popular relative to other news sources, are still a significant 
source of news, with newsbrands and magazines still having a monthly reach of 94% of 
individuals aged 15 or over in 2016.1 Newsworks, a marketing body for national newspapers, 
reports that written media has a monthly reach of 47 million adults in the UK, which exceeds 
that of Google. The prevalence of written media as a news source is also highlighted in studies 
such as Blinder and Krueger (2004) and Gerber et al. (2009) who suggest that newspapers are 
still one of the main information sources on economic issues such as wage growth and 
unemployment. Additionally, as argued in Murphy (2014), a measure of newspaper coverage 
can be a good proxy of other types of media coverage.  
Newspaper coverage can bias the beliefs of voters by reporting incorrect information, 
or by deliberately over-reporting news and information that support a viewpoint and under-
reporting or omitting to cover specific news and information that support a different viewpoint 
(see Williams and Dickinson (1993), Bjorvatn et al. (2015), Grigorieff et al. (2016), and 
Larreguy et al. (2016)). If newspapers had some information bias against or in favour of the 
 
1 Source: NRS PADD Apr 2016 – Mar 2017. 
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EU Leave decision, then this bias might have had an effect on the final referendum result. 
Moore and Ramsay (2017) provide evidence of slanted news coverage in the context of the 
2016 EU referendum. In particular, they note that “both sides engage in mutual accusations of 
lying” and “highly partisan” reporting.  
The first main contribution of this paper is to provide an estimate of the effects of 
newspaper coverage of news about migrant crime, the economic impact of migration, and anti-
EU topics on the percentage of Leave votes by exploiting variation in the newspapers’ coverage 
across constituencies. I find that newspaper over-coverage (under-coverage) of negative 
migrant related news lead to a higher (lower) Leave vote share, but only in constituencies with 
a low level of education. This seems to suggest a potential effect of over-coverage (under-
coverage) of news in favour of the Leave campaign on voters’ beliefs in low-educated areas.  
Additionally, the information presented by news sources can strengthen a reader’s 
previously held expectations via confirmation bias if the message presented matches their prior 
belief. Importantly, theoretical evidence outlined in Rabin and Schrag (1999) indicates that an 
overconfident reader could dismiss evidence that is too different from their prior expectation. 
A voter who has a strong enough preconception could dismiss unbiased news entirely. On the 
other hand, a discerning reader would be able to realise the misleading effect present in some 
publications and update their expectation accordingly, explaining why some voters are less 
prone to media persuasion. Furthermore, voters in the EU referendum might have formed their 
beliefs about the EU based on ‘what comes to mind’, for example overweighing information 
and events covered by newspapers in the period just before the referendum and underweighing 
more distant news and events. This type of bias is known in the literature as availability bias 
(see Tversky and Kahneman (1973) Kosse (2013), Ferraz and Finnan (2008), and Grigorieff et 
al. (2016)) and it may imply that newer coverage may offset the effect of past coverage. This 
would imply that the effect of news would be much stronger the closer the date of publication 
is to the EU referendum.  
The second main contribution of this paper is to provide new insights on the effect of 
availability bias on the EU referendum results. I find evidence that newspaper coverage of 
migration related news in the 6 months before the EU referendum had a larger effect on voters 
than newspaper coverage in the 12 months before the EU referendum. This seems to suggest 
that voters formed their decision about what to vote in the EU referendum by giving more 
weight to most recent news and articles.   
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A third main contribution of this paper is to evaluate whether the effect of newspaper 
coverage varies by publication type and stance (in support of or against leaving the EU). I find 
that coverage originating in broadsheets which favoured Remain did not have significant 
effects on the referendum vote. On the other hand, tabloids which supported Remain were 
successful at dissuading voters from voting Leave. I find also that coverage originating in 
broadsheets which supported Leave increased the Leave vote percentage. Anti-EU coverage is 
also found to be positive and statistically significant if originating in Leave-supporting tabloids, 
but the other two definitions are not. 
The empirical analysis is based on area (constituency) level data from the 2011 census, 
the British Election Study (BES), the Office of National Statistics (ONS), Local Media Works 
which provides data on newspaper circulation and distribution, and an international database 
of national and local newspapers articles called Nexis. By combining the last two datasets I 
derived new measures of newspaper coverage which better capture the type of published 
articles that might have affected the EU beliefs of readers and which better measure the 
coverage intensity at level of constituency by considering the circulation of each newspaper 
and the population present in each constituency. This improves upon the article count measures 
utilised in previous literature (see e.g. Lamla and Lein (2008) and van der Wiel (2009)).  
The results indicate that overall, differences in media coverage intensities had a small, 
positive, and statistically insignificant effect on the constituency level decision to vote Leave. 
However, the effects are heterogeneous, with a small, statistically significant and positive effect 
on the percentage of EU leave votes mainly in constituencies in the bottom quarter of the 
education qualification distribution, where a one unit increase in the coverage variable 
increased the Leave vote percentage between 0.003 and 0.005 percentage points depending on 
the analysed type of coverage. The effect decreases the more educated the electorate in the 
constituency is, and the overall effect is small, positive and statistically insignificant. 
Heterogeneous results are observed when separating the coverage by publication type and 
position taken with respect to the then upcoming referendum. A unit increase in the weighted 
articles variable that tabloid coverage supporting Remain decreased the Leave vote between 
0.672 and 0.9 percentage points, while an equivalent increase in the coverage variable for 
Leave supporting broadsheets increased the Leave vote between 0.1 and 0.3 percentage points. 
The coverage effects are stronger in the last six months before the referendum. Anti-EU 
coverage from Leave supporting tabloids also increased the Leave vote by around 0.8 
percentage points per one unit increase in the coverage variable. 
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One potential drawback of this study is the possible presence of endogeneity. This can 
occur if the share of leave votes is correlated with unobserved characteristics that also affect 
the level of weighted (negative) coverage. One potential factor is Euroscepticism, the inherent 
dissatisfaction of the electorate towards the EU, which would in turn affect the public demand 
for negative coverage. For example, if the electorate has inherent Euroscepticism, it would 
affect both the resulting vote leave percentage and the demand for negative coverage prior to 
and at the time of the referendum. As a result, this affects not only the overall coverage 
variables, but also how this coverage is split across publication types. This creates a potential 
endogeneity issue, which in turn causes a bias in the OLS estimates. A measure of local 
Euroscepticism, detailed in the data section, is included in all regressions as a robustness check.   
The remainder of the chapter is structured as follows: Section 2 provides a review of 
previous relevant literature, Section 3 describes the dataset and media variable construction 
details, Section 4 outlines the empirical strategy, while Section 5 presents a discussion of the 
results and concludes. 
Section 2.2: Literature Review 
Two main methodologies are employed in the economic literature concerned with how 
exposure to the media affects decisional outcomes. The first involves using survey data to 
ascertain the effects of media exposure on a plethora of outcomes such as the respondents’ fear 
of crime, attitudes towards immigration, or the effects of corruption uncovered by the media 
on voting outcomes. Studies that use this methodology include those by Williams and 
Dickinson (1993), Banerjee et al. (2011), Kasper, Kogler and Kirchler (2015), Bjorvatn et al. 
(2015), and Facchini et al. (2016), among others. The second methodology involves quasi-
experiments using variation in media availability over time. This strand of literature explores 
mainly exogenous variation in television or radio signal strength created by geographical 
features, as seen in Enikopolov et al. (2011) Durante et al. (2009, 2015), Bursztyn and Cantoni 
(2014), or due to staggered introduction, as observed in Jacobsen (2011) or Durante and Knight 
(2009). 
Noteworthy variations of the latter methodology consist of the studies of Ferraz and 
Finan (2008) and Larreguy et al. (2014). The former study uses variation created by the 2003 
Brazilian anti-corruption programme in which municipalities were randomly selected for 
expenditure auditing, alongside the presence of radio in the municipality. Their results indicate 
that media coverage diminished the chances that a corrupt mayor would be elected, as well as 
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increasing the chances that an ‘honest’ mayor would be re-elected. Interestingly, the results 
here also indicate voter discretion, inasmuch mayors with populistic platforms were more 
negatively affected by the presence of the media.  
Larreguy et al. (2014) find similar results in Mexico, outlining the relative importance 
of local media in changing voters’ perception of the credibility and competence of politicians 
seeking re-election. In addition to the findings of Ferraz and Finan (2008), Larreguy et al. 
(2014)’s results indicate that redirecting resources that are meant for the poor has especially 
large effects for the Populist Party, attesting to voter sophistication in the form of punishing 
ideological dishonesty. However, media coverage of the malfeasance of a candidate who was 
based in another municipality is found to have no effect, indicating the relative importance of 
local media in changing voter perception. These two studies indicate that the media influences 
political outcomes through the distribution of information and that the electorate has the 
capacity to filter media bias to a certain extent. This becomes relevant in this context since the 
analysis of Moore and Ramsay (2017) reveals media slant in the coverage leading up to the EU 
referendum particularly on migration and economic concerns.  
A similar study was conducted by DellaVigna and Kaplan (2007) in the United States. 
The authors analyse the impact of the introduction of Fox News on the Republican vote share 
and vote switch in the 1996 and 2000 US Presidential elections. The analysis suggests that the 
pro-Republican news station had a positive effect on the vote share for Republican candidates 
as well as on voter turnout. Additionally, DellaVigna and Kaplan (2007) estimate that Fox 
News convinced 5% to 30% of the non-Republican audience to vote for the party. The authors 
put forward three possible explanations. Their first contention is that towns were becoming 
more conservative in areas where Fox News was first introduced, picking up political trends; 
however, the authors supply evidence to discredit this explanation. Secondly, they propose that 
initially, voters were unsure about the bias of Fox News, resulting in a temporary effect on 
voting. The observed effect does not disappear in 2004, which indicates that the availability of 
Fox News is an insufficient justification. Their third explanation is that viewers are subject to 
nonrational persuasion, altering their beliefs and voting behaviour; this is of particular interest 
as it is also a hypothesis present in this study. Another plausible explanation is that, like in 
Durante et al. (2015), exposure to Fox News has been continuous until re-evaluation, which 
does not allow the effects to dissipate. 
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Durante et al. (2015) examine the staggered introduction in 1985 of Mediaset, a 
commercial station owned by Silvio Berlusconi, on citizens’ attitudes and ultimately on their 
voting decisions. The media variable is Mediaset availability, based on the location and 
strength of the transmitters. The results indicate that areas exposed to Mediaset displayed 
higher electoral support for Berlusconi’s party in 1994, an effect which lasts for two decades. 
Using survey data, the authors bring evidence that this effect was stronger for individuals who 
watched TV more, with older people becoming more likely to watch pro-Berlusconi news via 
increased attachment to the network. Conversely, younger individuals became less interested 
in politics and more prone to populist messages. The continuous coverage present in this study 
precludes the possibility of availability bias attenuation but highlights the electoral effect of 
information.  
In line with the work of DellaVigna and Kaplan (2007), Banerjee et al. (2011) indicate 
that media coverage is correlated with higher voting turnout and a higher propensity to cast an 
‘informed’ vote. However, the results of Dutta et al. (2013) underline that the media induced a 
difference between actual and perceived outcomes, indicating that unfavourable media 
coverage may compound the potential effects of migrant shares and net migration. The 
resulting bias indicates a possible disparity in effects between the expectations formed due to 
media exposure and official figures on unemployment, crime, or growth figures. 
An interesting study on the persistence of availability bias and the effects of coverage 
of economic issues is that of Doms and Morin (2004). Their results indicate that consumers 
update their expectations about the economy more frequently in times of high media coverage, 
that the resulting expectation stickiness is countercyclical, and that expectation changes are 
short-lived. The results not only indicate the presence of availability bias, but also that the 
effects of the media depend on reporting intensity.  
The studies of Williams and Dickinson (1993) and Tversky and Kahneman (1973) are 
relevant to this study in the sense of both information bias and availability bias. Williams and 
Dickinson (1993) argue that the media is a contributor in consumers’ expectation formation. 
More precisely, reports of crime and increased criminality increased individuals’ fear of crime, 
although the effect was dependent upon the reporting style of the paper. This indicates both a 
fundamental information bias as well as an underlying availability bias, as more recent papers 
had a greater effect on consumers, as introduced in Tversky and Kahneman (1973). The 
analyses in both studies indicate that the media has a strong effect in influencing the population, 
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and that media tone rather than media coverage is relatively more important when analysing 
its effects. In this context, it suggests that electorates may be prone to media persuasion that 
would alter voting intentions.  
More recently, Facchini et al. (2016) used a large-scale Japanese experiment to 
demonstrate that exposing citizens to material pertaining to the positive social and economic 
effects of immigration combats the often-antagonistic public sentiment towards immigrants 
and leads to increased support for a more open immigration policy. The effects were 
heterogeneous across the population and, in line with the results of Williams and Dickinson 
(1993), heterogeneous in tone. These effects were also present at re-evaluation, indicating a 
potential policy measure that could quell scepticism towards immigration and potentially 
populism. The results from the study by DellaVigna et al. (2011) propose similar results with 
the opposite effect, indicating that Serbian radio transmissions in Croatia were correlated with 
higher incidences of nationalism. This outlines a potential channel through which a media 
induced distortionary effect on decision making can occur. 
A counterpoint to these papers is the study of Gerber et al. (2009), whose findings 
suggest that exposure to the media is more important than media tone in changing readers’ 
perceptions. The authors’ survey results indicate that despite the ‘media slant’, the qualitative 
results were similar for the two newspapers that expressed significant differences in reporting 
style. The results also show that voters filtered out the media bias, effectively negating the non-
informative role of media coverage, providing evidence of voter sophistication in filtering 
biased information.  
The studies of Burstzyn and Cantoni (2014), Eisensee, and Stromberg (2007) also find 
media effects on various outcomes to be short lived. The latter contends that the media effect 
may be transitory since their results indicate that natural disasters are more likely to receive 
monetary relief when the competition for US news time is low, due to the American public 
being more likely to notice the contributing organisations’ charitable behaviour. Since media 
coverage influences public outcry, this result is in alignment with the availability bias 
hypothesis.  
Bjorvatn et al. (2015) suggest that exposure to certain media can make individuals more 
financially literate and more interested in entrepreneurship but provides mixed evidence on the 
persistence of media effects. The study of Hovland et al. (1949), cited in Prat and Stromberg 
(2013) notes the presence of a ‘sleeper effect’, which manifests itself in the form of gradually 
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reverting to one’s original position after being exposed to a persuasive message.  This result is 
similar to the hypothesis of Tversky and Kahneman (1973) who argue that more recent and 
more common information is more relevant in opinion formation.  
Economic literature indicates that exposure to the media has an impact on decision 
making and on individual behaviour, but that this effect can be transitory and offset by newer 
coverage. 
Section 2.3: Data  
Section 2.3.1: Sources 
For the present study, I use data from Version 2.1 of the 2015 British Election Study 
Constituency Results. This dataset is also enhanced with demographic data from the 2011 
census, including total population, ethnicity, country of birth, religion, and socio-economic 
classification. The population data from the census is used to define variables in the 
constituency controls and migrant controls categories defined below. Vote Leave shares in the 
EU membership referendum were constructed and added to the BES dataset. In addition, this 
analysis uses data from the Office of National Statistics (ONS) to add constituency level data 
on, net migration, gross value added, wage median and unemployment levels, and regional 
levels of public spending and investment from the EU. Net migration data, which is used to 
construct a variable detailing the net migration flow, constitutes the final variable in the 
migration control set, while the remainder set of variables are used to construct economic 
indicator variables. The latter variable group accounts for relative economic performance 
between the constituencies, which may have contributed to determining the percentage of 
Leave votes. Intuitively, a relatively ‘worse off’ constituency is expected to have a higher 
propensity to vote to Leave as suggested in Hobolt (2016). In this context, changes in 
unemployment and wage median are at constituency level and are defined as changes from the 
year prior to the referendum. The change in public spending variable is defined in the same 
period, but is only available at NUTS-1 aggregation level, which comprises of several 
constituencies.  Changes in EU funding are defined at the same aggregation level but are 
defined as changes in the allocated regional budgets from between the 2007-2014 and 2014-
2020 periods. Gross Value Added (GVA) is a measure of the level of economic activity in a 
region, available at the level of NUTS-3 regions.  
To construct the media variables, this study uses Nexis and the Newspaper Database 
(JICREG), offered by Local Media Works. The former is an online database of regional and 
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national newspaper articles from a set of countries, including the United Kingdom. It allows 
the retrieval of all newspaper articles published in the UK fitting some specified search criteria. 
Relevant article searches depend on using keywords linked by logical operators, country of 
publication, whether regional newspapers are included, and period. To improve precision, 
relevant search terms can be constricted to be in either the headline or the main text, and all 
articles pertaining to events or reports outside the UK are eliminated. The second database used 
in the media construction variable is the Newspaper Database (JICREG), offered by Local 
Media Works, which offers information about both the titles and geographic circulation of a 
newspaper. Based on information from these two databases, it is possible to construct variables 
detailing the number of applicable articles to which constituencies were exposed during the 
chosen period. Due to circulation data unavailability for Northern Ireland, the present study 
uses the remaining 632 General Election (GE) constituencies in England, Scotland and Wales. 
A constituency is defined as an electoral area that elects one Member of Parliament (MP) at 
each General Election. 
Section 2.3.2: Media variable construction 
For the analysis, this study uses the behavioural economic assumption of myopic 
expectation building motivated by previous literature; in other words, a disproportionate 
emphasis on information encountered nearer the present. Since the average voting citizen does 
not have access to the official police records of crime, they form subjective expectations based 
on available data. More recent articles are expected to be relatively more important in shaping 
individual decisions, and as such articles published closer to the 23rd of June 2016 are expected 
to have a stronger effect on electors’ voter decisions, as suggested by Burstzyn and Cantoni 
(2014), Tversky and Kahneman (1973), and DellaVigna and Kaplan (2007). Because of myopic 
expectation building and the fact that the referendum was announced on the 27th of May 2015, 
the present analysis focuses mainly on media coverage in the year prior to the referendum. 
The count variable, as used in previous literature, is given by: 𝑀𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑖 = ∑ 𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑗𝑗∈𝑁𝑖                                        [Eq. 1] 
where i denotes the constituency, 𝑁𝑖 denotes the set of newspapers distributed in constituency 
i during the analysed period, j denotes a newspaper,  𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑗 is the number of articles 
published by newspaper j in a specific topic found by Nexis according to a search criteria,  and 
Mediavariablei measures the total number of articles published in constituency i in a particular 
topic. I will consider articles published on topics portraying the EU in a negative manner and 
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more in particular articles about migrant crime and about economic consequences of migration. 
Similar article count variables have been used by Lamla and Lein (2008), van der Wiel (2009) 
and Murphy (2014).   
A drawback with this Mediavariablei measure is that it allocates the same weight to all 
newspapers distributed in a constituency regardless of their relative local circulation figures. 
This overestimates the effect of regional, smaller but spatially fragmented publications. 
Additionally, some regional newspapers have a wide geographical distribution despite the 
focus on their coverage being relatively small. While the majority of relevant articles originate 
in national newspapers with high distribution, the majority of the variation in constituency 
coverage derives from regional newspapers. For this reason, I introduce a new Mediavariablei 
measure that take account of different level of circulation of a newspaper by constituency 
defined as follows:   𝑊𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑀𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑖 = ∑ 𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑗∗𝑐𝑖𝑟𝑐𝑖,𝑗𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑖,1000𝑠 𝑗∈𝑁𝑖                    [Eq. 2] 
where 𝑐𝑖𝑟𝑐𝑖,𝑗 denotes the total number of copies of newspaper j distributed in constituency i, 
which can be thought as a proxy for readership in the constituency, and 𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑖,1000𝑠 denotes 
the size of the electorate (in units of 1000) in the constituency i in 2015. The size of the 
electorate is used instead of the total population for two reasons. Firstly, eligibility criteria for 
the 2015 general election are identical to that of the referendum one year later. This, by 
definition, excludes the share of the population for whom the effect of media coverage is 
irrelevant due to institutional constraints which prevent them from voting. Secondly, due to 
data constraints, total population size data originates in the 2011 census, but the electorate size 
data matches populations in 2015. These two reasons render the size of the electorate in 2015 
a better approximation of the size of the constituency population who could have voted in the 
referendum than the total population measured at the 2011 census. One caveat on the second 
measure is to account for the populations of different constituencies to be relatively better 
informed or more up to date relative to others, in which case the first version of the weighted 
variable would partly pick up positive correlation between more qualified electorates and 
remain votes. Analysis using the unweighted media variables can be found in Appendix A2, 
with results listed in Tables 2.10 and 2.11. 
To explain the share of Leave votes at constituency level I will use the 𝑊𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑀𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑖 as my main explanatory variable to capture the effect of 
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newspaper coverage on specific topics but always controlling also for the level of readership 
at constituency level using the following measure:  𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝𝑖 = ∑ 𝑐𝑖𝑟𝑐𝑖,𝑗𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑖,1000𝑠𝑗∈𝑁𝑖   .                 [Eq.3] 
I will consider three different specific definitions of media variables using equation (2) to 
derive a weighted count of the number of articles on the following three different topics: 
• migrant crime and crime involving migrants; 
• migrant induced resource constraints, including alleged pressure on public services 
such as schooling and the NHS, ‘benefit scrounging’, etc.; 
• anti-EU sentiment, due to socio-economic reasons or concerning alleged loss of border 
control/sovereignty associated with continued EU membership.  
 
The delimitation outlined above stems from the main arguments used by the Leave 
campaign in the period leading up to the referendum and is based on the review presented in 
Moore and Ramsay (2016). For the construction of the variables, migration concerns are split 
into two categories: crime, and public resource constraints. Moore and Ramsay (2016) point 
out that migration coverage prior to the referendum was overwhelmingly negative in all 
categories. Separating coverage in this fashion allows the analysis of the effect of variation in 
differing types of content and their relative effects. The definitions for each variable are given 
below and alternative definitions for the migrant crime category along with corresponding 
results are found in the appendix A1. 
 
The methodology employed in devising the keywords is based on a linguistic approach 
in which relevant keywords, or combinations thereof, are used to identify the articles of interest 
as well as the style of content. Here, as in the other work exemplified below, the negative focus 
of the article is ensured by the combination of negative keywords and the subject focus of the 
study. This method is applicable to other fields such as health economics, as observed and 
exemplified in Nagelhout et al. (2011) and Niederdeppe (2010), law (Garber et Bower (1999), 
and others. The approach used in this study also appears in economic literature such as Lamla 
and Lein (2008), van der Wiel (2009), Murphy (2014), and McAuliffe et al. (2017) who employ 
specific wordings in order to capture the sentiment of their relevant articles. In particular, 
Lamla and Lein (2008) use terminology such as ‘expensive euro’ or ‘teuro’ in order to search 
for and distinguish articles in which the introduction of the euro currency was blamed for rising 
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inflation, with a specifically negative outlook. The study of van der Wiel (2009) employs a 
similar strategy, constructing variables indicating the number of relevant articles published 
weekly containing pertinent terms in the headline or introduction respectively as well as 
combinations in the headline, but does not make distinctions regarding the tone of the articles.  
The study of Murphy (2014) also uses the LexisNexis database and employs a similar 
strategy to this paper in order to identify news reporting cases in which teachers were either 
accused of or investigated for misconduct. The author uses the word ‘teacher’ to pinpoint the 
focus of the coverage, and then various keyword alternatives suggesting differing formulations 
in which the idea of being accused and/or under investigation could be expressed. Furthermore, 
due to the focus of his paper, further keywords are added to identify whether the teacher was 
in a union, but other relevant information such as the gender of the teacher and what level they 
were teaching was inferred from reading the articles.  
For the present study, a list of relevant keywords was drafted covering each issue as 
exhaustively as possible based on the examples of headlines provided in Moore and Ramsay 
(2016). In order to avoid false positives in the search results, the main keywords were linked 
with identifiers found in the first string. In the case of all variables, the first set of keywords 
aims to ensure that the article is specifically referring to migrants or migration in general and 
refers to differing formulations in which newspapers may refer to a non-native.  
One potential weakness of this definition is that the nationality of the culprit may be 
used instead of a variation of the word migrant, however, the search criteria used still uncovers 
articles which match this description. The second keyword string in the first definition is more 
restrictive, requiring the keywords to be found in the headline, ensuring that the focus of the 
article is indeed the required topic and it includes variation of nouns and phrases commonly 
associated with the subject. In the case of the definition of the definition of resource constraints 
resulting from migration, the second keyword string attempts to capture formulations which 
portray migrants or migration in general as a strain on public services, in particular the National 
Health Service (NHS). The third string of keywords used in this definition follows a similar 
intuition. . The United Kingdom index is added to ensure that the articles uncover coverage of 
economic pressure of migration on the British public infrastructure only. The keyword 
codebook exemplified above was obtained through iterative modifications aimed at 
encompassing all formulations in which the negative news could be phrased, based on the 
report of Moore and Ramsay (2016). The codebook may not necessarily be comprehensive, but 
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it was expanded to account for a majority of possible combinations and phrases. In line with 
previous literature, the results were checked to ensure the validity of the search. 
The keywords used to construct the main set of media coverage variables are detailed 
in Appendix A1. The keywords for the crime are included in the keywords for the anti-EU 
sentiment because crime is one of the reasons for which anti-EU sentiment is expressed.  
Two alternative keyword specifications are tested in the case of the migrant crime 
coverage to check the validity of the main keyword codebook. The first alternative definition 
aims to narrow the search to articles in which migrants are tried and found guilty, and to filter 
out mere allegations of criminal activity. This is in line with previous literature involving 
coverage of crime, such as work by van der Wiel (2009), Nagelhout et al. (2014), and Murphy 
(2014), who focus on creating relevant categories. Therefore, the second set of search strings 
is aimed at narrowing down coverage of migrant crime to only cases in which a migrant is 
convicted and/or imprisoned. Since in these articles the guilt of the migrant has been 
established, a reader whose perception would be affected negatively by such coverage would 
find such articles more relevant. The first keyword string refers to differing formulations in 
which newspapers may refer to a non-native, while the last second string aims to capture 
coverage in which crime or criminality may be reported. The second search string in the first 
alternative definition string attempts to narrow down the search to instances in which the guilt 
of the culprit is verified, as opposed to the first definition which does not make this distinction. 
The first two strings are relatively less stringent and can be found in the main text of the article. 
It can be expected that an article may omit the guilty status and or the nationality of the culprit 
in the headline. The third keyword string is more restrictive, requiring the keywords to be found 
in the headline, ensuring that the focus of the article is indeed fixed on crime and it includes 
variation of possible crimes and nomenclatures for persons engaging in them. This variation 
has two potential advantages. Firstly, if negative coverage of migrant crime affects voting 
intentions in respect of the EU membership referendum through fear of crime, its increased 
relevance would better capture this effect, similar to the literature listed above. Secondly, its 
formulation is aimed specifically at ensuring that the origin of the crime is not a native person. 
As in the original keyword formulation, a plausible weakness of this definition is that the 
nationality of the culprit may be used instead a variation of the word migrant, but the search 
still uncovers articles which match this description. These alternative specifications and their 
results can be found in Appendix A.3.  
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On the other hand, the third search imitates the concept of a ‘brute force search’ from 
computer science. The aim is to list all plausible word combinations which express the link 
between a crime and migrants or migration. In particular, the second alternative definition 
systematically tallies all the elements in the Cartesian product of the set of keywords from the 
first two strings of previous definitions. The logical link between the products ensures the 
search returns articles which feature at least one element in the Cartesian product. The strength 
of this definition is that it ensures, by construction, the exclusion of articles in which the 
migrant is the victim of the crime. Although intuitively appealing, this approach has the 
disadvantage of being inefficient in the context of higher complexity queries such as written 
language where certain combination would be superfluous due to unnatural speech. 
Additionally, the complexity of the resulting ‘brute-force’ keyword search increases 
exponentially with the complexity of the previous two keyword searches. Since generating all 
the plausible word combinations in which migrant crime may be referred to is implausible, the 
resulting variable is more likely an imprecise proxy of total coverage. Appendix A3 presents 
alternative formulations for the media variables on the coverage of migrant crimes and their 
similar) corresponding results.  
Furthermore, overall media coverage variables can be split into broadsheet, tabloid, and 
regional. This division is motivated by the results of Williams and Dickinson (1993), who find 
that the self-reported fear of crime effects was stronger in the case of ‘tabloid’ newspapers, 
which also displayed a greater propensity to cover crime and to cover it in a more sensationalist 
fashion. Since the original variables included all three categories, their estimated coefficient is 
likely capturing an average effect, with a stronger effect for tabloids and weaker for 
broadsheets. This paper uses the classification between tabloids and broadsheets of Bednarek 









Broadsheets Tabloids Regionals 
Daily Telegraph Daily Mail Publications with limited 
spatial distribution 
Sunday Telegraph The Mail on Sunday 
The Times Daily Express 
Sunday Times Sunday Express 
Financial Times The Sun 
The Guardian The Sun on Monday 
The Observer Daily Mirror 
The Independent (until the 
26th of March 2016) 
Sunday Mirror 
 Sunday People 
 Daily Star 
 Morning Star 
 
The delimitation outlined above accounts only for reporting style, but not for stated 
positions. The newspapers can be further split by their editorial position in relationship to the 
referendum choice. According to Firmstone (2016), The Guardian, The Mirror, The 
Independent, The Times and Financial Times have stated support for remain; while Leave was 
supported by The Sun, The Daily Mail, Daily Express, and Daily Telegraph. The Sunday 
editions followed the same line as the main publication with two notable exceptions: The Mail 
on Sunday which supported remain, and the Sunday Times which supported Leave. Further to 
the publications mentioned in Firmstone (2016), The Observer, Morning Star and Daily Star 
also explicitly stated their position, with the former backing remain and the latter two 
supporting Leave. This allows grouping tabloids and broadsheet newspapers in four categories 
depending on their position on the referendum, accounting for reporting style heterogeneity. 
Section 2.3.3: Summary statistics  
Summary statistics for the main variables are detailed in Table 2.1. All coverage 
variables presented here are weighted. 
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Table 2.1: Summary Statistics of media coverage variables and Leave votes 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Vote Leave percent 632 52.11407 11.40347 18.48123 74.96078 
Weighted Migrant crime coverage 
Migrant crime articles 1 year 632 738.8511 386.172 126.1288 1944.349 
Migrant crime articles 6 months 632 477.2277 261.5479 79.6209 1316.427 
Weighted Resource constraint coverage 
Resource constraint articles 1 
year 
632 493.5794 251.5361 85.85534 1284.373 
Resource constraint articles 6 m 632 318.463 172.124 45.24339 847.438 
Weighted Aggregate anti-EU coverage 
Aggregate coverage articles 1 
year 
632 427.7436 238.7579 58.54731 1170.73 
Aggregate coverage articles 6 
months  
632 252.9924 139.8663 34.95857 685.8712 
Coverage in the last six months before the 2015 General Election 
Weighted Migrant crime coverage 
Migrant crime  632 242.82 135.5237 39.24323 685.7206 
Regional coverage 632 .6372705 .5487861 .2638319 5.234414 
Weighted Resource constraint coverage 
Resource constraint coverage 632 117.4623 66.09668 18.98097 335.5742 






Table 2.1.1: Summary Statistics of media coverage variables and Leave votes (continuation) 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Broadsheet supporting Leave 
 
Migrant crime articles 1 year 632 115.6089    68.18404 7.819592 290.6104 
Migrant crime articles 6 months 632 62.86246 37.61009 2.879936 155.9359 
Aggregate coverage articles 1 
year 
632 69.19222 40.79668 6.185204 181.4025 
Aggregate coverage articles 6 
months  
632 38.3419     22.34291 3.948822 100.1305 
Resource constraint articles 1 
year 
632 51.41028 30.49804 3.388902 130.8966 
Resource constraint articles 6 m 632 35.26233 20.9185 2.284552 89.69765 
Broadsheet supporting Remain  
Migrant crime articles 1 year 632 303.3806 221.9983 42.08141 1068.551 
Migrant crime articles 6 months 632 201.9173 163.713 26.87609 773.1436 
Aggregate coverage articles 1 
year 
632 168.9584 133.3664 18.51411 629.3856 
Aggregate coverage articles 6 
months  
632 120.1814 91.81594 12.23505 432.6766 
Resource constraint articles 1 
year 
632 159.5925 136.2441 15.92887 635.2037 
Resource constraint articles 6 m 632 109.8156 90.55837 10.29046 424.5381 
Tabloids supporting Leave 
 
Migrant crime articles 1 year 632 305.8619 112.8783 73.17387 661.2477 
Migrant crime articles 6 months 632 203.7952 73.49953 49.42139 435.9189 
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Aggregate coverage articles 1 
year 
632 181.7865 75.42665 33.27156 412.6098 
Aggregate coverage articles 6 
months  
632 126.5895 53.49541 22.28644 289.9303 
Resource constraint articles 1 
year 
632 257.489     99.9897 57.01041 566.3782 
Resource constraint articles 6 m 632 173.2691 72.11565 32.54597 391.4078 
Tabloids supporting Remain 
 
Migrant crime articles 1 year 632 14.43221 5.154451 3.300129 29.97733 
Migrant crime articles 6 months 632 9.154418 4.032874 0.632659 19.98489 
Aggregate coverage articles 1 
year 
632 7.606239 3.400746 0.451899 16.65408 
Aggregate coverage articles 6 
months  
632 132.6745 55.72814 22.64796 303.2535 
Resource constraint articles 1 
year 
632 11.00576 4.219103 1.830824 23.31571 











Table 2.2: Summary statistics of other variables 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Constituency Controls 
 
Constituency Readership 632 0.673264 0.317043 0.273459 2.201388 
Share of people aged 30 to 44  632 20.27771 2.751368 13.99852 31.75177 
Share of people aged 45 to 59 632 19.71651 2.203759 11.45902 24.13966 
Share of people age over 60 632 20.69523 4.755848 7.20494 35.01723 
Population density 632 20.22218 25.65448 0.055717 146.3846 
Male share 632 49.07457 0.804575 46.8641 53.04909 
Share of married people  632 33.34806 5.772054 14.63279 46.32761 
Share individuals with 
qualification level at least 4, 2011 
Census 
632 26.74864 8.319327 12.06501 57.39058 
Migration Controls 
Share of Pre-2004 EU 
immigrants 
632 1.503952 1.482931 0.325282 14.04585 
 
Share of Post 2004 EU 
immigrants 
632 1.818318 1.688463 0.16075 11.86967 
Share of non-EU immigrants  632 7.853686 8.611992 0.981044 47.39812 
Net migration in the last 5 years  632 5.304484 5.938312 -1.989 30.983 
Economic indicators 
Unemployment rate, census 2011 632 4.373037 1.421444 1.837399 9.526676 
Decrease in unemployment rate 
(2015-16) 
632 0.060177 0.292878 -1.35075 1.251096 
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Decrease in EU funding (% 
2007-14 to 2014-2020) 
632 -14.4383 30.81162 -90 29.16667 
Change in public spending 
(2015-16 %) 
632 1.157129 1.660864 -0.55899 5.880651 
GVA per head (£ 000s) 632 24.30064 18.84479 13.411 292.855 
Change in wage median (2015-
16 %) 
632 -2.51502 4.963389 -22.1532 14.85149 
 
Data in Table 2.1 above suggests the presence of variability within the constructed 
media coverage variables and the constituency level Leave vote shares. The Leave vote 
displays a mean of 52.1% and a standard deviation of 11.4 percent, while overall 401 
constituencies had a majority of Leave votes.  In absolute terms, media coverage relating to 
migration is the most prominent. In the case of weighted migrant crime variables, the measure 
of article coverage involving migrants and crime displays a smaller mean of 738.85 but a 
considerably larger standard deviation of 386.17 is observed. As expected, coverage about 
migration pressure on the British resources is also extensive, but less so than that of crime, with 
a mean of 493.57 weighted articles per constituency in the year prior to the referendum. 
Shortening the time span to 6 months reduces means and standard deviations in all variable 
categories. It is worth noting that an increase in the intensity of coverage was observed in the 
last 6 months compared to the 6 to 12-month period prior to the referendum, which indicates 
an increase in the relative intensity of relevant coverage. Summary statistics of the weighted 
media variables and constituency readership by newspaper can be found in Table 2.15 in the 
appendix..  
Data in Table 2.2 presents the summary statistics for the main explanatory variables 
used in the analysis below. People aged 15 or older at the 2011 census are considered for this 
study since they would have reached the minimum age of 18 at the time of the referendum. All 
age groups display similar means of roughly 20% of the population and 2% standard deviations, 
but the oldest band display higher standard deviations of nearly 5%. Three measures of migrant 
population are used based on whether the migrant is a member of an EU country, which in turn 
is split based on whether the country joined prior the 2004 EU enlargement. The shares of both 
categories of EU migrants display similar mean and standard deviations of roughly 1.8 and 
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1.5% respectively, while the shares of non-EU migrants display a higher mean of 7.85% and a 
standard deviation of 8.61%. It can also be argued that individuals’ migration concerns 
stemmed not from local stocks of migrants, but from perceptions of net increases in one’s local 
area. Net migration indicators data is appended from the ONS to test this hypothesis, where net 
migration is defined as the difference between the inflow and outflow of migrants in the area. 
A set of plausible determinant of a constituency’s vote are changes in local economic 
conditions. To this end, changes in unemployment, EU funding, public spending and local 
economic activity data appended from the ONS are included in the analysis. Constituency level 
data is only available in the case of unemployment, which is considered in the year prior to the 
referendum, while changes in the other variables are available at NUTS-1 and NUTS-3 level. 
NUTS-1 level are the largest statistical areas of the UK, including nine statistical regions for 
England, with Scotland and Wales as separate entities. NUTS-3 level is defined by groups of 
unitary authorities, counties or council areas in England, Scotland or Wales, which can be 
aggregated into constituencies.  To account for differing levels in economic activity, measures 
of Gross Value Added (GVA) are added from the ONS. Table 2.1 displays the summary 
statistics the GVA per head in 2015. The change in public spending and EU funding are only 
available at NUTS-1 level, which coincide with the main UK administrative divisions. 
 Since graduates and student shares were found to be inversely related to Leave votes, 
the share of individuals whose highest qualification is at least level four according to the 
Regulated Qualifications Framework (RQF) at the time of the 2011 census was included as a 
proxy. The summary statistics suggest that at the time of the 2011 Census, a mean 26.74 percent 
of a constituency’s population satisfied this qualification requirement, with a standard 
deviation of 8.31. An RQF qualification level four indicates that the person has completed some 
further education beyond college, but less than a bachelor’s degree. On this scale, Bachelor and 
Master degrees are levels six and seven respectively, which renders this an imprecise measure 
of share of tertiary education. For the purpose of the present analysis, we use the share of 
individuals whose highest qualification is at least four and create a dummy which equals one 
if the constituency’s share is above the sample average, as well as four distinct quartile range 
dummies.  
The Eurobarometer surveys have collected historical levels of Euroscepticism in the 
UK, but they are only available at country level. Since this is constant across constituencies in 
a cross-section, it is unusable in this context. An alternative measure of Euroscepticism 
proposed in Godwin and Milazzo (2015) comes from the sixth wave of the Internet Panel of 
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the British Election study (BES), collected 13 months before the referendum and before the 
start of the media coverage variable used in this study. The respondents were asked: “If there 
was a referendum on Britain's membership of the European Union, how do you think you 
would vote?”. The share of respondents in the constituency who responded Leave would be a 
reasonable proxy of inherent local Euroscepticism, especially since their responses were 
collected before start of the 1-year media coverage variables used in the study. Given the 
number of respondents at the constituency level ranges from 17 to 154, it is unlikely the share 
of Leave responders is a very accurate representation of the true value. This value is added in 
all regressions as a robustness check, and all results subsequently account for this measure of 
local Euroscepticism. 
Section 2.4: Empirical Strategy  
The estimated model is: 𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑖 = 𝛼1 + 𝛽1𝑚𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑖 + µ𝟏𝑽𝒊 + 𝜹𝟏𝒎𝒊𝒈𝒓𝒂𝒏𝒕𝒄𝒐𝒏𝒕𝒓𝒐𝒍𝒊 +𝝆𝟏𝑬𝒄𝒐𝒏𝒐𝒎𝒊𝒄𝒊𝒏𝒅𝒊𝒄𝒂𝒕𝒐𝒓𝒔𝒊 + 𝜺𝟏,𝒊     [Eq.4] 
In equation 4, 𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑖 is the percentage vote to Leave in the EU membership 
referendum, 𝛼1 is the intercept, 𝑚𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑖 denotes the weighted media variable, 𝑉𝑖 is a 
vector of constituency specific characteristics, 𝑚𝑖𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝒊 is a vector containing the 
migration controls previously mentioned, 𝐸𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑠𝒊 is a vector containing 
constituency and region level economic controls and 𝜀𝑖 is the error term. The vector of 
economic indicators includes changes in economic variables such as public spending, 
unemployment and wage medians, while the migrant controls vector includes the percentage 
of migrants from pre-2004 expansion EU, post-2004 expansion and non-EU countries in the 
constituency recorded in the census. Similarly, µ, 𝝆 and δ are vectors of coefficients. 
 
One extension to the analysis is to check whether the effect of media coverage is 
heterogeneous across constituencies with differing shares of ‘qualified’ individuals. To this 
end, equation 5 below outlines the new model, where the qualification shares vector includes 
dummy variables equalling 1 if the constituency is in one of the top three quartiles of the 
qualification distribution. The media variable interactions vector includes the interaction 
between the media variable of interest and the qualification dummies denoting constituencies 




𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑖=𝛼2 + 𝛽2𝑚𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝒊 + 𝜽𝟐𝒎𝒆𝒅𝒊𝒂𝒗𝒂𝒓𝒊𝒂𝒃𝒍𝒆𝒊𝒏𝒕𝒆𝒓𝒂𝒄𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒔𝒊 + µ𝟐𝑽𝒊 +𝝉𝟐𝑸𝒖𝒂𝒍𝒊𝒇𝒊𝒄𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝑫𝒖𝒎𝒎𝒚𝒊 + 𝝆𝟐𝑬𝒄𝒐𝒏𝒐𝒎𝒊𝒄𝒊𝒏𝒅𝒊𝒄𝒂𝒕𝒐𝒓𝒔𝒊 + 𝜹𝟐𝒎𝒊𝒈𝒓𝒂𝒏𝒕𝒄𝒐𝒏𝒕𝒓𝒐𝒍𝒊 + 𝜺𝟐,𝒊
     [Eq.5] 
Since the first set of variables includes article counts irrespective of the credibility, 
reputation and writing style of publication, the estimated effect will lie between the effect of 
exposure to reputable newspapers and that of tabloid-type publications. Furthermore, national 
newspapers and their regional counterparts may enjoy different levels of trustworthiness, so a 
further split is proposed for further research. Further analysis can be done using the weighted 
index described in the previous section, differentiating between national article coverage and 
regional, and analysing whether the effects were differentiated across publication types and 
referendum stances. The estimated model is outlined in equation 6 below: 𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑖=𝛼3 + 𝛽3𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑏𝑟𝑜𝑎𝑑𝑠ℎ𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑖 +𝛽4𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑜𝑖𝑑𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽5𝑟𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒 +𝜽𝟑𝒎𝒆𝒅𝒊𝒂𝒗𝒂𝒓𝒊𝒂𝒃𝒍𝒆𝒊𝒏𝒕𝒆𝒓𝒂𝒄𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒔𝒊 + µ𝟑𝑽𝒊 + 𝝉𝟑𝑸𝒖𝒂𝒍𝒊𝒇𝒊𝒄𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝑫𝒖𝒎𝒎𝒊𝒆𝒔𝒊 +𝝆𝟑𝑬𝒄𝒐𝒏𝒐𝒎𝒊𝒄𝒊𝒏𝒅𝒊𝒄𝒂𝒕𝒐𝒓𝒊 + 𝜹𝟑𝒎𝒊𝒈𝒓𝒂𝒏𝒕𝒄𝒐𝒏𝒕𝒓𝒐𝒍𝒊 + 𝜀3,𝑖 
[Eq.6] 
Another interesting extension is analysing whether variation in coverage closer to the 
referendum date is relatively more important, as outlined in the literature by Tversky and 
Kahneman (1973) or Doms and Morin (2004). For this analysis, variants of the variables 
defined above are created to account for coverage in the 6 months prior to the referendum and 
the six months prior to the General Election in 2015. This extension can be analysed alone or 
in conjunction with the credibility split extension. This empirical strategy exploits two sources 
of exogenous variation: coverage intensity across parliamentary constituencies as well as 
differences in reporting propensities in the six months before the referendum.  
One potential drawback of this study is the possible presence of endogeneity. This can 
occur if the share of Leave votes is correlated with unobserved characteristics that also affect 
the level of weighted (negative) coverage. One potential factor is Euroscepticism, the inherent 
dissatisfaction of the electorate towards the EU, which would in turn affect the public demand 
for negative coverage. For example, if the electorate has inherent Euroscepticism, it would 
affect both the resulting vote Leave percentage and the demand for negative coverage prior to 
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and at the time of the referendum. This creates a potential endogeneity issue, which in turn 
causes a bias in the OLS estimates. 
Denote local Euroscepticism by 𝑍𝑖 and assume the true model, in matrix form, is given 
by: 𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑖 = 𝜆𝑿𝒊 +  𝛾𝒁𝒊 + 𝑒 
Where 𝑿𝒊 is a matrix containing the included variables, media and the controls, 𝜆 is the 
associated vector of coefficients, 𝒁𝒊 is a column vector containing ‘omitted’ Euroscepticism 
and e is the residual. The normal form equations will be: 
[𝑿𝑖′𝑿𝑖 𝑿𝑖′𝒁𝒊𝒁𝒊′𝑿𝑖 𝒁𝒊′𝒁𝒊] [?̂?𝛾] = [𝑿𝑖′𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑖𝒁𝒊′𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑖] 
Solving for ?̂?: 𝑿𝑖′𝑿𝑖?̂? + 𝑿𝑖′𝒁𝒊𝛾 = 𝑿𝑖′𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑖 𝑿𝑖′𝑿𝑖?̂? = 𝑿𝑖′𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑖 −𝑿𝑖′𝒁𝒊𝛾  ?̂? = (𝑿𝑖′𝑿𝑖)−1𝑿𝑖′𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑖 − (𝑿𝑖′𝑿𝑖)−1𝑿𝑖′𝒁𝒊𝛾  ?̂? = 𝜆 − (𝑿𝑖′𝑿𝑖)−1𝑿𝑖′𝒁𝒊𝛾 
The second right hands side term denotes the correction arising from omitted variable 
bias. Note that if (𝑿𝑖′𝑿𝑖)−1𝑿𝑖′𝒁𝒊𝛾 = 𝟎  the OLS estimate is unbiased and preferable. This can 
happen under two conditions. First, if the elements in 𝑿𝒊 are orthogonal to ‘unobserved’ 
Euroscepticism, then (𝑿𝑖′𝑿𝑖)−1𝑿𝑖′𝒁𝒊 = 𝟎 and the estimate is unbiased. However, this may not 
be true in the case of the coverage variables if Euroscepticism is a newspaper demand 
determinant. For example, if Euroscepticism increases demand for negative coverage in an 
area, publications may increase the amount of negative coverage aimed at such areas. Inversely, 
publications which feature more negative coverage may circulate more in areas with higher 
Euroscepticism due to increased demand. This in turn increases coverage intensity as measured 
by the weighted variables, rendering the orthogonality assumption invalid.  
Secondly, the estimates would be unbiased if 𝛾 = 0, or if Euroscepticism had no impact 
on a constituency’s propensity to vote Leave, which is unlikely to hold. Since higher levels of 
Euroscepticism are expected to be positively correlated with both local propensities to vote 
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Leave and with the amount of negative coverage the constituency is exposed to, the resulting 
OLS coefficients would be biased. 
The endogeneity issue is not restricted to the general model shown above, but also to 
the case in which coverage is split by publication type. More precisely, the difference in 
publication type readership may be endogenous as well. According to previous literature and 
the split observed above, most of the tabloid publications declared their support for the Leave 
vote while the opposite is true for broadsheets. Therefore, it may be the case that while both 
corr(𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑜𝑖𝑑𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑖, 𝜀𝑖) ≠ 0 and corr(𝑏𝑟𝑜𝑎𝑑𝑠ℎ𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑖, 𝜀𝑖) ≠ 0, Euroscepticism has 
a higher impact on tabloid coverage. The editorial stance split indicated at the end of the data 
section suggests tabloid coverage has a stronger correlation with Euroscepticism.  
Section 2.5: Results 
Section 2.5.1: Benchmark Results 
Data in Table 2.3 displays the regression results when the variable of interest is the total 
coverage of crime involving migrants in the year prior to the referendum. The first column 
indicates the OLS results obtained with only constituency controls, whereas the second and the 
third successively add migration and economic indicators. If neither migration nor economic 
indicators are accounted for, an article increase in average elector exposure in the year prior to 
the referendum increased Leave vote by 0.003 percentage points or by 1.159 per standard 
deviation increase (see first column in Table 2.3). Interestingly, the estimated effect on the 
Leave vote increases to  0.004 percentage point increase per unit increase in the weighted 
coverage once migration controls are considered. While this does not suggest more 
cosmopolitan constituencies were more susceptible to media framing, migrant shares are 
significant predictors of constituency level decisions to vote to Leave. Interestingly, the 
estimated effects of constituency readership, although negative in all three specifications, 
become statistically significant once differences in migrant shares are included. The estimated 
effect of minus 2.46 percentage points per circulated newspaper. The measure may be 
interpreted as a proxy for overall ‘informedness’, indicating that more ‘informed’ or up-to-date 
electorates were less likely to vote to Leave the European Union.  Only the migrant stock from 
the post-2004 accession countries is estimated to have had a positive statistically significant 
effect of 0.54 percentage points on the vote Leave percentage per percentage point increase. 
On the other hand, the estimated effect on the pre-2004 accession EU migrants is strongly 
statistically significant and negative, indicating a 3.56 percentage points reduction in Leave 
votes per 1 percentage point increase, indicating the vote leaving propensity is lower in more 
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cosmopolitan areas. This is further strengthened by minus 0.37 percentage points decrease 
observed as the estimated effect of the share of non-EU migrants or 3.7 percentage points per 
10 percentage points increase, which is significant. These findings support the hypothesis that 
the stock of migrants is a relevant predictor of the constituency level Leave vote or due to pre-
2004 EU migrants selecting more affluent areas. 
The third column reports the regression results when economic indicators are 
considered. The estimated effect of the media coverage on vote Leave percentage in the year 
up to the referendum becomes statistically insignificant, positive and smaller in magnitude at 
0.001 percentage points (or 0.38 per standard deviation increase), indicating the negative 
estimates observed in the first two columns were underlined by economic disparities. 
Constituency newspaper readership is still negative and statistically significant even after 
accounting for migration and economic factors, although its estimated effect on the Leave vote 
decreased to -2.28 percentage points . All economic indicator variables are statistically 
significant and have the expected sign, further indicating that economic grievances were a more 
accurate predictor of the decision to vote to Leave the EU. A one percentage point increase in 
the unemployment rate at the 2011 census is estimated to have increased the propensity to vote 
to Leave by approximately 4.09 percentage points. Furthermore, a constituency level one 
percent decrease in unemployment in the year before the referendum is estimated to have 
decreased the Leave vote by 2.44 percentage points. This suggests that constituencies with 
better labour market conditions were less likely to vote to Leave in the 2016 referendum. 
Exposure to the EU programs was also significant, although small in magnitude. Here, a one 
percentage point decrease in EU funds allocated to the region lead to 0.046 percentage points 
increase in the Leave vote, or 1.41 per standard deviation. However, in some regions, the 
decrease may be attributed to the region becoming too wealthy to be eligible for some EU 
funds, but the estimated effects are small in magnitude. A one percent decrease in public 
spending in the year before the referendum has a similar effect as a one standard deviation 
decrease in media coverage, indicating a decrease in the Leave vote of2.22 percentage points. 
Given the politics of austerity begun by Conservative governments in 2010, cuts on public 
spending may be a proxy for economic deprivation. If the pattern of reduction is proportional, 
the estimates indicate that pre-existing patterns of deprivation at the time of the referendum, 
were relevant in predicting the propensity to vote Leave. All four estimates are statistically 
significant at 99% confidence level. Furthermore, the analysis suggests that once public 
spending patterns are accounted for, the estimates for total media coverage become statistically 
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insignificant. However, the estimated coefficient of the media coverage effect in column three 
might hide heterogeneous effects of media type coverage. All control variable groups are also 
jointly statistically significant.  
The results on the migration indicators are similar to those observed in the second 
column. The estimated coefficient for the share of pre-2004 migrants is negative and 
statistically significant, albeit reduced in magnitude to a 1.17 percentage point reduction in the 
Lave vote per percentage point increase in this migrant share. This change between the second 
and the third column indicates possible migrant self-selection as the majority of the negative 
effect observed in column 2 was driven by economic factors. A similar observation can be 
made about the estimated coefficient of the share of migrants from post 2004 accession EU 
countries. The estimated coefficient is strongly statistically significant and strengthened 
relative to that in column two, indicating that a percentage point increase in the migrant share 
led to a 0.99 percentage points increase in Leave votes.  
Table 2.4 below contains the results of equivalent regressions when the main 
explanatory variable is the weighted coverage of migration induced resource constraints in the 
year prior to the referendum. Results are similar to those found in Table 2.3. In the absence of 
migration and economic controls, a unit increase in weighted media coverage is estimated to 
increase Leave vote by 0.004 percentage points, or one percentage point per standard deviation 
increase. This result is statistically significant at 99% confidence interval and statistically 
higher than the migrant crime equivalent (p=0.002). When migration controls are taken into 
account, the estimated effect of media coverage remains statistically significant and increases 
to indicate a 1.5 percentage points increase in the Leave vote per standard deviation increase 
in this media coverage variable. As in the previous table, the pattern of results may be indicative 
of migrant self-selection in less or more affluent areas. When both migration and economic 
indicators are taken into account, the estimated effect of media coverage decreases and 
becomes statistically insignificant, indicating the previous estimates were driven by differences 
in economic determinants. However, this is the effect of aggregate coverage which does not 
distinguish reporting style and assumed position on EU membership. Therefore, the coefficient 
may mask heterogeneities in effect, which are analysed in subsequent subsections. Similarly, 
the effect of overall constituency is negative in all specifications and statistically significant in 
the last two, indicating that more informed constituencies were less likely to vote to Leave. 
Looking at the effects of migrant shares in the second column, only the share of EU 
migrants from the post-2004 accession countries is estimated to have had a positive statistically 
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significant effect of 0.53 percentage points on the vote Leave percentage per percentage point 
increase in this share. On the other hand, the estimated effect on the pre-2004 accession EU 
migrants is strongly statistically significant and negative at minus 3.5 percentage points, 
indicating the vote leaving propensity is lower in more cosmopolitan areas. This is further 
strengthened by a minus 0.37 percentage points decrease observed as the estimated effect of 
the share of non-EU migrants or 3.7 percentage points per 10 percentage points increase. As 
before, these results may indicate migrant self-selection, with non-EU and pre-2004 EU 
nationals settling in areas that are more affluent. This is reinforced by the results of the 
migration coefficients in the last column. The estimated coefficient of a percentage point 
increase in the pre-2004 EU migrant stock decreased in magnitude to suggest a 1.17 percentage 
points decrease in Leave votes. However, the share of EU migrants from countries which joined 
the EU after 2004 is estimated to have increased the Leave vote by one percentage point per 
increase in this migrant share. This may be indicative of newer EU member state nationals 
being more prevalent in areas with more individuals ‘targeted’ by the Leave campaign and/or 
with worse economic conditions. 
The estimated results on economic factors again indicate that it is economic factors 
rather than variation in media coverage which matters in explaining constituency level 
propensities to vote Leave. A one percentage point increase in the unemployment rate at the 
2011 census is estimated to have increased the propensity to vote to Leave by approximately 
4.09 percentage points, the equivalent of 2.5 standard deviations increase in the media variable 
from the previous specification. Furthermore, a constituency level 1 percent decrease in 
unemployment in the year before the referendum is estimated to have decreased the Leave vote 
by 2.43 percentage points. Exposure to the EU programmes was also significant, although 
small in magnitude. Here, a 1 percentage point decrease in EU funds allocated to the region 
lead to 0.045 percentage points increase in the Leave vote, or 1.67 per standard deviation 
increase, while a one percent decrease in public spending in the year before the referendum has 
a similar effect as a one standard deviation decrease in media coverage at minus 2.23 
percentage points. Furthermore, previous analyses suggest that once public spending patterns 
are accounted for, the estimates for total media coverage become insignificant. All four 
estimates are statistically significant at 99% confidence level.  
This underlines that economic grievances were, as predicted, important determinants of 
constituency level propensity to vote Leave, as also observed in Becker et al. (2017). 
Furthermore, the overall message emerging from the estimates of the effects of the economic 
indicators suggest that areas with worse labour market conditions and declining public finances 
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were more likely to vote Leave. The analysis of Fetzer (2018) comes to similar results, 
outlining that austerity measures taken by Conservative governments after 2010 were 
significant determinants of Leave vote. Given that the media effect estimates are insignificant 
once economic indicators considered all benchmark regressions, it can be ascertained that 
economic conditions have had a stronger effect on the propensity to vote Leave than written 
media coverage of crime involving migrants. 
The signs and significance patterns of the constituency controls variables are similar to 
those observed in the previous table and in agreement with the study of Becker et al. (2017). 
In the migration controls category, it can be observed that only the stock of migrants from post-
2004 EU countries was positively correlated with an increase in Leave votes. Since the skill 
distribution of this group is predominantly low skilled, they are competing with similarly 
skilled natives and putting pressure on their wages. This assertion, aimed at low-skilled natives, 
was used by Leave campaign rhetoric and noticed in previous economic literature (see Borjas 
(2003) and Borjas and Monras (2017)), which may cause the positive coefficient observed in 
Tables 2.3 and 2.4. A side result in the next subsection also outlines that a lower share of skilled 
natives correlates with higher Leave vote shares, but the estimated coefficient for the post-2004 
EU migrant stock remains statistically significant and positive. Becker et al (2017) also finds 
that the proportion of post 2004 EU Nationals increased the predicted Leave vote, which brings 
evidence in favour of this hypothesis.  
One concern with the results from third specifications in section 2.5.1 is the possibility 
that variation in media coverage is entirely explained by the remaining vector of covariates. 
This hypothesis is tested and the results are reported in Tables 2.8 and 2.9. It can be observed 
that for all weighted media variables there is still significant variation which is not explained 
by the remainder of the vector of covariates. The addition of interaction effects as seen in 




Table 2.3:  Estimation of the effect of weighted newspapers coverage of migrant crime 
in the year before the EU referendum:  
Dependent variable: percentage 







Coverage variables    
Total weighted coverage of 
migrant crime 
0.003*** 0.004*** 0.001 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Constituency controls    
Constituency readership -0.818 -2.465** -2.285*** 
 (1.054) (0.967) (0.882) 
Leave voting intention 0.573*** 0.484*** 0.288*** 
 (0.031) (0.031) (0.025) 
Share of people aged 30 to 44  -1.247*** -0.046 0.006 
 (0.255) (0.299) (0.205) 
Share of people aged 45 to 59 0.578* -0.610* -0.774*** 
 (0.314) (0.358) (0.251) 
Share of people age over 60 -0.250 0.390** 0.749*** 
 (0.159) (0.172) (0.124) 
Population density -0.058** 0.093** -0.017 
 (0.027) (0.037) (0.028) 
Male share 1.362*** 1.831*** 1.264*** 
 (0.479) (0.527) (0.340) 
Share of married people  -0.044 0.148 0.614*** 
 (0.099) (0.114) (0.091) 
    
    
Migration Controls    
Share of Pre 2004 EU 
immigrants 
 -3.560*** -1.172** 
  (0.624) (0.537) 
Share of Post 2004 EU 
immigrants 
 0.540* 0.999*** 
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  (0.286) (0.255) 
Share of non-EU immigrants   -0.372*** -0.478*** 
  (0.090) (0.074) 
Net migration in the last 5 years   -0.027 -0.016 
  (0.054) (0.044) 
Economic Indicators    
Unemployment rate, census 
2011 
  4.097*** 
   (0.301) 
Decrease in unemployment rate 
(2015-16) 
  -2.445*** 
   (0.837) 
Decrease in EU funding (% 
2007-14 to  
  0.046*** 
2014-20)   (0.007) 
Change in public spending 
(2015-16 %) 
  -2.228*** 
   (0.180) 
GVA per head (£ 000s)   0.046** 
   (0.020) 
Change in wage median (2015-
16 %) 
  0.092** 
   (0.041) 
Constant -14.934 -50.734* -51.758*** 
 (26.842) (29.409) (19.675) 
Observations 632 632 632 
R-squared 0.533 0.639 0.783 
Notes to Table 2.3: All variables at constituency level except for EU funding and public 
spending variables. Dependent variable defined as ‘Constituency level percentage voting 
‘Leave’’. White robust standard errors in parentheses and significance level denoted by *** 





Table 2.4:  Estimation of the effect of weighted newspapers coverage of migrant 
induced resource constraints in the year before the EU referendum:  
Dependent variable: percentage 







Coverage variables    
Total weighted resource 
constraint coverage 
0.004*** 0.006*** 0.002 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) 
Constituency controls    
Constituency readership -0.783 -2.427** -2.282** 
 (1.053) (0.966) (0.883) 
Leave intention 0.572*** 0.483*** 0.288*** 
 (0.031) (0.031) (0.025) 
Share of people aged 30 to 44  -1.249*** -0.048 0.009 
 (0.255) (0.299) (0.205) 
Share of people aged 45 to 59 0.578* -0.616* -0.774*** 
 (0.314) (0.358) (0.251) 
Share of people age over 60 -0.249 0.389** 0.751*** 
 (0.159) (0.172) (0.124) 
Population density -0.060** 0.091** -0.017 
 (0.027) (0.037) (0.028) 
Male share 1.365*** 1.832*** 1.262*** 
 (0.479) (0.526) (0.340) 
Share of married people  -0.047 0.148 0.614*** 
 (0.099) (0.114) (0.091) 
Migration Controls    
Share of Pre 2004 EU 
immigrants 
 -3.548*** -1.172** 
  (0.624) (0.536) 
Share of Post 2004 EU 
immigrants 
 0.539* 1.002*** 
  (0.286) (0.255) 
Share of non-EU immigrants   -0.375*** -0.476*** 
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  (0.090) (0.074) 
Net migration in the last 5 years   -0.028 -0.016 
  (0.054) (0.044) 
Economic Indicators    
Unemployment rate, census 
2011 
  4.094*** 
   (0.302) 
Decrease in unemployment rate 
(2015-16) 
  -2.439*** 
   (0.837) 
Decrease in EU funding (% 
2007-14 to  
  0.045*** 
2014-20)   (0.007) 
Change in public spending 
(2015-16 %) 
  -2.230*** 
   (0.180) 
GVA per head (£ 000s)   0.046** 
   (0.020) 
Change in wage median (2015-
16 %) 
  0.092** 
   (0.041) 
Constant -15.063 -50.722* -51.761*** 
 (26.842) (29.368) (19.680) 
    
Observations 632 632 632 
R-squared 0.533 0.640 0.783 
Notes to Table 2.4: All variables at constituency level except for EU funding and public 
spending variables. Dependent variable defined as ‘Constituency level percentage voting 
‘Leave’’. White robust standard errors in parentheses and significance level denoted by *** 
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. ‘Coverage type’ defined as: ‘resource constraint articles 1 year 




Section 2.5.2: Analysis of heterogeneous effects by relative shares of qualified residents   
 
Whereas the previous section outlined that the overall effect of negative media coverage 
preceding the EU referendum becomes insignificant while economic indicators are considered, 
this overall result may obfuscate heterogeneity in effects. For this purpose, this section analyses 
whether constituencies with different vectors of population qualifications differ in their 
predisposition to internalise media framing and uncover whether media coverage was more 
successful in constituencies with fewer highly qualified inhabitants. 
Precise educational attainment data is not available in this context. The qualification 
variables used in this sub-section come from the 2011 census data, which includes information 
on highest qualification achieved, which in this case encompasses the share of individuals 
whose qualification level is at least level four. More details are available in the data section. 
Using the quartile distribution of this variable, four binary variables are created which equal 
one if the constituency lies in the 0 to 25th, 25th to 50th, 50th to 75th or above the 75th quantile 
respectively. These variables together with their interactions with the six months and one-year 
weighted media variables are included in the model to account for possible heterogeneity in 
effects, with the reference category set as the bottom 25th percentile of population whose 
highest qualification level is at least four. Since the analysis in the previous section outlined 
that the initial estimated effects of media coverage were due to differences in economic and 
migration indicators, subsequent analysis focuses solely on the third specification from the 
previous section. In this specification, the coefficient for weighted media coverage estimates 
its effect on a reference constituency, while the following three interactions capture the 
additional effect of media coverage relative to a reference constituency. 
 In this section, the first column in a table will outline the regression results where the 
media variable is concerned with crime involving migrants, while the second will display the 
estimates coverage of migrant induced resource constraints in the year before the referendum. 
The results in column 3 are the ones obtained when the media coverage is focused on anti-EU 
coverage. Table 2.5 contains the results for regressions when the media duration is the year 
before the referendum, while Table 2.6 contains the results for regressions for when the media 
duration is in the last six months before. The reference category denotes constituencies whose 
share of ‘qualified’ inhabitants is below the first quartile. 
The first column in Table 2.5 outlines the regression results when the media variable is 
weighted coverage of crime including migrants, outlining a relatively small increase of 0.003 
percentage points per media article an average elector in a reference constituency is exposed 
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to in the year prior to the referendum. Similar results can be observed in the case of resource 
constraint variable in column 2, indicating an increase in Leave votes of 0.004 percentage 
points per article increase an average voter in a reference constituency ‘observes’. The third 
regression suggests that anti-EU coverage was also associated with an increase in Leave votes 
of 0.005 percentage points per weighted media variable increase. All three results are 
statistically significant at the 95% confidence level, providing weak evidence that constituencies 
whose ‘educated’ electorate share is below the national 25th percentile are prone to media 
framing. Given the results for the first two interactions are statistically insignificant in all 
regressions while their combined effect is still positive, this argument can be extended to 
include all constituencies whose share of qualified inhabitants is below the 75th percentile. 
Additionally, the one-year estimates of media coverage for a reference constituency are 
significantly higher in the case of resource constraint and anti-EU than migrant crime (p=0.02), 
indicating the former coverages were influential on Leave votes. This may be indicative of 
sovereignty and economic issues being relatively more important in the decision to vote Leave.  
The pattern of results indicates result reversal for constituencies in the top quartile of 
the qualification distribution. In the case of migrant crime, the estimate of the top quartile 
interaction term suggests a decrease relative to a reference constituency of 0.005 percentage 
points per unit increase in weighted media coverage. This effect is larger than the one observed 
in reference constituencies, but the total effect is not significantly different from zero 
(p=0.052), suggesting no effect of media at the top of the qualification distribution. Similar 
results can be observed in the second column in the case of resource constraint coverage. Here, 
the estimated coefficient of the third interaction term indicates a 0.007 and 0.008 percentage 
points relative decrease in Leave votes relative to benchmark constituencies per article an 
average elector is exposed to. This effect is again strong enough to reverse the sign observed 
in the benchmark constituency (p=0.016), and higher than the one observed in the case of 
migrant crime (p=0.033). The same pattern holds in the case of anti-EU coverage, where a 
reversal of effect is observed at the top of the qualification distribution.  
 Further evidence of voter sophistication arises from the estimated results of the first 
three variables in the constituency controls categories. The results for the qualification quartile 
dummies are all negative and strongly statistically significant. Furthermore, the pattern 
observed in all three specifications indicates that the estimated effect of being in a higher 
qualification quartile band is progressively higher in magnitude, relative to the reference case. 
A constituency situated in the second quartile is estimated to cast 4.76, 4.62 and 4.56 
percentage points fewer votes relative to reference case in the three regressions respectively, 
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ceteris paribus. The results indicate that being the immediately higher band reduces the 
estimated Leave vote by roughly 8 percentage points for all coverage types, while being in the 
top quarter of the qualification quartile distribution reduces Leave vote by 12.09, 11.8 and 11.9 
percentage points respectively relative to the reference category. These results bring evidence 
in support of the theory that constituencies that have a higher share of highly qualified 
inhabitants were less likely to vote to Leave. This is reinforced by the estimated effect of 
constituency readership, which is negative and statistically significant at 90% significance 
level. The results on the age bands indicate a Leave voting prevalence amongst the over-60 
electors, whose estimated coefficient suggests a 0.53 percentage point increase in Leave votes 
per percentage point increase in the band. 
The estimates of the migrant controls are qualitatively similar to those observed in the 
previous section. Only the migrant stock from the post-2004 accession countries is estimated 
to have had a positive statistically significant effect of roughly 0.75 percentage points on the 
vote Leave percentage per percentage point increase in the share. This is lower than and 
statistically different from the benchmark estimate for all types of coverage (p=0.09, p=0.09 
and p=0.09 respectively). This and the estimated results on the qualification quartile binary 
variables suggest the positive effect estimated for post-2004 EU migrants is not exclusively 
due to self-selection. On the other hand, the estimated effect on the pre-2004 accession EU 
migrants is still strongly statistically significant but significantly decreased in magnitude, 
indicating an approximate 0.74 percentage points decrease in Leave votes per percentage 
increase in the pre-2004 EU migrant population. However, the results suggest I am unable to 
reject the null hypothesis that the coefficients are different from the benchmark case (p=0.27, 
p=0.28 and p=0.27 respectively). On the other hand, the equivalent null is rejected in the case 
of non-EU migrants, whose estimated coefficients increase relative to the benchmark case in 
all specifications. A one-percentage point increase in the non-EU migrant stock is estimated to 
have decreased Leave votes by 0.139, 0.137 and 0.141 percentage points in the three cases 
respectively. 
Although there is some evidence of significant media effects in this section, the results 
on economic factors are again significant predictors of the constituency level Leave votes. A 
one percentage point increase in the unemployment rate at the 2011 census is estimated to have 
increased the propensity to vote to Leave by approximately 0.86, 0.85 and 0.87 percentage 
points in the migrant crime, resource constraint and aggregate coverage specifications 
respectively. All three results are statistically significant and significantly different then their 
benchmark counterparts, indicating a relative prevalence of ‘qualified’ individuals in 
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constituencies with less unemployment.  
The results for the other economic indicators are similar to their benchmark equivalents 
and not statistically different from them. A constituency level 1 percent decrease in 
unemployment in the year before the referendum is estimated to have decreased the Leave vote 
by roughly 2.2 percentage points in all specifications. Exposure to the EU programs was also 
significant, although small in magnitude. Here, a 1-percentage point decrease in EU funds 
allocated to the region lead to 0.05 percentage points increase in the vote, or 1.67 per standard 
deviation in the EU funding variable. On the other hand, a one percent decrease in public 
spending in the year before the referendum correlates with a minus 2.3 percentage points 
decrease in Leave votes in all specifications. In magnitude, this is similar to roughly two 
standard deviations decrease in media coverage.  
The results in Table 2.6 present the results obtained when the focus of the media 
variables is the last six months before the referendum. The first column in Table 2.6 outlines 
the regression results when the media variable is weighted coverage of crime including 
migrants, outlining a relatively small increase of 0.005 percentage points in the Leave vote per 
media article an average elector in a reference constituency is exposed to in the year prior to 
the referendum. This result is weakly statistically significant and higher than the equivalent 
estimate from Table 2.5 (p=0.004). Similar results can be observed in the case of resource 
constraint variable in column 2, indicating an increase in the Leave vote of 0.007 percentage 
points per article increase an average voter in a reference constituency ‘observes’. The third 
regression suggests that anti-EU coverage was also associated with an increase in Leave votes, 
of 0.009 percentage points per weighted article increase. All three results are statistically 
significant at the 95% confidence level, providing weak evidence that constituencies whose 
‘educated’ electorate share is below the national 25th percentile are prone to media framing.  
 Given the results for the first two interactions are statistically insignificant in all 
regression and that the combined effect is still positive, this argument can be extended to 
include all constituencies whose share of qualified inhabitants is below the 75th percentile. As 
with the estimate of migrant crime coverage, the 6 months estimates of weighted coverage in 
a reference constituency of both resource constraints and anti-EU are significantly higher than 
their one-year equivalents (p=0.009 and p=0.007 respectively). These results provide evidence 
of the availability bias hypothesis. 
As in Table 2.5, the second and third column estimates of media coverage for a 
reference constituency are significantly higher in the case of resource constraint and anti-EU 
than migrant crime (p=0.006), indicating the former coverages were more associated with 
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Leave votes. This may be indicative of sovereignty and economic issues being relatively more 
important in the decision to vote Leave in both the year and six months before the referendum. 
The qualification interaction estimates yield similar results to the one-year regressions, 
with the results becoming increasingly negative in each successive quartile. However, in all 
specifications, the interaction with the top quartile is negative and strongly statistically 
significant. In the case of migrant crime, the estimate of the top quartile interaction term 
suggests a decrease of 0.007 percentage points per unit increase in weighted media coverage. 
This effect is larger than the one observed in reference constituency and the total effect is 
weakly significantly different from zero (p=0.057), suggesting an opposite effect of media at 
the top of the qualification distribution. The top quartile interaction in the second column 
indicates a 0.012 percentage points decrease in Leave votes per article an average elector is 
exposed to. The overall media effect in a constituency in the top qualification quartile is 
statistically insignificant (p=0.08). The same pattern holds in the case of anti-EU coverage, 
where a negation of effect is observed at the top of the qualification distribution. Plausible 
explanations for the effect observed with the third interaction term in all six regressions may 
be voter discretion or a higher propensity to vote remain amongst ‘qualified’ individuals which 
negative coverage was unable to overturn. Additionally, constituencies with a higher share of 
qualified individuals were less likely targeted by the Leave campaign. The increasingly 
negative pattern of effect observed with the interaction terms in for all coverage supports the 
first theory. 
The estimates of the migrant controls are qualitatively similar to those observed in the 
previous section and in Table 2.5. Only the migrant stock from the post-2004 accession 
countries is estimated to have had a positive statistically significant effect of roughly 0.75 
percentage points on the vote Leave percentage per percentage point increase in the share, 
which is lower than and weakly statistically different from the benchmark estimate for all types 
of coverage (p=0.09 in all cases). This and the estimated results on the qualification quartile 
binary variables suggest the positive effect estimated for post-2004 EU migrants is not 
exclusively due to self-selection. On the other hand, the estimated effect on the pre-2004 
accession EU migrants is still strongly statistically significant but significantly decreased in 
magnitude, indicating decreases of 0.79 or 0.8 percentage points decrease in Leave votes. 
However, the results suggest I am unable to reject the null hypothesis that the coefficients are 
different from the benchmark case (p=0.23, p=0.23 and p=0.24 respectively).  
Although there is some evidence of significant media effects in this section, the results 
on economic factors are again significant predictors of the constituency level Leave votes. A 
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one percentage point increase in the unemployment rate at the 2011 census is estimated to have 
increased the propensity to vote to Leave by approximately 0.87, 0.85 and 0.86 percentage 
points in the migrant crime, resource constraint and aggregate coverage specifications 
respectively. All three results are statistically significant and significantly different then their 
benchmark counterparts, indicating a relative prevalence of ‘qualified’ individuals in 
constituencies with less unemployment. A constituency level 1 percent decrease in 
unemployment in the year before the referendum is estimated to have decreased the Leave vote 
by roughly 2.21 percentage points in all specifications. Exposure to the EU programs was also 
significant, although small in magnitude. Here, a 1-percentage point decrease in EU funds 
allocated to the region lead to 0.049 percentage points increase in the vote, or 1.67 per standard 
deviation in the EU coverage variable. On the other hand, a one percent decrease in public 
spending in the year before the referendum correlates with a minus 2.29 percentage points 
decrease in Leave votes in all specifications. In magnitude, this is similar to roughly two 
standard deviations decrease in media coverage.  
The notable difference with respect to the benchmark results is the evidence of positive 
media effects in the bottom three quartiles of the qualification distribution, which persist once 
public spending patterns are considered. The estimated effects of economic indicators are still 
strongly statistically significant and important in magnitude. Overall, the effects of economic 
coefficients are largely identical between the regressions involving all types of negative 
coverage considered in this paper. Appendix A3 presents alternative formulations for the media 
variables on the coverage of migrant crimes and their (similar) corresponding results in Tables 














Table 2.5: Estimation of the effect of weighted newspapers coverage  
in the year before the EU referendum: heterogeneity by education quartiles 
Dependent variable: percentage 









Coverage variables    
Total weighted media coverage 0.003** 0.004** 0.005*** 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) 
Interactions with education 
quartile dummy  
   
Interaction with Education 
Second quartile dummy 
-0.000 -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) 
Interaction with Education 
Third quartile dummy 
-0.002 -0.003 -0.003 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Interaction with Education Top 
Quartile dummy 
-0.005*** -0.007*** -0.008*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Constituency controls    
Second quartile dummy -4.761*** -4.626*** -4.569*** 
 (1.216) (1.252) (1.150) 
Third quartile dummy -8.281*** -8.099*** -7.990*** 
 (1.257) (1.288) (1.203) 
Top Quartile dummy -12.095*** -11.871*** -11.945*** 
 (1.328) (1.352) (1.272) 
Leave intention 0.175*** 0.175*** 0.175*** 
 (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) 
Constituency readership -1.302** -1.307** -1.333** 
 (0.590) (0.590) (0.589) 
Share of people aged 30 to 44  0.068 0.072 0.072 
 (0.158) (0.158) (0.157) 
Share of people aged 45 to 59 -0.080 -0.080 -0.081 
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 (0.207) (0.207) (0.206) 
Share of people age over 60 0.531*** 0.534*** 0.534*** 
 (0.112) (0.112) (0.112) 
Population density 0.014 0.015 0.014 
 (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) 
Male share 0.632** 0.631** 0.640** 
 (0.275) (0.275) (0.275) 
Share of married people  0.456*** 0.455*** 0.455*** 
 (0.069) (0.069) (0.068) 
Migration Controls    
Share of Pre-2004 EU 
immigrants 
-0.800*** -0.804*** -0.795*** 
 (0.267) (0.267) (0.267) 
Share of Post 2004 EU 
immigrants 
0.759*** 0.761*** 0.755*** 
 (0.151) (0.151) (0.151) 
Share of non-EU immigrants  -0.139** -0.137** -0.141*** 
 (0.054) (0.054) (0.054) 
Net migration in the last 5 years  -0.011 -0.012 -0.012 
 (0.034) (0.034) (0.034) 
Economic Indicators    
Unemployment rate, census 
2011 
0.865*** 0.856*** 0.877*** 
 (0.282) (0.282) (0.282) 
Decrease in unemployment rate 
(2015-16) 
-2.229*** -2.223*** -2.215*** 
 (0.637) (0.637) (0.635) 
Decrease in EU funding (% 
2007-14 to  
0.049*** 0.049*** 0.049*** 
2014-20) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
Change in public spending 
(2015-16 %) 
-2.317*** -2.315*** -2.289*** 
 (0.137) (0.137) (0.139) 
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GVA per head (£ 000s) 0.033*** 0.033*** 0.033*** 
 (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) 
Change in wage median (2015-
16 %) 
0.049 0.048 0.048 
 (0.034) (0.034) (0.034) 
Constant -4.925 -5.087 -5.650 
 (15.870) (15.863) (15.827) 
    
Observations 632 632 632 
R-squared  0.869 0.869 0.869 
Notes to Table 2.5: All variables at constituency level except for EU funding and public 
spending variables. Dependent variable defined as ‘Constituency level percentage 
voting ‘Leave’’. White robust standard errors in parentheses and significance level 

















Table 2.6: Estimation of the effect of weighted newspapers coverage  
in the 6 months before the EU referendum: heterogeneity by education quartiles 
Dependent variable: percentage 









Coverage variables    
Total weighted media coverage 0.005** 0.007** 0.009** 
 (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) 
Interactions with dummy 
quartile variables 
   
Interaction with Second quartile 
dummy 
-0.000 -0.001 -0.002 
 (0.002) (0.004) (0.004) 
Interaction with Third quartile 
dummy 
-0.003 -0.005 -0.006 
 (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) 
Interaction with Top Quartile 
dummy 
-0.007*** -0.012*** -0.015*** 
 (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) 
Constituency controls    
Second quartile dummy -4.724*** -4.425*** -4.491*** 
 (1.197) (1.173) (1.156) 
Third quartile dummy -8.187*** -7.854*** -7.925*** 
 (1.237) (1.223) (1.209) 
Top Quartile dummy -12.013*** -11.802*** -11.889*** 
 (1.304) (1.290) (1.276) 
Leave intention 0.175*** 0.175*** 0.175*** 
 (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) 
Constituency readership -1.311** -1.333** -1.337** 
 (0.590) (0.589) (0.589) 
Share of people aged 30 to 44  0.072 0.073 0.072 
 (0.158) (0.157) (0.157) 
Share of people aged 45 to 59 -0.087 -0.075 -0.077 
58 
 
 (0.206) (0.206) (0.206) 
Share of people age over 60 0.536*** 0.533*** 0.533*** 
 (0.112) (0.112) (0.112) 
Population density 0.014 0.015 0.015 
 (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) 
Male share 0.647** 0.630** 0.634** 
 (0.275) (0.275) (0.275) 
Share of married people  0.454*** 0.453*** 0.454*** 
 (0.068) (0.068) (0.068) 
Migration Controls    
Share of Pre-2004 EU 
immigrants 
-0.791*** -0.806*** -0.800*** 
 (0.267) (0.267) (0.267) 
Share of Post 2004 EU 
immigrants 
0.753*** 0.759*** 0.757*** 
 (0.151) (0.150) (0.151) 
Share of non-EU immigrants  -0.143*** -0.137** -0.139*** 
 (0.054) (0.054) (0.054) 
Net migration in the last 5 years  -0.012 -0.013 -0.012 
 (0.034) (0.034) (0.034) 
Economic Indicators    
Unemployment rate, census 
2011 
0.874*** 0.857*** 0.869*** 
 (0.282) (0.282) (0.282) 
Decrease in unemployment rate 
(2015-16) 
-2.246*** -2.219*** -2.221*** 
 (0.636) (0.636) (0.635) 
Decrease in EU funding (% 
2007-14 to  
0.049*** 0.049*** 0.049*** 
2014-20) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
Change in public spending 
(2015-16 %) 
-2.308*** -2.293*** -2.291*** 
 (0.136) (0.139) (0.139) 
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GVA per head (£ 000s) 0.033*** 0.033*** 0.033*** 
 (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) 
Change in wage median (2015-
16 %) 
0.048 0.048 0.048 
 (0.034) (0.034) (0.034) 
Constant -5.778 -5.233 -5.433 
 (15.847) (15.825) (15.826) 
    
Observations 632 632 632 
R-squared  0.869 0.869 0.869 
Notes to Table 2.6: All variables at constituency level except for EU funding and public 
spending variables. Dependent variable defined as ‘Constituency level percentage voting 
‘Leave’’. White robust standard errors in parentheses and significance level denoted by *** 

















Section 2.5.3: Analysis of newspaper style  
A third extension stems from the fact that original variables included all relevant articles 
regardless of the source and their respective reputation and credibility. Consequently, both sets 
of variables can be further split into national broadsheet, tabloid, and regional. Since the 
original variables included all three categories, their estimated coefficient is likely capturing 
an average effect, with a positive effect for tabloids and expected negative for broadsheets. 
Although a distinction exists between tabloid and broadsheet style reporting at the level of 
national publications, a clear distinction does not exist for regional newspapers. For this reason, 
the latter regional coverage remains a separate category.  
For the purpose of this analysis, the year before the referendum and the 6 months prior 
are considered as separate cases for all coverage categories defined above. Four media 
variables are considered based on the type of the publication and their assumed position on the 
referendum. In Table 2.7, the first two columns contain the results obtained when the media 
coverage variable is migrant crime in the twelve and six-month intervals before the referendum 
respectively. The results from the resource constraint regressions are outlined the third and 
fourth columns, while the last two contain the results of the OLS regressions with anti-EU 
coverage media variables. Since the analysis indicates that the estimated effects of 
constituency, migrant, and economic controls are largely similar in both sign and magnitude to 






Table 2.7:  Estimation of the effect of newspapers coverage of migrant crime in the year and in the 6 months before the EU 
referendum: Heterogeneous effect by share of highly educated people in the constituency and by type of newspaper 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Migrant Crime 1 
year 
Migrant Crime 6 
months 
Resource 




Anti-EU 1 year Anti-EU 6 
months 
Broadsheet 
coverage Remain 0.00771 0.00779 0.0118 0.00636 -0.0112 -0.0121 
 (0.00477) (0.00590) (0.00806) (0.0116) (0.0180) (0.0183) 
Tabloid coverage 
Remain -0.672*** -0.793*** -0.895*** -0.941*** -0.896** -0.856** 
 (0.144) (0.181) (0.220) (0.259) (0.366) (0.367) 
Broadsheet 
coverage Leave 0.0217 0.101*** 0.0379 0.187** 0.286** 0.309** 
 (0.0253) (0.0316) (0.0802) (0.0793) (0.139) (0.138) 
Tabloid coverage 
Leave 0.00722 -0.0199 0.0143 -0.0155 0.840** 0.791* 
 (0.0139) (0.0146) (0.0231) (0.0216) (0.404) (0.404) 
Regional 




 (0.280) (0.474) (0.169) (0.981) (1.012) (1.484) 
Constituency 
Controls 
X X X X X X 
Migration 
Controls 
X X X X X X 
Economic 
Indicators 
X X X X X X 
Observations 632 632 632 632 632 632 
R-squared 0.761 0.760 0.761 0.763 0.767 0.763 
Notes to Table 2.7: All variables at constituency level except for EU funding and public spending variables. Dependent variable defined 
as ‘Constituency level percentage voting ‘Leave’’. White robust standard errors in parentheses and significance level denoted by *** 
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. ‘Coverage type’ defined in the column heading. Tabloid, Broadsheet and Regional coverage represents 
coverage from the respective type of publication on the specified period.  Qualification quartiles based on the share of individuals in the 
constituency whose maximum qualification level is at least four. 
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The estimation results suggest that broadsheet coverage from publications that endorsed 
Remain did not have a statistically significant effect in any specification while estimates have 
the expected sign in the last two specifications. On the other hand, broadsheet coverage 
originating in publications that declared their support for Leave is found to have had positive 
effects on the constituency level Leave vote, particularly in the last six months before the 
referendum. A unit increase in the weighted media coverage of migrant crime is estimated to 
have increased the Leave vote by 0.1 percentage points, while an equivalent increase in the 
resource constraint and anti-EU coverages led to increases of 0.18 and 0.3 percentage points 
respectively. Both the resource constraint and the anti-EU are weakly significantly larger than 
their migrant crime equivalent in column 2, with p-values of 0.08 and 0.054 respectively.  
However, the null hypothesis they are not significantly different from each other is not rejected 
(p=0.14), suggesting that, in the six months before the referendum, coverage of economic 
issues and sovereignty originating in broadsheets were relatively more important determinants 
of the Leave vote, even after relevant economic and migration indicators are considered. 
Broadsheet coverage from Leave supporting publications in the year prior to the referendum 
was a significant predictor of the vote only in the case of aggregate coverage. The estimated 
effect is a 0.28 percentage points increase per unit increase in the weighted media variable, 
which is statistically significant at 90% confidence interval and significantly lower than the 
coefficient in column 6 (p=0.02), providing evidence in support of availability bias.  
On the other hand, the results suggest heterogeneity in the pattern of effects of tabloid 
coverage. Unlike broadsheet publications which supported Remain, the equivalent estimates of 
tabloid coverage are all negative and statistically significant for all types and both periods. A 
one article increase in weighted migrant crime coverage in the year before the referendum is 
estimated to have decreased Leave votes by 0.67 percentage points, and 0.79 percentage points 
in the six months equivalent. The six months estimate is significantly higher than the one in 
column 1 (p=0.05), bringing further evidence in support of the availability bias theory. The 
results for resource constraint coverage suggest that a unit increase weighted media coverage 
in the year before the referendum decreased the Leave vote by 0.89 percentage points. This 
result is strongly statistically significant and weakly statistically different from the one-year 
migrant crime equivalent (p=0.06), but the same does not hold in the six months case (p=0.15).  
The estimate of tabloid coverage about resource constraints in the last six months before the 
referendum suggest a decrease of .94 percentage points per unit increase in the media variable. 
However, I am unable to conclude that it is significantly higher than the yearly resource 
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constraint equivalent in column 3. A similar pattern is observed in columns 5 and 6 where the 
media focus is on anti-EU coverage, where the estimates suggest decreases of 0.89 and 0.85 
percentage points in Leave votes per article an average elector is exposed to, for the year and 
six months regressions respectively. but I am unable to conclude the two estimates are 
significantly different (p=0.31). Given that the coverage originated in publications which 
supported Remain, the negative signs suggest successful media persuasion. The results in the 
last two columns suggest that in the case of Leave supporting tabloids, anti-EU coverage the 
only coverage found to be statistically significant. 
Overall evidence on availability bias in this section is mixed since the estimate of the 
migrant crime coverage of is higher in the six months compared to the one-year case for Remain 
backing tabloids and, in the case of Leave backing broadsheets, for both migrant crime and 
resource constraint. However, this effect does not hold in the other pairwise comparisons. 
 Overall, the evidence suggests that in the six months before the referendum, the tabloid 
results suggest that resource constraint coverage was the most successful at persuading the 
electorate to vote remain if originating from a tabloid publication which supported Remain. 
Consequently, if a tabloid supported Leave, their most significant coverage type was anti-EU 
coverage. In the case of Leave supporting broadsheets, the estimates suggest that an extra 
article increase per average elector in the last six months was estimated to significantly increase 
Leave vote more for the resource constraint and anti-EU cases relative to migrant crime. 
Section 2.5.4: Determinants of overall coverage: is there evidence of bias? 
 Table 2.8 below provides the results obtained when estimating the effects on the 
weighted media coverage variables of the other regressors used in the benchmark specification. 
In each column, the dependent variable is the coverage of type and period displayed at the top. 
Table 2.9 below displays the equivalent results when the dependent variables are weighted 
tabloid coverage variables. The estimation results indicate that in all specifications, for both 
types of coverage and both time periods, coverage intensity increases with population density 
and in all shares for all age bands, indicating a possible newspaper preference for individuals 
living in cities and those aged 30 or more. A one percentage point increase in the share of 
individuals aged between 30 to 44 is estimated to increase the number of circulated articles on 
migrant crime an average elector is exposed to by 33.5 in the year prior to the referendum and 
22.98 in the 6 months prior, both of which are statistically significant at the 99% confidence 
interval. The estimated effects of the age bands are progressively lower as the age bands 
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increase, which indicates heterogeneity in newspaper demand across age groups. A similar 
pattern is observed in the case of resource constraint coverage and the magnitudes observed in 
columns 2 and 4 are consistent with the fact that the majority of relevant articles occurring in 
the last 6 months before the 23rd June 2016.  
The estimated coefficients in the migration controls sections provide evidence that the 
migrant stock from the pre-2004 accession countries did not have a statistically significant 
effect on the level of coverage of any type. On the other hand, a 1-percentage point increase in 
the share of both non-EU and post-2004 EU migrants is found to have increased coverage 
intensity for all coverage types and in both periods. Of particular interest the case of migrant 
crime, for which a percentage point increase in the post-2004 EU migrant stock is estimated to 
have increased migrant crime coverage by 27.5 and 19.1 articles per average elector in the year 
and 6 months before the referendum respectively. Furthermore, the estimated coefficients of 
the non-EU migrant stocks are also positive and statistically significant, indicating increases of 
22.4 and 15.6 articles an average elector is exposed to in the year and six months before the 
referendum respectively. The results in Table 2.9 indicate the same pattern of significance and 
sign in the case of tabloid coverage. We do not have access to local crime figures, but it can 
reasonably be expected that migrant crime is positively correlated with local migrant 
populations. The positive sign observed on these estimates provides weak evidence of the 
absence of bias in migrant crime reporting volume since the results validate the expected 
direction.  
This result however does not preclude bias in reporting style, but this analysis is beyond 
the scope of this paper. The results in the last four columns indicate similar results of migrant 
stocks on the weighted resource constraint variables. Since these variables were constructed 
with a migrant focus in mind, the results strengthen the validity of the keyword choice. 
Additionally, these results do not provide evidence of bias in resource constraint reporting since 
the coverage is increasing with the migrant stock. The results of the economic indicators 
suggest that a 1-percentage point increase in public spending significantly decreased the 
weighted coverage variable in all four specifications. In the case of resource constraint 
coverage, this suggests that the overall media coverage is not biased in terms of volume, as the 
amount of coverage is inversely proportional to the increase in local funds.  
The estimated results for tabloid coverage are qualitatively similar with respect to 
constituency and migration controls. One crucial difference with respect to the overall coverage 
regressions is that the estimates suggest that a 1-percentage point decrease in unemployment 
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rate increased by the weighted resource constraint coverage by 8.7 and 6.1 articles per average 
elector in the 1 year and 6-month cases respectively. This indicates an increase in tabloid 































 Table 2.8:  Estimation of the effect on total weighted media coverage type of the regressors  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Migrant crime 
1year 
Migrant crime 6 
months 
Resource 




Anti-EU 1 year Anti-EU 6 
months 
Constituency controls       
Constituency readership -55.241 -41.704* -39.928* -28.801* -37.699* -22.483* 
 (36.215) (23.807) (23.498) (15.891) (21.739) (12.811) 
Share of people aged 30 to 44  33.566*** 22.998*** 21.486*** 14.232*** 20.345*** 11.834*** 
 (9.498) (6.244) (6.163) (4.168) (5.702) (3.360) 
Share of people aged 45 to 59 27.783** 19.888** 19.246** 12.852** 17.809** 10.308** 
 (12.752) (8.383) (8.274) (5.595) (7.655) (4.511) 
Share of people age over 60 15.357** 10.590** 9.692** 6.553** 9.295** 5.465** 
 (6.721) (4.418) (4.361) (2.949) (4.034) (2.377) 
Population density 5.023*** 3.554*** 3.307*** 2.203*** 3.113*** 1.808*** 
 (1.101) (0.724) (0.714) (0.483) (0.661) (0.389) 
Male share -36.648** -27.587** -23.994** -15.998** -23.497** -13.400** 
 (17.108) (11.246) (11.100) (7.507) (10.269) (6.052) 
Share of married people  9.351** 5.981** 5.996** 4.090** 5.453** 3.238** 
 (4.204) (2.763) (2.728) (1.845) (2.523) (1.487) 
Migration Controls       
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Share of Pre- 2004 EU 
immigrants 
-6.385 -4.217 -4.153 -2.110 -3.173 -1.865 
 (16.621) (10.926) (10.785) (7.293) (9.977) (5.880) 
Share of Post 2004 EU 
immigrants 
27.554*** 19.123*** 17.725*** 12.043*** 16.949*** 9.889*** 
 (9.280) (6.100) (6.021) (4.072) (5.571) (3.283) 
Share of non-EU immigrants  22.244*** 15.645*** 14.394*** 9.659*** 13.899*** 8.027*** 
 (3.222) (2.118) (2.090) (1.414) (1.934) (1.140) 
Net migration in the last 5 years  0.596 0.217 0.487 0.366 0.243 0.192 
 (2.110) (1.387) (1.369) (0.926) (1.266) (0.746) 
Economic Indicators       
Unemployment rate, census 
2011 
-2.422 -2.890 0.549 0.848 -2.089 -0.562 
 (17.546) (11.534) (11.385) (7.699) (10.532) (6.207) 
Decrease in unemployment rate 
(2015-16) 
40.904 26.014 25.572 17.881 21.002 14.017 
 (39.548) (25.998) (25.661) (17.354) (23.740) (13.990) 
Decrease in EU funding (% 
2007-14 to  
-0.368 -0.201 -0.201 -0.084 -0.125 -0.075 
2014-20) (0.380) (0.250) (0.247) (0.167) (0.228) (0.134) 




 (7.709) (5.068) (5.002) (3.383) (4.628) (2.727) 
GVA per head (£ 000s) -0.773 -0.533 -0.509 -0.353 -0.490 -0.287 
 (0.728) (0.479) (0.473) (0.320) (0.437) (0.258) 
Change in wage median (2015-
16 %) 
1.138 0.711 0.705 0.467 0.663 0.368 
 (2.149) (1.413) (1.394) (0.943) (1.290) (0.760) 
Constant 495.148 428.394 329.418 210.326 341.616 185.497 
 (980.887) (644.820) (636.455) (430.413) (588.804) (346.993) 
R-squared 0.549 0.575 0.552 0.563 0.575 0.57 
Notes to Table 2.8: All variables at constituency level except for EU funding and public spending variables. Dependent variable is the total 
weighted coverage of type and duration outlined in the column heading. White robust standard errors in parentheses and significance level denoted 









Table 2.9: The effects on weighted tabloid coverage of the qualification quartiles and controls. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Tabloid Migrant 
crime 1 year 
Tabloid Migrant 
crime 6 months 
Tabloid 
Resource 






EU 1 year 
Tabloid-EU 6 
months 
Constituency controls       
Constituency readership -9.016 -6.210 -9.740 -8.515 -7.516 3.406** 
 (13.65) (8.877) (11.87) (8.300) (8.634) (1.605) 
Share of people aged 30 to 44  7.504** 4.924** 6.461** 4.467** 4.806** 2.129 
 (3.212) (2.089) (2.785) (1.946) (2.265) (2.155) 
Share of people aged 45 to 59 4.907 3.162 4.483 3.271 2.989 1.582 
 (4.246) (2.766) (3.679) (2.573) (3.040) (1.136) 
Share of people age over 60 3.484 2.248 3.087 2.185 2.228 0.409** 
 (2.318) (1.509) (2.002) (1.395) (1.602) (0.186) 
Population density 0.910*** 0.591*** 0.812*** 0.575*** 0.579** -0.402 
 (0.338) (0.220) (0.295) (0.207) (0.262) (2.891) 
Male share 0.446 0.174 0.0292 -0.213 -0.598 1.910*** 
 (5.730) (3.733) (4.964) (3.467) (4.079) (0.710) 
Share of married people  4.212*** 2.756*** 3.629*** 2.506*** 2.717*** 3.238** 
 (1.247) (0.813) (1.082) (0.757) (1.002) (1.487) 
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Migration Controls       
Share of Pre- 2004 EU 
immigrants 
-2.072 -1.313 -1.489 -0.748 -0.316 -0.218 
 (5.557) (3.642) (4.863) (3.436) (3.963) (2.808) 
Share of Post 2004 EU 
immigrants 
6.416* 4.186* 5.709* 4.084* 4.157* 2.944* 
 (3.610) (2.348) (3.112) (2.164) (2.213) (1.568) 
Share of non-EU immigrants  3.541*** 2.323*** 3.181*** 2.312*** 2.402*** 1.715*** 
 (1.006) (0.656) (0.866) (0.603) (0.768) (0.544) 
Net migration in the last 5 years  1.210 0.786 1.056 0.736* 0.744 0.520 
 (0.746) (0.485) (0.641) (0.442) (0.503) (0.356) 
Economic Indicators       
Unemployment rate, census 
2011 
9.808** 6.238** 8.729** 6.117** 5.716 3.962 
 (3.955) (2.575) (3.412) (2.376) (4.183) (2.965) 
Decrease in unemployment rate 
(2015-16) 
25.40** 16.51** 22.64** 16.00** 16.059* 11.209* 
 (12.75) (8.299) (11.00) (7.660) (9.429) (6.682) 
Decrease in EU funding (% 
2007-14 to  
-0.193* -0.115 -0.149 -0.0629 -0.043 -0.023 
2014-20) (0.116) (0.0753) (0.101) (0.0720) (0.091) (0.064) 
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Change in public spending 
(2015-16 %) 
-19.39*** -13.29*** -19.68*** -17.62*** -18.670*** -13.702*** 
 (2.358) (1.533) (2.007) (1.365) (1.838) (1.303) 
GVA per head (£ 000s) -0.185 -0.120 -0.169 -0.126 -0.128 -0.091 
 (0.396) (0.259) (0.347) (0.244) (0.174) (0.123) 
Change in wage median (2015-
16 %) 
0.492 0.328 0.405 0.274 0.291 0.205 
 (0.814) (0.530) (0.703) (0.490) (0.512) (0.363) 
Constant -237.2 -142.8 -199.6 -131.3 -112.434 -80.958 
 (328.8) (214.2) (284.5) (198.4) (233.865) (165.740) 
R-squared 0.298 0.306 0.327 0.375 0.375 0.382 
Notes to Table 2.9: All variables at constituency level except for EU funding and public spending variables. Dependent variable defined as 
‘Weighted tabloid coverage’ of type and period outlined in the column heading. White robust standard errors in parentheses and significance level 
denoted by *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Section 2.6: Discussion and Conclusion 
The fundamental result of this analysis is that economic indicators were the main predictors of 
Leave vote percentages, whereas total weighted media coverage had a relatively small and 
overall statistically insignificant effect on aggregate. The use of the weighted media variables 
proposed in this paper mitigates the drawbacks of the relevant article count variable (defined 
in Equation 1) used in previous literature such as Lamla and Lein (2008) and van der Wiel 
(2009), leading to more accurate estimates and thus eliminating bias resulting from 
measurement error.  
The benchmark weighted media results indicate that newspaper coverage of migrant 
crime had an initial small, positive, and statistically insignificant effect on the constituency 
level percentage Leave votes regardless of the version of coverage used.  Further analysis 
reveals heterogeneities of effects both from relative population qualifications and from 
coverage type. The estimates suggest that negative coverage had a small, statistically 
significant and positive effect in constituencies in the bottom three quartiles of the qualification 
distribution. This provides evidence in favour of information bias since overall media coverage 
had a statistically significant effect which persists after accounting for migration and economic 
indicators. However, this effect dissipates in the top quartile of the qualification distribution 
for all coverage types and all periods. Furthermore, the estimated results of the dummies 
indicating the relative qualification levels of the electorates are all negative and strongly 
statistically significant in all specifications. This suggests that the percentage of Leave votes is 
significantly lower in constituencies with higher proportions of highly educated people. 
Analysis on publication type and stance reveals a heterogeneous pattern of effects. 
Coverage originating in broadsheets which favoured Remain was not found to have 
significantly altered the referendum vote. On the other hand, tabloids which supported Remain 
were successful at dissuading voters from voting Leave, which is significant in all 
specifications. Coverage originating in broadsheets which supported Leave is estimated to have 
increased the Leave vote percentage in the last six months before the referendum for all 
coverage types and in both periods in the case of anti-EU coverage. Anti-EU coverage is also 
found to be positive and statistically significant if originating in Leave-supporting tabloids, but 
the not if found in the other two definitions. 
 Generally, constituencies which experienced a decrease in public spending and EU 
funding and those which experienced increases in unemployment in the year preceding the 
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referendum were estimated to vote more in favour of exiting the EU. The estimated effect of 
an EU funding decrease was relatively small in magnitude, indicating a 0.045 to 0.049 
percentage point increase in Leave vote percentages. A one percentage point decrease in public 
spending in the year before the referendum has strong effect in all specifications, larger in 
magnitude than 2.3 percentage points. A one percentage point increase in the unemployment 
rate at the 2011 census is estimated to have significantly increased the propensity to vote to 
Leave by approximately four percentage points in the benchmark specifications. The estimated 
effect drops to indicate an increase in Leave vote percentages of 0.8 points in subsequent 
analyses. Furthermore, a constituency level one percentage point decrease in unemployment in 
the year before the referendum is estimated to have decreased the Leave vote by roughly 2.2 to 
2.4 percentage points in all specifications. 
Looking at the effects of migrant shares, only the migrant stock from the post-2004 
accession countries is estimated to have had a positive statistically significant effect on the 
propensity to vote Leave, which is consistent across specifications. On the other hand, the 
estimated effects of the pre-2004 accession EU migrants and non-EU migrants is still strongly 
statistically significant and negative, indicating the propensity to vote Leave is lower in areas 
that are more cosmopolitan and possible migrant self-selection. On the other hand, recent net 
migration is not a significant predictor of the percentage of Leave votes. Overall, the effects of 
economic coefficients are largely identical between the regressions involving all types of 
negative coverage considered in this paper. Although there is some evidence of significant 
media effects in this study, the results on economic factors are significant predictors of the 
constituency level Leave votes in all specifications. The results on migrant shares are similar 
to those obtained by Becker et al. (2017). 
This study has two main limitations. The first is the endogeneity issue outlined above, 
since the resulting OLS estimates would be biased upwards. However, given that the results 
are already relatively small, this reinforces the finding that the overall media effect is 
insignificant in magnitude. The Leave voting intention variable obtained from the May 2015 
British Election Study survey is added to account for potential differences in latent 
Euroscepticism and to alleviate concerns about endogeneity. 
Although the main results of the paper indicated that media coverage had no significant 
overall effect, they suggest that coverage is more effective if it originates in a broadsheet 
publication supporting Leave or a tabloid supporting Remain. This finding is similar to that of 
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Chiang and Knight (2011) in the sense that credibility affects the effect of media coverage. 
These results are in line with the studies of Williams and Dickinson (1993), Banerjee et al. 
(2013), and Larreguy et al. (2014), among others, where being exposed to information can alter 
both the perception and voting actions of individuals in line with the message being relayed. 
Furthermore, this study finds evidence that not only are more qualified electorates less prone 
to media persuasion, but also that voters are aware of the reputation of a newspaper. This result 
is strengthened by Larreguy et al. (2014) and Chiang and Knight (2011), who also find evidence 
of voter sophistication along the lines of reputation and expected bias. A further analysis of 
this manner in the context of the 2014 Scottish independence referendum would be an 
















Chapter 3: An Analysis on Political Competition and Media Suppression 
Section 3.1: Introduction 
Beginning at the end of the last century, the world experienced a wave of 
democratisation, and, in the context of former Iron Curtain counties, freer media markets. The 
democratisation trend was believed to lead to less censorship and biased media, as they were 
seen as the purview of autocratic regimes. However, Besley and Prat (2006, page 720) note 
that in a modern context, ‘despite the lack of old-fashioned pre-emptive censorship’ economic 
means are increasingly used to restrict media freedom in order to gain favourable coverage. 
Furthermore, Corduneanu-Huci and Hamilton (2018) show that media restriction via both 
censorship and economic means is an increasing trend, ‘affecting both democracies and 
autocracies, with negative consequences for the overall quality of political institutions and civil 
liberties’. Given these results and the backsliding on media freedom outlined empirically in 
Corduneanu-Huci and Hamilton (2018), it becomes interesting to analyse whether the media 
and political competition together are sufficient to increase media transparency and voter 
welfare. A study analysing the role of potentially biased media in the presence of imperfectly 
informed electorates is a relevant and interesting avenue of research given the recent attention 
to the perceived role of fake news in affecting the outcomes of democratic elections and 
referenda. 
How can increased competition, both politically and within media market, lead to media 
suppression, media bias and dual information systems? Is voter welfare negatively affected? 
This paper proposes a novel theoretical approach that analyses the incentives of politicians and 
media outlets to misrepresent information to the electorate.  
Previous literature suggests that media competition is generally an insufficient deterrent 
for media capture.  Theoretical inquiry into the effect of the biased media market on electoral 
outcomes is a relatively recent academic development. There is ample literature regarding the 
perception of media bias from the perspective of the reader, as observed in Burke (2008), 
Besley and Prat (2006), and Sobrio (2013), etc. Of interest in the previous theoretical literature 
was whether an independent media could prevent or limit the incentives of elected politicians 
to engage in dishonest practices, yielding mixed results. With respect to the origin of bias, two 
main categories are distinguished: demand side and supply side. The overall message is that 
media market competition hinders supply driven bias and exacerbates demand driven bias. 
There are two types of bias distinguished in the literature: (outright) distortion of fact and 
information filtering. Focusing on media slant, Mullainathan and Shleifer (2005), Baron 
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(2006), Rudiger (2013), Sobrio (2013), and Várdy and Oliveros (2015) find that media 
competition does not alleviate bias, which in turn can lead to a suboptimal election result. The 
results of Besley and Prat (2006) and Anand et al. (2007) indicate that electoral outcomes 
improve with competition. Within this category, media slant can occur either via the demand 
side due to audience bias, or via the supply side due to the beliefs of the reporter or the 
reputational concerns of the editor. The closest papers to this study are those of Besley and Prat 
(2006) and Trombetta and Rossignoli (2020), who analyse political games of endogenous 
media capture. Both papers analyse the conditions under which media capture is feasible and 
desirable from the perspective of the incumbent, indicating that political media capture can 
occur despite media freedom. However, neither paper accounts for political competition and 
electoral spending laws, which could help or hinder media freedom. 
This paper analyses whether political competition and electoral standards, here defined 
as having equal campaign budgets, help mitigate these effects and looks at the theoretical 
incentives of media suppression in more democratic settings, with novel results. This study 
aims to contribute to the burgeoning literature on the interplay between media, political 
outcomes, and the flow of information. The proposed model builds on the seminal paper of 
Besley and Prat (2006) and that of Trombetta and Rossignoli (2020) in two ways. Firstly, it 
introduces an active challenger in the political game, effectively emulating a simple majority 
democratic election or referendum. Secondly, it extends the analysis to account for binding and 
non-binding electoral spending laws. However, unlike Trombetta and Rossignoli (2020) and 
Besley and Prat (2006), the results indicate that in pure strategy Perfect Bayesian Equilibria, 
media and political competition and electoral standards ensure that the true state of politicians 
is always revealed to a subset of the electorate. However, if the proportion of voters who 
actively seek political news is sufficiently large, full disclosure occurs in the media market 
even if both politicians are bad. The present model can be seen as a generalisation of the 
previous models as it collapses to that of Trombetta and Rossignoli (2020) if the politicians’ 
budgets are highly asymmetrical and there are no reputation concerns. With the additional 
assumption that the share of informed voters is zero, it collapses to the analysis of Besley and 
Prat (2006).  
The remainder of this chapter follows the following structure. Section 3.2 provides a 
brief literature review. Section 3.3 outlines the actors and features of the model. I then analyse 
a limited game to pinpoint which features are paramount for the results. Section 3.5 analyses 
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the full games with media market credibility. Section 3.6 includes an outline of the results and 
discussions. 
Section 3.2: Literature 
The relationship between the media and electoral or political outcomes has been widely 
researched in the theoretical political economy literature, as outlined comprehensively in the 
reviews of Prat and Stromberg (2013) and Gentzkow et al. (2016). Two main strands of 
literature can be distinguished, namely supply driven bias and demand driven bias respectively. 
The former arises when media market bias arises from rational consumers who may prefer 
confirmatory news, as outlined in Chan and Suen (2008) and Duggan and Martinelli (2011) or 
gain psychological utility from reading reports whose stance is closer to the reader’s prior 
beliefs, as in Mullainathan and Shleifer (2005). Alternatively, reporting closer to what the 
readers believe to be the true state of the world could be used as a signal of accuracy and 
trustworthiness by outlets in an attempt to increase their (future) demand, as outlined in the 
model of Gentzkow and Shapiro (2006). The overall message is that media bias persists despite 
increased media market competition, as misreporting may become a profit maximising decision 
for the outlets. Supply side bias arises when the outlets themselves have a political preference, 
a mobilisation incentive, or act under pressure from third parties such as politicians and 
advertisers. This is outlined in the models of Baron (2006), Besley and Prat (2006), Anderson 
and McLaren (2012) and Trombetta and Rossignoli (2020). Whereas these incentives can lead 
to bias even with rational consumers, increased competition tends to diminish bias and increase 
consumer welfare. 
The issue of side payments or ‘bribes’ from the politicians to the media is motivated by 
evidence of the government ownership of media outlets and political courting of favourable 
coverage, as outlined empirically in Durante and Knight (2012) in Italy and Enikopolov et al. 
(2011, 2018) in Russia, and theoretically by Gehlbach and Sonin (2014). In explaining the 
effect of the media on political outcomes, two important aspects arise in the literature, namely 
the ideological motive and the profit motive. In this context, it may be a profit maximisation 
decision for outlets to misreport the correct ‘state of the world’ to cater to their customer base, 
even if they received the correct signal. An example of the latter appears in Anderson and 
McLaren (2012), but their main focus is on the market structure in the media market. An 
interesting feature is the behaviour of voters in this framework, especially since the voters do 
not know whether the signal the media reports is genuine or deceitful, or whether the outlet 
obtained the wrong signal themselves.  
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Chakraborty and Ghosh (2016) enhance probabilistic modelling with a Hotelling-
Downs structure to construct an electoral model with potentially biased media, in which voters 
care about policy and a politician’s character. The Hotelling-Downs model is not optimal in 
the context of this analysis due its focus on political position rather than competency. While 
some degree of ideological solidarity appears in this model, the ultimate determinant of relative 
second period voter utility is the competency of the elected politician, since not providing any 
public good is his optimal strategy. The probabilistic model employed in Várdy and Oliveros 
(2015) allows for the possibility that voters abstain. Here, voters have a pre-existing belief of 
the state of the world, which acts both as a measure of ideological conviction and as an input 
in a voter’s decision on whether to consult the media. Their results suggest that the possibility 
of abstention and media competition lead to diminish the intensity of bias, but not remove it.  
The closest models to the one analysed in this paper are those of Besley and Prat (2006) 
and Trombetta and Rossignoli (2020). Besley and Prat (2006) analyse a political game of 
endogenous media capture, in which an incumbent politician can attempt to ‘capture’ outlets 
such that they misreport their signal to the electorate. In this context, media capture is defined 
by a politician, who by economic or coercive means induces one outlet to misreport their signal. 
The authors analyse the conditions under which media capture is feasible and desirable from 
the perspective of the politician, indicating that the incumbent captures either all or none of the 
outlets. In this framework, the cost of capture is strictly increasing with competition as each 
outlet needs to be paid monopoly profits in equilibrium. Trombetta and Rossignoli (2020) 
extends the analysis by introducing heterogeneous voters, who can either intentionally follow 
political content or only see it when their outlet reports it. This results in heterogeneous levels 
of political capture if the share of informed voters is small enough, but the cost of capture 
becomes non-monotonic. 
Other papers extending the model of Besley and Prat (2006) are Drufuca (2014) who 
endogenizes the information choice voters face, and Corduneanu-Huci and Hamilton (2018) 
who analyse the substitutability of censorship and capture via economic inducements. Neither 
paper considers both political and media market competition nor reputation concerns for the 
outlets. The results shown below show that heterogeneous media capture can arise in pure 
strategy Perfect Bayesian Equilibria in the presence of both political and media market 
competition, but total media suppression never occurs. 
80 
 
Section 3.3: Model 
In this model, I attempt to retain as many features of the models of Besley and Prat 
(2006) and Trombetta and Rossignoli (2020) in order to provide a contrast to the result obtained 
therein. The proposed two period electoral model includes three actors, namely: two politicians, 𝑛 ∈ ℕ media outlets, and voters with mass normalised to 1. In order to win, a politician must 
acquire at least a 50% share of the total votes. In this respect, the following model is 
approximating a second run of a majority vote system. The voters have restricted access to 
information and are expected utility maximisers. This model further develops the work of 
Besley and Prat (2006), enhancing the model by not only adding heterogeneous voters, as seen 
in Trombetta and Rossignoli (2020), but also adding an active challenger politician who has 
identical incentives as the incumbent and heterogeneous media agents. Additionally, this model 
proposes an extension concerning reputation in the media market, which should decrease the 
probability of ‘capture’. In their model, Besley and Prat (2006) analyse a two-period game in 
which an incumbent politician attempts to ‘capture’ media agents in order to determine what 
facilitates media capture as well as its welfare effects. Trombetta and Rossignoli (2020) extends 
their model by allowing voters to be heterogeneous in their attention and demand for political 
news. Unlike Besley and Prat (2006), this feature allows for heterogeneous levels of media 
capture to arise in pure strategy Perfect Bayesian Equilibria. 
The game takes place in three stages, which occur successively: the political 
competition stage, the media market competition stage, and the voting stage. The political 
competition occurs successively, while media competition and voting are simultaneous. 
Section 3.3.1: Politicians 
There are two risk-neutral politicians in this model, namely the incumbent and the 
challenger; for exogenous reasons, the incumbent is in office at the beginning of the first period. 
In the rest of the paper, subscripts I and C will denote an incumbent and challenger specific 
variables respectively. The politicians can be either good or bad. Let 𝜃𝑖 = {𝑔, 𝑏}, denote the 
type of politician, where i indexes the politicians. Both politicians desire to win the election 
and be in power in the second period. Assume that the prior probability a politician is good is 
γ, i.e. Pr { 𝜃𝑖 = 𝑔} = 𝛾, 𝑖 ∈ {𝐼, 𝐶}, and is known to all agents. This assumption is similar to that 
observed in Adachi and Hizen (2014).  
The utility of either politician is independent of the administration they provide, but a 
good politician always choses the policy which maximises voter’s welfare, while a bad 
81 
 
politician chooses a policy which yield no utility to the voters. The incumbent is in office at 
the start of the first period and has a positive and finite budget 𝐵 ∈ ℝ to spend on campaigning. 
The politicians know their type as well as their opponent’s, both of which are unknown to 
voters, who need to rely on the media to obtain such information. Therefore, politicians can 
pay a vector of ‘bribes’ to the n media outlets, where n ∈ ℕ is a finite number, in an attempt to 
persuade media outlets to report on them in a beneficial manner.2 Unlike the studies of Besley 
and Prat (2006) and Trombetta and Rossignoli (2020), an honest incumbent would also have 
an incentive to offer a vector of payments towards media outlets to prevent a dishonest 
challenger from influencing these media outlets and potentially winning the election. 
Politicians observe their type and what signals the media agents received, as explained in detail 
below. Let 𝜏𝐽, 𝐽 ∈ {𝐼, 𝐶} denote the vector of bribes offered by politician J, and  𝜏𝐽𝑖 ≥ 0 the 
proposed transfer from politician J to outlet i, such that   𝜏𝐽 = [ 𝜏𝐽1, 𝜏𝐽2,  𝜏𝐽3, … ,  𝜏𝐽𝑛] 
The resulting utility of the politicians is given by: 
𝑈𝐼 = {𝐵 − ∑ 𝜏𝐼𝑖𝑖∈𝑀 , 𝑖𝑓 ℎ𝑒 𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑒𝑠2𝐵 − ∑ 𝜏𝐼𝑖𝑖∈𝑀  𝑖𝑓 ℎ𝑒 𝑤𝑖𝑛𝑠, 
Where B is the budget a politician can spend on electoral campaigning, M is the set of 
news agents, and 𝜏𝐼𝑖 is the monetary transfer aimed at outlet i from the incumbent. For the 
benchmark analysis, it is assumed that both politicians have the same budget. This assumption 
is relaxed in Section 6. Therefore, the utility of the challenger is given by: 
𝑈𝐶 = {  
  𝐵 −∑𝜏𝐶𝑖𝑖∈𝑀 , 𝑖𝑓 ℎ𝑒 𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑒𝑠2𝐵 −∑𝜏𝐶𝑖𝑖∈𝑀  𝑖𝑓 ℎ𝑒 𝑤𝑖𝑛𝑠 
For tractability reasons, politicians pay by discrete units of 1.3 Additionally, there is an 
incumbency advantage in the sense that the incumbent wins in the event of a tied vote and he 
is preferred by both types of voters should voting for either politician yield the same expected 
utility.  
 
2 This will be defined below.  
3 This assumption helps in tiebreaking optimal decisions. 
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Section 3.3.2: Media 
Media outlets can receive signals about the true nature of the politicians and are revenue 
maximisers. They are risk neutral and have two potential sources of revenue: advertising, which 
is proportional to their audience, or a possible bribe from either politician. This assumption is 
similar to those of Besley and Prat (2006) and Trombetta and Rossignoli (2020), where the 
bribe could originate only from the incumbent. They are revenue maximisers, and should 
outlets receive offers from both politicians, they would accept only the contribution that 
maximises their revenue. Should accepting either offer lead to the same expected revenue, they 
prefer the one that allows the outlet to remain honest. Their audience revenue is dependent on 
their readership, which in turn is determined by the actions of all media outlets. The revenue 
structure will be detailed in the next subsection. 
Should an outlet accept the bribe, they must report favourably towards that politician. 
Let 𝑠𝑘 ∈ {𝛷𝑘, 𝑏𝑘} denote the signal received by media outlets about politician k. The 𝛷𝑘,  signal 
is uninformative while 𝑏𝑘 indicates the politician is bad. The uninformative signal is always 
received in the case of a good politician. The bad signal can only occur if the politician is bad, 
i.e. Pr(𝑠𝑘 = 𝑏𝑘|𝜃𝑘 = 𝑔) = 0. Furthermore, let Pr(𝑠𝑘 = 𝑏|𝜃𝑖 = 𝑏) = 𝑞, denote the probability 
that the outlets receive a bad signal about a bad politician and Pr(𝑠 = 𝛷|𝜃𝑖 = 𝑏) = 1 − 𝑞. 
Correspondingly, the signal set is given by 𝑆𝑘 = {𝛷𝐼𝛷𝐶 , 𝑏𝐼𝑏𝐶,𝑏𝐼𝛷𝐶 , 𝛷𝐼𝑏𝐶,}. Given their signal 
and potential transfers received from politicians, outlets decide their optimal action. The 
outlets’ actions can be either to accurately report the nature of the politicians or misreport the 
state of one of them. To simplify the analysis, the outlets are assumed to only be capable of 
reporting negative information about politicians after receiving a bad signal about them. 
A novel feature of an extension of this proposed model is the introduction of reputation 
concerns in the media market. For each outlet, with probability λ, nature reveals at the 
beginning of the second period an outlet which suppressed a bad signal as dishonest. In this 
case, the guilty outlet loses all their audience and the associated revenue. Since it is optimal for 
the elected politician to keep the entire second period budget to himself, this revelation 
eliminates second period revenue from the media outlets revealed to be dishonest. The 
assumption that the λ=0 across media outlets types is made for the benchmark analysis. 




Section 3.3.3: Voters 
Voters are risk-neutral and have an interest in an honest politician being elected, 
receiving no utility otherwise. Hence, voter utility is:  
𝑈𝑉 = {1 𝑖𝑓 𝑎 𝑔𝑜𝑜𝑑 𝑝𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑛 𝑖𝑠 𝑖𝑛 𝑜𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑒 0 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒  
For tractability reasons, the voters cannot observe their utility until after having cast 
their votes in the first period. This assumption is taken from the papers of Besley and Prat 
(2006) and Trombetta and Rossignoli (2020) and is introduced to provide a contrast to their 
results by adapting their models as little as possible. Recall that voters have heterogeneous 
interest in following political news. The first group, called attentive voters, are like those 
modelled in Besley and Prat (2006) in the sense that they will seek media that covers political 
news. Rationally inattentive voters are split equally between the competing outlets and get 
politically informed if their media outlet publishes political news in the form of a bad signal 
about either politician. Let α denote the share of attentive voters. Consequently, the share of 
rationally inattentive voters is 1-α. Voters know their own type and α is common knowledge.  
Section 3.3.4: Benchmark case: No audience related revenues 
 In this section, I analyse the benchmark case in which audience related revenues are 
normalised to 0 irrespective of the signals received by media outlets and their actions. All other 
features of the model are maintained. This is the most difficult case, as the addition of audience 
revenues will reinforce the results since suppression becomes more difficult.  For this section, 
we assume that the probability that a media outlet is discovered as dishonest in the second 
period, λ, is zero. Therefore, the only way in which outlets receive positive revenue is if they 
receive a positive transfer from the politician. In this section, I determine the main drivers of 
the equilibrium result. These are the inability of outlets to fabricate a bad signal, the consecutive 
movement in the politician game and constant budget political competition, rather than media 
market competition. I begin by analysing the Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium arising in this case, 
and then prove that under these general conditions, total media suppression never arises as an 
equilibrium outcome if politicians have equal budgets. This result cannot be extended to the 
unequal budgets case as sufficiently asymmetrical budgets approximate the absence of political 
competition in media capture. This collapses the analysis to that of Besley and Prat (2006) if 
no voter heterogeneity is considered, or Trombetta and Rossignoli (2020) if it is, under both of 
which total media suppression can occur. 
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Under this baseline scenario, the minimal acceptable bribe from any bad politician is 1. 
Formally, the payoffs for the outlets becomes: 
Then the payoff structure of outlet i in the first period, 𝛲1𝑖, is the following: 𝛲1𝑖 = {𝜏𝐽,𝑖 𝑖𝑓 𝑖𝑡 𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑝𝑡𝑠 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑜𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑟 𝑓𝑟𝑜𝑚 𝑝𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑛 𝑗0 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒  𝛲2𝑖 = 0, ∀𝑖 
One inherent tie breaking assumption is made, namely that outlets prefer to report when they 
receive no offer from the politician. This renders truth telling the optimal action in the absence 
of political interference in the media market, which is in line with what is observed in the 
remainder of the paper, where, in the absence of political intervention, reporting audience 
revenues exceed non-reporting audience revenues. 
The purpose of this section is to show that the absence of total media suppression result is 
driven by two factors: firstly, that media outlets can only report a politician is bad when they 
receive a signal and secondly, that political competition increases the cost of total media 
capture. 
The timing of the game is: 
• Nature determines the types of the politicians 𝜃𝑖, where 𝑖 ∈ {𝐼, 𝐶} and 𝜃𝑖 ∈ {𝑔, 𝑏}. Only the 
politicians know their type and their opponent’s type prior to the signal. The prior probability 
that a politician is good is γ for both the incumbent and the challenger and is known by all 
agents. The shares of informed voters 𝛼 is determined and is known to all agents.  
• Outlets receive a composite signal about the state of the politicians, with each bad politician 
being revealed with probability q. The signal set outlets may receive 
is {𝛷𝐼𝛷𝐶 , 𝑏𝐼𝑏𝐶,𝑏𝐼𝛷𝐶 , 𝛷𝐼𝑏𝐶,}. The voters do not know that all outlets received the signal, and 
their prior belief that a politician is bad is γ. If a politician is revealed as bad, all media agents 
know it, but the voters do not. Additionally, both politicians know which has been exposed as 
bad   
• Politicians decide successively on two vectors of bribes 𝜏𝐼 and 𝜏𝐶 towards the media outlets 
and they specify a reporting strategy towards the outlets they are bribing, with the incumbent 
moving first. These vectors are unknown only to the voters. 
• Media outlets decide simultaneously whether to accept the bribe and report accordingly. The 
voters do not observe this stage and do not know which, if any, outlets have accepted 
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compensation from the politician. If a news outlet is approached by both politicians, its best 
response is to adopt the strategy which maximises the outlet’s revenue. Should both politicians 
make equal acceptable offers, it will report the truth. Should the expected payoff after receiving 
donations from either politician match, they prefer the incumbent. 
• Voters simultaneously observe the signal from the media according to their type and vote to 
maximise their expected utility.  
Second period begins. 
• The election results are announced along with politician types and are known to all agents.  
• Voters simultaneously consume media and the game ends. 
In the following sections, I identify pure strategy Perfect Bayesian Equilibria (PBE), which are 
outlined through a series of lemmas.  
Proposition 1 
In the Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium, the incumbent wins in cases 𝛷𝐼𝛷𝐶, 𝛷𝐼𝑏𝐶, 𝑏𝐼𝑏𝐶, while the 
incumbent wins if case 𝑏𝐼𝛷𝐶. Consequently, a good politician always wins the election  if he 
is present and a bad incumbent defeats a bad challenger. Outlets report honestly if at in all 
cases. The minimum share of outlets a bad challenger needs to ‘influence’ to win the election 
is 𝛤 = 𝟎.𝟓𝟏−𝜶, unless both politicians are revealed as bad. If both politicians are bad, the number 
of outlets the incumbent needs to capture 𝛤∗ = 𝟎.𝟓−𝜶𝟏−𝜶 ≤ 𝛤. 




received by media 
𝛷𝐼𝛷𝐶 𝛷𝐼𝑏𝐶 𝑏𝐼𝛷𝐶 𝑏𝐼𝑏𝐶 
Prior Probability 𝛾2 + 2(1 − 𝛾)𝛾𝑞+ (1 − 𝛾)2(1 − 𝑞)2 𝛾(1 − 𝛾)𝑞+ (1 − 𝛾)2𝑞(1 − 𝑞) 𝛾(1 − 𝛾)𝑞 + (1 − 𝛾)2𝑞(1 − 𝑞) (1 − 𝛾)2𝑞2 
Agents and 
strategies 
    
Incumbent 
strategy 
 𝝉𝑰,𝒊 = 0, ∀𝑖, ∀𝐵, ∀ 𝐸(𝜏𝐶)  𝝉𝑰,𝒊 = 0, ∀𝑖, ∀𝐵 ∀ 𝐸(𝜏𝐶)   𝝉𝑰,𝒊 = 0, ∀𝑖 ∀𝐵, 𝑎𝑛𝑑 ∀ 𝐸(𝜏𝐶) 𝑠𝑢𝑐ℎ 𝑡ℎ𝑎𝑡 𝝉𝑪,𝒊 =𝟎 for 𝑛 + 1 − ⌈Γn⌉ outlets 
Otherwise, a) if 𝐵 ≥⌈Γn⌉ 
𝝉𝑰,𝒊 = {1 𝑡𝑜 ⌈Γn⌉ outlets0 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒  
b) if 𝐵 <⌈Γn⌉𝜏∗ 𝜏𝐼,𝑖 = 0, ∀𝑖 
If α=0 and n>2 or if α>0 and ⌈Γ∗n⌉(⌈Γn⌉+1)⌈Γ∗n⌉−2 < 𝐵 𝜏𝐼,𝑖 = 0, ∀𝑖 
If α=0, B≥ 1 and n=2 𝜏𝐼,𝑖 = 𝐵 − 1 𝑡𝑜 𝑜𝑛𝑒 𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑙𝑒𝑡 
If 
⌈Γ∗n⌉(⌈Γn⌉+1)⌈Γ∗n⌉−2 ≥ 𝐵 and 𝐵 ≥⌈Γn⌉ 
𝝉𝑰,𝒊 = {1 + (𝑙 + 𝑘)1⌈Γ∗n⌉  𝑡𝑜 ⌈Γ∗n⌉ outlets0 𝑡𝑜 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡  
If 
⌈Γ∗n⌉(⌈Γn⌉+1)⌈Γ∗n⌉−2 ≥ 𝐵 and 𝐵 ∈ [⌈Γ∗n⌉, ⌈Γn⌉) 
𝜏𝑖,𝐼 = {1 𝑡𝑜⌈Γ∗n⌉ 𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑙𝑒𝑡𝑠 0 𝑡𝑜 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡  





 𝝉𝑪,𝒊 = 0, ∀𝑖, ∀𝐵, ∀ 𝜏𝐼  𝝉𝑪,𝒊 = 0, ∀𝑖∀𝐵, ∀ 𝜏𝐼  If 𝜏𝐼,𝑖 < 1 for ⌈Γn⌉ outlets, then 𝝉𝑪,𝒊 = 0, ∀𝑖 ∀𝐵. 
If 𝜏𝐼,𝑖 ≥ 1 for x+⌈Γn⌉ outlets, pick the x+1 outlets 
with the smallest 𝜏𝐼,𝑖 ≥ 1, 𝜏𝐼,𝑖∗ , and 
𝝉𝑪,𝒊 = {𝝉𝑰,𝒊 + 1 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑖 ∈ 𝜏𝐼,𝑖∗0 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒  
If α=0 or if α>0 and ⌈Γ∗n⌉(⌈Γn⌉+1)⌈Γ∗n⌉−2 < 𝐵 
𝝉𝑪,𝒊 = {1 𝑓𝑜𝑟 ⌈Γn⌉ 𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑙𝑒𝑡𝑠0 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒  
Otherwise 𝝉𝑪,𝒊 = 0 , ∀𝑖 if 𝐵 <⌈Γn⌉  
If 𝐵 ≥⌈Γn⌉, let x denote the number of outlets for 
which 𝜏𝐼,𝑖=0 and order the remaining outlets 
ascendingly. Then if 1) x≥⌈Γn⌉ or 2) x<⌈Γn⌉ and  
𝐵 − 𝑥 ≥ ∑ 𝜏𝐼,𝑗 + (⌈Γn⌉ − x)⌈Γn⌉𝑗=𝑥+1  𝜏𝐶,𝑖
= { 1 𝑡𝑜min(𝑥, ⌈𝛤𝑛⌉)  𝑡𝑜 𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑙𝑒𝑡𝑠 𝑠. 𝑡 𝜏𝐼,𝑖 = 0𝜏𝐼,𝑖 + 1 𝑡𝑜 the first max(⌈𝛤𝑛⌉ − 𝑥, 0)  𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑙𝑒𝑡𝑠0 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒  
Otherwise 𝝉𝑪,𝒊 = 0 
 
Electoral result Incumbent wins Incumbent wins Challenger wins Depends on α, n and B 
Media Agents Report honestly,𝛷𝐼𝛷𝐶, 
for ∀ 𝜏𝐼 𝑎𝑛𝑑 ∀ 𝜏𝐶. If 𝜏𝑖,𝐼 ≠ 0 and or 𝜏𝐶,𝑖 ≠
Report honestly 𝛷𝐼𝑏𝐶 
if 𝜏𝐶,𝑖 < 1, ∀ 𝜏𝐼  Report honestly 𝑏𝐼𝛷𝐶 unless Report honestly b𝐼b𝐶 if either set of conditions holds 
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0, they would accept 
the higher offer and 
still report honestly 
Or if 𝜏𝐶,𝑖 ≥ 1 and 𝜏𝐼 ≥ 𝜏𝐶,𝑖 + 1 
Report Φ𝐼Φ𝐶 if 𝜏𝐶,𝑖 ≥ 1 and 𝜏𝐼 <𝜏𝐶,𝑖 + 1 
 
 { 𝜏𝐼,𝑖 ≥ 1𝐚𝐧𝐝𝜏𝐶,𝑖 < 𝜏𝐼,𝑖 + 1  
then report Φ𝐼Φ𝐶 
𝜏𝐼,𝑖 < 1 𝐚𝐧𝐝 𝜏𝐶,𝑖 < 1 𝑶𝑹𝜏𝐼,𝑗 > 1 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝜏𝐼,−𝑗 > 𝜏𝐼,𝑗 + 1 
For 𝑗 ∈ {𝐼, 𝐶} 
Report Φ𝐼b𝐶 if 𝜏𝐼,𝑖 ≥ 1 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝜏𝐼,𝑖 ≥ 𝜏𝐶,𝑖 
Report b𝐼Φ𝐶 if 𝜏𝐶,𝑖 ≥ 1 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝜏𝐼,𝑖 < 𝜏𝐶,𝑖  
Informed Voters Vote incumbent unless 
observe b𝐼Φ𝐶 in the 
media 
Vote incumbent 
unless observe b𝐼Φ𝐶 
in the media 
Vote challenger if they observe b𝐼Φ𝐶 in the media. 




Vote incumbent unless 
observe b𝐼Φ𝐶 from 
their outlet 
Vote incumbent 
unless observe b𝐼Φ𝐶 
from their outlet 
Vote challenger if they observe b𝐼Φ𝐶 from their 
outlet. Vote incumbent if they observe Φ𝐼Φ𝐶 from 
their outlet 
Vote challenger if they observe b𝐼Φ𝐶 from their 
outlet. Vote incumbent if they observe b𝐼b𝐶 or Φ𝐼b𝐶  from their outlet 
Equilibrium 𝝉𝑰,𝒊 = 0, ∀𝑖, 𝝉𝑪,𝒊 =0, ∀𝑖 
Media outlets report 
honestly Φ𝐼Φ𝐶 . 
Both types of voters 
vote incumbent. 
𝝉𝑰,𝒊 = 0, ∀𝑖, 𝝉𝑪,𝒊 =0, ∀ 𝑖 
Media outlets report 
honestly Φ𝐼𝑏𝐶. 
Both types of voters 
vote incumbent. 
𝝉𝑰,𝒊 = 0, ∀𝑖, 𝝉𝑪,𝒊 = 0, ∀ 𝑖 
Media outlets report honestly 𝑏𝐼𝛷𝐶. 
Both types of voters vote challenger. 
If α=0 and n>2 or if α>0 and ⌈Γ∗n⌉(⌈Γn⌉+1)⌈Γ∗n⌉−2 < 𝐵 𝜏𝐼,𝑖 = 0, ∀𝑖 𝝉𝑪,𝒊 = 0, ∀ 𝑖 
If α=0, B≥ 1 and n=2 
𝐼,𝑖 = 𝐵 − 1 𝑡𝑜 𝑜𝑛𝑒 𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑙𝑒𝑡, 𝝉𝑪,𝒊 = 0, ∀ 𝑖 
If 
⌈Γ∗n⌉(⌈Γn⌉+1)⌈Γ∗n⌉−2 ≥ 𝐵 and 𝐵 ≥⌈Γn⌉ 
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𝝉𝑰,𝒊 = {1 + (𝑙 + 𝑘)1⌈Γ∗n⌉  𝑡𝑜 ⌈Γ∗n⌉ outlets0 𝑡𝑜 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡  𝝉𝑪,𝒊 = 0, ∀ 𝑖 
If 
⌈Γ∗n⌉(⌈Γn⌉+1)⌈Γ∗n⌉−2 ≥ 𝐵 and 𝐵 ∈ [⌈Γ∗n⌉, ⌈Γn⌉) 
𝜏𝑖,𝐼 = {1 𝑡𝑜⌈Γ∗n⌉ 𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑙𝑒𝑡𝑠 0 𝑡𝑜 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡  𝝉𝑪,𝒊 = 0, ∀ 𝑖 
Media outlets report honestly 𝑏𝐼𝑏𝐶. 





In any Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium with weakly undominated strategies, voters will 
prefer to vote for the incumbent unless he is revealed as bad and the challenger is not.  
Proof: 
For the purposes of this proof, a distinction between how informed and uninformed 
voters update their beliefs needs to be made. 
From the perspective of any voter: Pr (𝜃𝐼 = 𝑔|𝑠𝑖 = 𝑏𝐼𝑏𝐶) = 0 < 𝛾 Pr (𝜃𝐼 = 𝑔|𝑠𝑖 = 𝑏𝐼𝛷𝐶) = 0 < 𝛾 Pr (𝜃𝐶 = 𝑔|𝑠𝑖 = 𝑏𝐼𝑏𝐶) = 0 < 𝛾 Pr (𝜃𝐶 = 𝑔|𝑠𝑖 = 𝛷𝐼b𝐶) = 0 < 𝛾 
which results from the structure of the game for both politicians and for both voter types and 
all histories. Therefore, upon observing a bad signal, a voter knows the politician is bad and 
that he would get utility of 0 if said politician is in office. It is therefore an optimal decision for 
the voter to not vote for a politician revealed as bad. If both politicians are revealed as bad, the 
voters prefer the incumbent due to the incumbency advantage. 
Voters are aware that bad politicians could attempt to ‘silence’ outlets, but they update 
their beliefs differently. An attentive voter acts like one in Besley and Prat (2006) and can be 
misled only by total media suppression.  
Applying Bayes’ rule for both the incumbent and the challenger from the perspective 
of an informed voter based on the politician strategies outlined above: 
Pr (𝜃𝐼 = 𝑔|𝑠𝑖 = 𝛷𝐼𝛷𝐶) = Pr (𝜃𝐼 = 𝑔)Pr (𝑠𝑖 = 𝛷𝐼𝛷𝐶|𝜃𝐼 = 𝑔)Pr (𝑠𝑖 = 𝛷𝐼𝛷𝐶)  
= 𝛾[𝛾 + (1 − 𝛾)(1 − 𝑞)]𝛾2 + (1 − 𝛾)2(1 − 𝑞)2 + 2𝛾(1 − 𝛾)(1 − 𝑞) 
Similarly, about the challenger: 
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Pr (𝜃𝐶 = 𝑔|𝑠𝑖 = 𝛷𝐼𝛷𝐶) = Pr (𝜃𝐼 = 𝑔)Pr (𝑠𝑖 = 𝛷𝐼𝛷𝐶|𝜃𝐼 = 𝑔)Pr (𝑠𝑖 = 𝛷𝐼𝛷𝐶)  
= 𝛾[𝛾 + (1 − 𝛾)(1 − 𝑞)]𝛾2 + (1 − 𝛾)2(1 − 𝑞)2 + 2𝛾(1 − 𝛾)(1 − 𝑞) 
 
This is because an informed voter observes a pair of null signals in the following three 
situations only: both politicians are good, both politicians are good and undiscovered, or one 
politician is good and the other is bad and undiscovered. Therefore, given politician j is good, 
a null signal can be observed only if a bad signal is not observed about politician -j. 
Now consider Bayesian updating for an informed voter when they observe signal 𝑏𝑗Φ−𝑗 Pr (𝜃𝑗 = 𝑔|𝑠𝑖 = 𝑏𝑗𝛷−𝑗) = 0 < 𝛾 
Pr (𝜃𝑗 = 𝑔|𝑠𝑖 = 𝛷𝑗𝑏−𝑗) = Pr (𝜃𝑗 = 𝑔)Pr (𝑠𝑖 = 𝛷𝑗𝑏−𝑗|𝜃𝑗 = 𝑔)Pr(𝑠𝑖 = 𝛷𝑗𝑏−𝑗)  
= 𝛾𝑞(1 − 𝛾)𝛾𝑞(1 − 𝛾) + 𝑞(1 − 𝛾)2(1 − 𝑞) > 0 
This happens because upon observing signal 𝛷𝑗𝑏−𝑗, informed voters know with 
certainty that politician -j is bad, while there is a strictly positive probability that politician j is 
good. Consequently, they would prefer politician –j as Pr (𝜃−𝑗 = 𝑔|𝑠𝑖 = 𝛷𝑗𝑏−𝑗) = 0. 
Because of the incumbency advantage assumption, informed voters prefer to vote for 
the incumbent should they observe 𝑏𝐼𝑏𝐶. Thus, the only scenario in which an informed voter 
prefers the challenger to the incumbent is if the expected utility from electing the challenger 
exceeds that of electing the incumbent, i.e. after observing 𝑏𝑖𝛷𝑐 
I now analyse how an uninformed voter updates their belief. As above, after observing 
a bad signal, the posterior belief that the politician is bad becomes one. The difference with 
respect to the informed voters is that in case 𝑏𝐼𝑏𝐶, some rationally inattentive voters can be 
subscribed to an outlet which misreports one of the politicians. The winning politician depends 




Let n denote the total number of outlets. Therefore, in both histories, the probability 
that an inattentive voter reads a captured outlet is 
⌈𝛤𝑛⌉𝑛  or ⌈𝛤∗𝑛⌉𝑛 , where 𝑚𝑖 and 𝑚𝑐 denote the 
number of outlets silenced by the incumbent and challenger respectively. For the incumbent: 
Pr (𝜃𝐼 = 𝑔|𝑠𝑖 = 𝛷𝐼𝛷𝐶) = Pr (𝜃𝐼 = 𝑔)Pr (𝑠𝑖 = 𝛷𝐼𝛷𝐶|𝜃𝐼 = 𝑔)Pr (𝑠𝑖 = 𝛷𝐼𝛷𝐶)  
= 𝛾[𝛾 + (1 − 𝛾)(1 − 𝑞)]𝛾2 + (1 − 𝛾)2(1 − 𝑞)2 + 2𝛾(1 − 𝛾)(1 − 𝑞) 
Similarly, for the challenger: 
Pr (𝜃𝐶 = 𝑔|𝑠𝑖 = 𝛷𝐼𝛷𝐶) = Pr (𝜃𝐼 = 𝑔)Pr (𝑠𝑖 = 𝛷𝐼𝛷𝐶|𝜃𝐼 = 𝑔)Pr (𝑠𝑖 = 𝛷𝐼𝛷𝐶)  
= 𝛾[𝛾 + (1 − 𝛾)(1 − 𝑞)]𝛾2 + (1 − 𝛾)2(1 − 𝑞)2 + 2𝛾(1 − 𝛾)(1 − 𝑞) 
As with informed voters, we can observe that Pr (𝜃𝐼 = 𝑔𝑜𝑜𝑑|𝑠𝑖,𝐼 = 𝛷) = Pr (𝜃𝐶 =𝑔𝑜𝑜𝑑|𝑠𝑖,𝐼 = 𝛷), and due to the incumbency advantage assumption, both informed and 
rationally inattentive voters prefer to vote for the incumbent after observing a pair of null 
signals. 
Now consider Bayesian updating for a rationally inattentive voter when they observe 
signal 𝑏𝐼𝛷𝐶. Since outlets cannot fabricate a bad signal, it follows that Pr (𝜃𝐼 = 𝑔|𝑠𝑖 = b𝐼𝛷𝐶) = 0 
In the case of the challenger: 
Pr (𝜃𝐶 = 𝑔|𝑠𝑖 = b 𝛷𝐶) = Pr (𝜃𝐶 = 𝑔)Pr (𝑠𝑖 = b𝐼𝛷𝐶|𝜃𝐶 = 𝑔)Pr (𝑠𝑖 = b𝐼𝛷𝐶)  
= 𝛾(1 − 𝛾)𝑞𝛾(1 − 𝛾)𝑞 + (1 − 𝛾)2𝑞(1 − 𝑞) + 𝜔(1 − 𝛾)2𝑞2 ⌈𝛤𝑛⌉𝑛 > 0 
Where 𝜔 denotes the probability that α>0 and ⌈𝛤∗𝑛⌉(⌈𝛤𝑛⌉+1)⌈𝛤∗𝑛⌉−2 < 𝐵. This expression is strictly 
larger than 0 since 𝛾 > 0, 𝜔 > 0, and 𝑞 > 0. Therefore, an inattentive voter will prefer to vote 
for the challenger upon observing b𝐼𝛷𝐶. A similar argument occurs for the 𝛷𝐼𝑏𝐶 signal. Since 
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outlets cannot fabricate a bad signal, it follows that Pr (𝜃𝐶 = 𝑔|𝑠𝑖 = 𝛷𝐼𝑏𝐶) = 0. In the case of 
the incumbent, we have: 
Pr (𝜃𝐼 = 𝑔|𝑠𝑖 = 𝛷𝐼𝑏𝐶) = Pr (𝜃𝐼 = 𝑔)Pr (𝑠𝑖 = 𝛷𝐼𝑏𝐶|𝜃𝐼 = 𝑔)Pr (𝑠𝑖 = 𝛷𝐼𝑏𝐶)  
= 𝛾(1 − 𝛾)𝑞𝛾(1 − 𝛾)𝑞 + (1 − 𝛾)2𝑞(1 − 𝑞) > 0 
This occurs because voters only observe Φ𝐼b𝐶 in three situations. These are: the incumbent is 
good while the challenger is bad and discovered; both politicians are bad and only the 
challenger is discovered; or if they are both bad and discovered and the voters read one of the 
outlets bribed by the incumbent when neither α=0 and n>2 nor α>0 and ⌈𝛤∗𝑛⌉(⌈𝛤𝑛⌉+1)⌈𝛤∗𝑛⌉−2 < 𝐵 hold. 
Because of the incumbency advantage assumption, rationally inattentive voters prefer to vote 
for the incumbent should they observe 𝑏𝐼𝑏𝐶. Thus, the only scenario in which a rationally 
inattentive voter prefers the challenger to the incumbent is if the expected utility from electing 
the challenger exceeds that of electing the incumbent, i.e. after observing 𝑏𝑖𝛷𝑐. 
QED Lemma 1∎ 
Lemma 2: 
If the budget is constant across politicians and a bad signal is received about only one 
politician, then total media suppression will not occur in equilibrium. 
Proof: 
In cases 𝒈𝒊𝒈𝒄 there is no scope for media interference. In case 𝒈𝒊𝒃𝒄, following Lemma 
1, media interference from the challenger is ineffective since both types of voters prefer the 
incumbent if no signal is observed. It remains to show that total media suppression will not 
occur in case 𝒃𝒊𝒈𝒄. 
Suppose ∃ is a vector of payment from the incumbent to the media outlets 𝜏𝐼 such that 
achieves total media suppression. Therefore, it must be the case that it is a winning strategy for 
the incumbent (but not necessarily optimal) and:  
∑ 𝜏𝑖,𝐼𝑖=1,..,𝑛 ≤ 𝐵 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝜏𝐼𝑖 ≥ 1 > 0 ∀𝑖  
Three cases are distinguished depending on the realisations of B and 𝛼: 
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1. 𝐵 ≤ 𝑛 
Under this realisation of B, total media suppression is impossible as the incumbent does not 
have enough funds to achieve it even if the challenger is inactive. 
2. 𝐵 ≥ 𝑛 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝛼 < 0.5 
If the challenger persuades at least one outlet to report honestly, he gains a share of 𝛼 votes 
from attentive voters and rationally inattentive votes proportional to the share of honest outlets. 
In order for the challenger to win the election, he also needs 0.5- 𝛼 votes from rationally 
inattentive voters. Therefore, allowing m to denote the number of outlets the challenger 
‘manipulates’  (1 − 𝛼)𝑚𝑛 ≥ 0.5 − 𝛼 
𝑚/𝑛 ≥ 0.5 − 𝛼1 − 𝛼 → 𝜞∗ = 𝟎. 𝟓 − 𝜶𝟏 − 𝜶  
Given this action from the incumbent and any realisation of B 𝛼 such that 𝐵 ≥𝑛𝜀 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝛼 < 0.5 the best response of the challenger is therefore to approach the outlets with 
the ⌈𝛤∗𝑛⌉ lowest offers and offer  𝜏𝐶,𝑖 = 𝝉𝑰,𝒊 + 1 
Since the politicians share the same budget, such an offer is affordable for the challenger and 
it ensures his electoral win. This contradicts the original hypothesis. 
3. 𝛼 ≥ 0.5 
If the challenger persuades at least one outlet to report honestly, he gains a share of 𝛼 votes 
from attentive voters and rationally inattentive votes proportional to the share of honest outlets. 
Therefore, to win the election, the challenger needs one outlet to report honestly. Total media 
suppression by the incumbent is obviously a suboptimal strategy in equilibrium since both 
politicians share the same budget and the incumbent needs to silence all n outlets while the 




Lemma 2 indicates that a good politician always prevents a bad politician from 
achieving total media suppression. Given the minimum number of ‘manipulated’ outlets 
required to win, there is a disparity in the politicians’ disposable income after the minimum 
media suppression cost given opponent inaction. This will affect the equilibrium outcome when 
both politicians are exposed as bad. For 𝛤 = 0.51−𝛼  and 𝛤∗ = 0.5−𝛼1−𝛼 , the relevant condition will 
be given by: ⌈𝛤𝑛⌉ − ⌈𝛤∗𝑛⌉ ≥ 1 
If the condition above holds, denote: 𝑘 = (⌈𝛤𝑛⌉ − ⌈𝛤∗𝑛⌉), 𝑘 ∈ ℕ 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑘 ≥ 1 
such that: 𝑩− ⌈𝜞∗𝒏⌉ − (𝑩 − ⌈𝜞𝒏⌉) = 𝒌 
Additionally, the politician budgets can be decomposed as: 𝑩 − ⌈𝜞𝒏⌉ = 𝒍, 𝒍 ∈ ℕ 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝑩− ⌈𝜞∗𝒏⌉ = (𝒌 + 𝒍), 𝒌, 𝒍 ∈ ℕ  
[Eq. 7] 
Case 1: 𝒈𝑰𝒈𝑪  
This can occur if both politicians are good or if either politician is bad and no signal is 
received by the media. In the absence of a signal, the media outlets are unable to report anything 
and therefore media framing is impossible. Since no signal is received, the best response of all 
outlets is to report honestly, even if they receive a transfer from either politician. Both sets of 
voters observe 𝛷𝐼𝛷𝐶 and their posterior beliefs the politicians are good are both higher than 𝛾. 
As shown in Lemma 1, they both prefer the incumbent. For both politicians, strictly positive 
transfers do not change the result of the election and reduce utility and hence their equilibrium 
actions will be to set 𝜏𝐼,𝑖 = 𝜏𝐶,𝑖 = 0. From the perspective of media outlets, their reporting 
strategy can only be honest even in the presence of positive transfers from the politicians, and 
therefore would accept any positive transfer, if offered. The incumbent wins and obtains utility 
2B, the challenger 0 and all media outlets report honestly. These equilibrium strategies and 
beliefs are consistent for all realisations of B, n 𝛿, and 𝛼. 
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Case 2: 𝒈𝑰𝒃𝑪 
This can occur if the challenger is bad and discovered with probability γ (1-γ)q or if 
both politicians are bad and only the challenger is discovered, with probability (1 − 𝛾)2𝑞(1 −𝑞). With probability γ (1-γ) (1-q) the incumbent is good, while the challenger is bad and 
undiscovered, in which case equilibrium actions are as outlined in 𝒈𝑰𝒈𝑪. From the voters’ 
perspective, this is the posterior belief induced if they observe 𝛷𝐼𝑏𝐶 in the media or from their 
preferred outlet. 
 The bad challenger may attempt to silence the media, in which case more than half the 
voters do not observe the bad signal about the challenger. However, upon seeing no signal 
about either politician, both types of voters still prefer to vote for the incumbent. An informed 
voter would revise his posterior belief to 1, whereas an uninformed voter would still prefer the 
incumbent. Since media persuasion is both costly and ineffective, it is a strictly suboptimal 
strategy. Therefore 𝝉𝑪,𝒊 = 0, ∀𝑖 and the best response of the incumbent is to also set 𝝉𝑰,𝒊 = 0, ∀i. 
The media outlets then report honestly 𝛷𝐼𝑏𝐶 . Should they receive an offer larger at least as 
large as 1 and 𝜏𝐼,𝑖 < 𝝉𝑪,𝒊 + 1 , the media outlets would decide to report 𝛷𝐼𝛷𝐶 . The incumbent 
wins and obtains utility 2B, while the challenger obtains 0. A special case where the challenger 
can suppress the media completely exists, but it is a strictly suboptimal strategy to do so. These 
equilibrium strategies and beliefs are consistent for all realisations of B, 𝑛, 𝛿 and 𝛼 < 0.5  
Case 3: 𝒈𝑪𝒃𝑰 
This can occur if the incumbent is bad and discovered with probability γ (1-γ)q or if 
both politicians are bad and only the incumbent is discovered, with probability (1 − 𝛾)2𝑞(1 −𝑞).With probability γ (1-γ)(1-q) the challenger is good, while the incumbent is bad and 
undiscovered, in which case equilibrium actions are as outlined in 𝒈𝑰𝒈𝑪. From the voters’ 
perspective, this is the posterior belief induced if they observe 𝑏𝐼𝛷𝐶 in the media or from their 
preferred outlet. 
We know from the properties of 𝛤 that in this scenario, the bad politician needs to manipulate 
at least half of the media outlets in order to avoid certain defeat in the election. 
In this case, the incumbent has B- ⌈𝛤𝑛⌉ revenue left over from attempting to manipulate ⌈𝛤𝑛⌉ outlets at the minimum acceptable ‘transfer’. Because of the properties of 𝛤, 𝑛 − ⌈𝛤𝑛⌉ ≤⌈𝛤𝑛⌉, i.e. the number of outlets the challenger needs to report honestly is smaller than the 
number of outlets the incumbent needs to ‘manipulate’.  
97 
 
By construction, an offer of 𝝉𝑰,𝒊 + 1 is acceptable from the challenger and preferable to 
an offer of 𝝉𝑰,𝒊from the incumbent. It is a best response for any outlet approached by the good 
politician with this offer to accept it. Consequently, any outlet approached with 𝜏𝑖,𝐼 ≥ 1 by the 
incumbent would accept only if the challenger offers less than 𝝉𝑰,𝒊 + 1 . Given the fact that the 
challenger moves second and has to convince fewer outlets to report honestly, a challenger 
strategy that ensures his victory exists for every vector of payments 𝝉𝑰. Therefore, the 
equilibrium action for the incumbent is to set 𝝉𝑰,𝒊 = 𝟎 for all outlets and for all B. Consequently, 
the equilibrium strategy for the challenger is to set 𝝉𝑪,𝒊 = 𝟎 if the incumbent has offered 𝜏𝑖,𝐼 ≥1 to less than ⌈𝛤𝑛⌉ outlets. If 𝜏𝐼,𝑖 ≥ 1 for 𝑥 ≥⌈Γn⌉ outlets, the optimal action of the challenger 
is to ensure that only ⌈𝛤𝑛⌉ − 1 outlets remain ‘manipulated’. This can be achieved by picking 
the x+1 outlets with the smallest 𝜏𝐼,𝑖 ≥ 1 , letting 𝜏𝐼,𝑖∗ denote their set, and: 
𝝉𝑪,𝒊 = {1 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑖 ∈ 𝜏𝐼,𝑖∗0 otherwise  
For any outlet that was not approached by any politician, it is a best response to report 
honestly, 𝑏𝐼𝛷𝐶 , and to get the higher audience revenues, which benefits the challenger as the 
resulting posterior beliefs induce the voters to prefer the challenger. For any offer from the 
incumbent, 𝜏𝐼,𝑖 ≥ 1, they would accept it and misreport if and only if 𝜏𝐶,𝑖 < 1, i.e. report 𝛷𝐼𝛷𝐶. 
The resulting politician equilibrium is that neither politician attempts any media suppression. 
The incumbent would not deviate from this strategy since any spending can be effectively 
negated at a lower cost by the challenger, ensuring the incumbent’s utility is less than B. Given 
the strategy of the incumbent, the challenger will not deviate for the same reason. In this 
equilibrium, all media outlets report honestly, and the incumbent is revealed as bad by all 
outlets. Based on Lemma 1, all voters prefer the challenger who then wins the election. These 
equilibrium strategies and beliefs are consistent for all realisations of B, n, 𝛿 and 𝛼 < 0.5.  
Case 4: 𝒃𝑰𝒃𝑪 
With probability (1 − 𝑞)2, neither politician is discovered as bad and the analysis 
collapses to that observed in case 𝒈𝑰𝒈𝑪. With probability 1-q the challenger is not discovered 
as bad and the analysis collapses to that observed in case 𝒃𝑰𝒈𝑪, and with probability 1-q the 
incumbent is not discovered and the analysis collapses to that observed in case 𝒈𝑰𝒃𝑪. 
With probability 𝑞2, both politicians are discovered as bad. Firstly, if 𝛼 = 0, the number 
of outlets each politician needs to capture depends on whether the number of outlets is odd or 
even. If n is even, the incumbent needs to capture half the outlets in order to win, whereas the 
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challenger needs  𝑛2 + 1. Consequently, if the number of outlets is odd, both politicians need  𝑛+12 .  
Firstly, if n is even, and if x denotes the number of extra outlets the incumbent attempts 
to persuade, the condition for the incumbent to be able to win is given by: 𝐵𝑛2 + 𝑥 ≥ 𝐵 − 𝑥𝐵𝑛2 + 𝑥 − 1(𝑛 − 𝑛2 − 𝑥) 
Re-arranging we obtain: 2𝐵𝑛 + 2𝑥 ≥ 𝐵 − 2𝐵𝑥𝑛 + 2𝑥 − 𝑛2 + 𝑥 𝑛2 − 𝑥 ≥ 𝐵(𝑛 − 2)𝑛 + 2𝑥  
By construction, 𝑥 ∈ {0, 1, 2, … , 𝑛2} . Both sides of the inequality are strictly increasing 
in x. When x=0, the incumbent wins if: 
1 ≥ 2𝐵(𝑛 − 2)𝑛  
Which only holds if 2≥ 𝑛. When x=𝑛2 the incumbent wins if: 
0 ≥ 𝐵(𝑛 − 2)2𝑛  
Which only holds if 2≥ 𝑛. 
Therefore, if n is even, 𝛼 = 0 and n>2, the incumbent is never able to win and 
consequently his optimal strategy is to not engage in any media manipulation, i.e. 𝜏𝐼𝑖 = 0. The 
optimal strategy for the challenger is to set 𝜏𝐶,𝑖 = 1 ⌈𝛤𝑛⌉ outlets and zero to the rest. Similarly, 
if n is odd, both politicians need to persuade 
 𝑛+12  outlets. Therefore, the incumbent can win if:  𝐵𝑛 + 12 + 𝑥 ≥ 𝐵 − 𝑥𝐵𝑛 + 12 + 𝑥 − 1(𝑛 − 𝑛 + 12 − 𝑥) 2𝐵𝑛 + 2𝑥 + 1 ≥ 𝐵(𝑛 + 1)𝑛 + 2𝑥 − 𝑛 + 1 + 2𝑥2  2𝐵(1 − 𝑛) ≥ [4𝑥2 − (𝑛 − 1)2] 
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0 ≥ 4𝑥2 + (𝑛 − 1)(2𝐵 − 𝑛 + 1) 
By construction, 𝑥 ∈ {0, 1, 2, … , 𝑛−12 } . Therefore, the incumbent can only win if: 
𝐵 < 𝑛 − 12  
which is equivalent to either politician having insufficient funds to ‘silence’ enough media 
outlets. Therefore, if n is odd, if sufficient media suppression is ‘affordable’, the incumbent 
cannot win. The incumbent’s optimal strategy is to set 𝜏𝐼𝑖 = 0, whereas for the challenger it is 
to set 𝜏𝐶,𝑖 = 1 ⌈𝛤𝑛⌉ outlets and zero to the rest. 
If the share of informed voters, 𝛼, is strictly positive as outlined above, the incumbent 
only needs to capture ⌈𝛤∗𝑛⌉ outlets, while the challenger needs to capture ⌈𝛤𝑛⌉. To make the 
subsequent analysis interesting, I assume that B> ⌈𝛤𝑛⌉. 
First notice that: ⌈Γn⌉ + ⌈Γ∗n⌉ ∈ {𝑛, 𝑛 + 1} 
The argument from the 𝛼 = 0 case extends if 𝛼 is sufficiently small. The threshold level of the 
share of informed voters if ⌈𝛤𝑛⌉ + ⌈𝛤∗𝑛⌉ = 𝑛 + 1 is the unique solution to the following: 𝐵⌈𝛤∗𝑛⌉ = 𝐵 − (𝑛 − ⌈𝛤∗𝑛⌉) − 𝐵⌈𝛤∗𝑛⌉ 
Re-arranging, the threshold 𝛼 is the solution to: 
𝐵 = ⌈𝛤∗𝑛⌉(⌈𝛤𝑛⌉ + 1)⌈𝛤∗𝑛⌉ − 2  
Similarly, if ⌈𝛤𝑛⌉ + ⌈𝛤∗𝑛⌉ = 𝑛, the threshold 𝛼 is the solution to: 
𝐵 = ⌈𝛤∗𝑛⌉⌈𝛤𝑛⌉⌈𝛤∗𝑛⌉ − 2  
If either set of conditions hold, the optimal strategies match the ones from the case when the 
share of informed voters is zero. 
If 𝛼 > 0, any offer from the incumbent of the type: offer 1 to 𝑥 ≥ ⌈𝛤𝑛⌉ outlets is strictly 
suboptimal. Since the challenger moves second, he can gain enough outlets by offering them 𝜏𝐼,𝑖 + 1 if 𝜏𝐼,𝑖 > 0 and 1 to ⌈𝛤𝑛⌉ − ⌈𝛤∗𝑛⌉ for the remaining outlets. This offer is affordable for 
the challenger, for whom it is an optimal strategy.  
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First, there is a disparity in politicians’ disposable income after the minimum media 
suppression cost given opponent inaction. For 𝛤 = 0.51−𝛼  𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝛤∗ = 0.5−𝛼1−𝛼 : 𝑩− ⌈𝜞𝒏⌉ = 𝒍, 𝒍 ∈ ℕ 𝒂𝒅 𝑩− ⌈𝜞∗𝒏⌉ = (𝒌 + 𝒍), 𝒌, 𝒍 ∈ ℕ  
The condition for which the incumbent can win is given by: 
1 + (𝑙 + 𝑘)𝑥 > 1 + 𝑙1 + 𝑥 − ⌈𝛤∗𝑛⌉ 
Where 𝑥 ≥ ⌈𝛤∗𝑛⌉ is the number of outlets approached by the incumbent. 
Re-arranging  (𝑙 + 𝑘)(1 + 𝑥 − ⌈𝛤∗𝑛⌉) > 𝑥 (𝑙 + 𝑘)(1 − ⌈𝛤∗𝑛⌉)𝑘 < 𝑥 
, which always holds, since (1 − ⌈𝛤∗𝑛⌉) ≤ 0 and 𝑙, 𝑘, 𝑥 ∈ ℕ. Therefore, any offer of the type 𝜏𝐼,𝑖 = 1 + (𝑙+𝑘)1𝑥  to 𝑥 ≥ ⌈𝛤∗𝑛⌉ outlets 
will ensure electoral victory for the incumbent.  
The x that maximises the incumbent’s welfare is given by: 
min𝑥≥⌈𝛤∗𝑛⌉,𝑥∈ℕ 𝑥(1 + (𝑙 + 𝑘)𝑥 ) 
Which is solved by 𝑥 = ⌈𝛤∗𝑛⌉. Given this strategy for the incumbent, the best response of the 
challenger is 𝜏𝑖,𝐶 = 0, ∀𝑖, since any positive media transfer would decrease his utility without 
resulting in electoral victory. 
Lemma 3: 
This equilibrium strategy is feasible for the incumbent if and only if the minimal 
acceptable vector of bribes for the challenger is affordable. 
Proof: 
Suppose the minimal acceptable vector of bribes is affordable for the challenger, i.e.: ⌈𝛤𝑛⌉ ≤ 𝐵 
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And the optimal vector of payments for the incumbent described above is not affordable: 
⌈𝛤∗𝑛⌉ (1 + (𝑙 + 𝑘)⌈𝛤∗𝑛⌉ ) > 𝐵 ⌈𝛤∗𝑛⌉  + (𝑙 + 𝑘) > 𝐵 (𝑙 + 𝑘) > 𝐵 − ⌈𝛤∗𝑛⌉  
By definition: 𝐵 − ⌈𝛤∗𝑛⌉ = (𝑘 + 𝑙) 
Thus: (𝑙 + 𝑘) > (𝑘 + 𝑙) 
Contradiction 𝑸𝑬𝑫 𝑳𝒎𝒎𝒂 𝟑∎ 
Therefore, the incumbent utility maximising action with media suppression is to offer 
the following vector of payments: 
𝜏𝑖,𝐼 = { 1 + (𝑙 + 𝑘)⌈𝛤∗𝑛⌉ 0 𝑡𝑜 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡  𝑡𝑜⌈𝛤∗𝑛⌉ 𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑙𝑒𝑡𝑠  
if 𝐵 ≥ ⌈𝛤𝑛⌉ 
If 𝐵 ∈ [⌈𝛤∗𝑛⌉ , ⌈𝛤𝑛⌉ ), the incumbent can still afford enough media suppression to allow his 
victory, but the challenger is unable to afford meaningful media intervention. Therefore, the 
equilibrium strategy of the incumbent becomes: 
𝜏𝑖,𝐼 = { 1 𝑡𝑜⌈𝛤∗𝑛⌉ outlets 0 𝑡𝑜 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡  
Finally, if 𝐵 < ⌈𝛤∗𝑛⌉, neither politician can afford meaningful media suppression and their 
equilibrium strategies are 𝜏𝑖,𝐼 = 𝜏𝑖,𝐶 = 0 
For any vector of payments from the incumbent other than the ones outlined above, there exists 
a corresponding vector for the challenger which allows him to win. Let 𝜏𝐼 denote a vector of 
incumbent payments below the optimal one described above. 
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Let x denote the number of outlets for which 𝜏𝐼,𝑖=0 and order the remaining outlets ascendingly. 
Then if:  
1) x≥⌈Γn⌉ or  
2) x<⌈Γn⌉ and  
𝐵 − 𝑥 ≥ ∑ 𝜏𝐼,𝑗 + (⌈𝛤𝑛⌉ − 𝑥)⌈𝛤𝑛⌉𝑗=𝑥+1  
𝜏𝐶,𝑖 = { 1 𝑡𝑜min(𝑥, ⌈𝛤𝑛⌉)  𝑡𝑜 𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑙𝑒𝑡𝑠 𝑠. 𝑡 𝜏𝐼,𝑖 = 0𝜏𝐼,𝑖 + 1 𝑡𝑜 the first max(⌈𝛤𝑛⌉ − 𝑥, 0)  𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑑 𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑙𝑒𝑡𝑠0 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒  
Otherwise 𝝉𝑪,𝒊 = 0 
From the perspective of the media outlets, their optimal strategy is to report 
honestly, 𝑏𝐼𝑏𝐶, if they receive no offer higher than 1 or if 𝜏𝑗 ≥ 1 and 𝜏−𝑗 ≥ 𝜏𝑗 + 1. Otherwise, 
they accept the higher offer, and they report 𝛷𝐼𝑏𝐶 or 𝑏𝐼𝛷𝐶 depending on the origin of the offer. 
According to Lemma 1 voters prefer the incumbent if they observe 𝑏𝐼𝑏𝐶 or the candidate not 
revealed as bad otherwise. Therefore, the incumbent wins the election. 
Second equilibrium 




received by media 
𝛷𝐼𝛷𝐶 𝛷𝐼𝑏𝐶 𝑏𝐼𝛷𝐶 𝑏𝐼𝑏𝐶 Beliefs  
Prior Probability 𝛾2 + 2(1 − 𝛾)𝛾𝑞+ (1 − 𝛾)2(1 − 𝑞)2 𝛾(1 − 𝛾)𝑞+ (1 − 𝛾)2𝑞(1− 𝑞) 
𝛾(1 − 𝛾)𝑞 + (1 − 𝛾)2𝑞(1 − 𝑞) (1 − 𝛾)2𝑞2  
Agents and 
strategies 
     
Incumbent 𝝉𝑰,𝒊 = 0, ∀𝑖, ∀𝐵, ∀ 𝐸(𝜏𝐶) 𝝉𝑰,𝒊 = 0, ∀𝑖, ∀𝐵, ∀ 𝐸(𝜏𝐶) 𝝉𝑰,𝒊 = 0, ∀𝑖 ∀𝐵, 𝑎𝑛𝑑  ∀ 𝐸(𝜏𝐶) 𝑠𝑢𝑐ℎ 𝑡ℎ𝑎𝑡 ∀𝝉𝑪,𝒊 ≥1 + 𝝉𝑰,𝒊 
Otherwise, a) if 𝐵 ≥⌈Γn⌉ 𝝉𝑰,𝒊 =  𝑡𝑜 𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑙𝑒𝑡𝑠 
b) if 𝐵 <⌈Γn⌉ then 𝜏𝐼,𝑖 = 0,∀𝑖 
𝜏𝐼,𝑖 = 𝐵 − (𝑛 − 2)1 to 1 outlet, zero 
otherwise ∀ 𝐸(𝜏𝐶) if B≥n 





good if they 
observe Φ𝐼Φ𝐶 
or Φ𝐼b𝐶 in the 
media. Believe 
challenger is 
good if observe Φ𝐼Φ𝐶 or b𝐼Φ𝐶 
in the media. 
Believe both 
politicians are 
Challenger  𝝉𝑪,𝒊 = 0, ∀𝑖, ∀𝐵, ∀ 𝜏𝐼  𝝉𝑪,𝒊 = 0, ∀𝑖, ∀𝐵, ∀ 𝜏𝐼 If 𝜏𝐼,𝑖 = 0 for 𝑛 − 1 outlets, then 𝝉𝑪,𝒊 =0, ∀𝑖 ∀𝐵. 
If 𝜏𝐼,𝑖 ≥ 1 for 𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑛 outlets, pick the 
outlet with the smallest 𝜏𝐼,𝑖 and offer 𝜏𝐶,𝑖 = 1 + 𝝉𝑰,𝒊 
 𝜏𝐶,𝑖 = 0, ∀𝑖 if 𝐵 < 𝑛 
If 𝐵 ≥⌈Γn⌉1, let x denote the number of 
outlets for which 𝜏𝐼,𝑖=0 and order the 
remaining outlets ascendingly. Then if 
1) x=n or  
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2) x<n and  
𝐵 − 𝑥 ≥ ∑ 𝜏𝐼,𝑗 + (n − x)n𝑗=𝑥+1  𝜏𝐶,𝑖= { 1 𝑡𝑜 𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑠. 𝑡 𝜏𝐼,𝑖 = 0𝜏𝐼,𝑖 + 1 𝑡𝑜 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑙𝑒𝑡𝑠 
Otherwise 𝝉𝑪,𝒊 = 0 
 
 
bad if they 
observe b𝐼b𝐶 in 













good if they 
observe Φ𝐼Φ𝐶 
or b𝐼Φ𝐶 from 
their outlet. 
Result Incumbent wins Incumbent wins Challenger wins Incumbent wins 
Media Agents Report 
honestly,Φ𝐼Φ𝐶, for ∀ 𝜏𝐼 𝑎𝑛𝑑 ∀ 𝜏𝐶. If 𝜏𝑖,𝐼 ≠ 0 and 
or 𝜏𝐶,𝑖 ≠ 0, they 
would accept the 
higher offer and still 
report honestly 
Report honestly Φ𝐼b𝐶 if 𝜏𝐶,𝑖 < 1, ∀ 𝜏𝐼  
Or if 𝜏𝐶,𝑖 ≥ 1 and 𝜏𝐼 ≥ 𝜏𝐶,𝑖 + 1 
Report Φ𝐼Φ𝐶 if 𝜏𝐶,𝑖 ≥ 1 and 𝜏𝐼 <𝜏𝐶,𝑖 + 1 
Report honestly b𝐼Φ𝐶 unless 
 { 𝜏𝐼,𝑖 ≥ 1 𝐚𝐧𝐝𝜏𝐶,𝑖 < 𝜏𝐼,𝑖 + 1  
then report Φ𝐼Φ𝐶 
Report honestly b𝐼b𝐶 if either set of 
conditions holds 𝜏𝐼,𝑖 < 1 𝐚𝐧𝐝 𝜏𝐶,𝑖 < 1 𝑶𝑹𝜏𝐼,𝑗 > 1 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝜏𝐼,−𝑗 > 𝜏𝐼,𝑗 + 1 
For 𝑗 ∈ {𝐼, 𝐶} 
Report Φ𝐼b𝐶 if 𝜏𝐼,𝑖 ≥ 1 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝜏𝐼,𝑖 ≥ 𝜏𝐶,𝑖 




 Believe both 
politicians are 
bad if they 
observe b𝐼b𝐶 
from their outlet 
 
Informed Voters Vote incumbent 
unless 




observe b𝐼Φ𝐶 in 
the media 
Vote challenger if they observe b𝐼Φ𝐶 in 
the media. Vote incumbent if they 
observe Φ𝐼Φ𝐶 in the media 
Vote challenger if they observe b𝐼Φ𝐶 in 
the media. Vote incumbent if they 





observe b𝐼Φ𝐶 from 
their outlet 
Vote incumbent 
unless observe B𝐼Φ𝐶 from their 
outlet 
Vote challenger if they observe b𝐼Φ𝐶 
from their outlet. Vote incumbent if they 
observe Φ𝐼Φ𝐶 from their outlet 
Vote challenger if they observe b𝐼Φ𝐶 
from their outlet. Vote incumbent if they 
observe b𝐼b𝐶 or Φ𝐼b𝐶  from their outlet 
Equilibrium 𝝉𝑰,𝒊 = 0, ∀𝑖, 𝝉𝑪,𝒊 =0, ∀𝑖 
Media outlets report 
honestly Φ𝐼Φ𝐶 
Both types of voters 
vote incumbent 
𝝉𝑰,𝒊 = 0, ∀𝑖, 𝝉𝑪,𝒊 = 0, ∀ 𝑖 
Media outlets 
report honestly Φ𝐼𝑏𝐶 
Both types of 
voters vote 
incumbent 
𝝉𝑰,𝒊 = 0, ∀𝑖, 𝝉𝑪,𝒊 = 0, ∀ 𝑖 
Media outlets report honestly 𝑏𝐼𝛷𝐶. 
Both types of voters vote challenger 
𝝉𝑰,𝒊 = 0, ∀𝑖, 𝝉𝑪,𝒊 = 0, ∀ 𝑖 if B<n 
Otherwise 𝜏𝐼,𝑖 = 𝐵 − (𝑛 − 2)1 to 1 outlet, 𝜏𝐼,𝑖 = 0 to the rest 𝝉𝑪,𝒊 = 0, ∀ 𝑖 
Media outlets report honestly 𝑏𝐼𝑏𝐶. 




Case 1: 𝒈𝑰𝒈𝑪  
This can occur if both politicians are good or if either politician is bad and no signal is 
received by the media. In the absence of a signal, the media outlets are unable to report anything 
and therefore media framing is impossible. Therefore the best response of all outlets is to report 
honestly, even if they receive a transfer from either politician. Both sets of voters observe 𝛷𝐼𝛷𝐶 
and their posterior beliefs the politicians are good are both higher than 𝛾. As shown in Lemma 
1, they both prefer the incumbent. For both politicians, strictly positive transfers do not change 
the result of the election and reduce utility, and hence their equilibrium actions will be to 
set 𝜏𝐼,𝑖 = 𝜏𝐶,𝑖 = 0. From the perspective of media outlets, their reporting strategy can only be 
honest, even in the presence of positive transfers from the politicians, and therefore would 
accept any positive transfer, if offered. The incumbent wins and obtains utility 2B, the 
challenger 0 and all media outlets report honestly. These equilibrium strategies and beliefs are 
consistent for all realisations of B, n 𝛿 and 𝛼. 
Case 2: 𝒈𝑰𝒃𝑪 
This can occur if the challenger is bad and discovered with probability γ (1-γ)q or if 
both politicians are bad and only the challenger is discovered, with probability (1 − 𝛾)2𝑞(1 −𝑞). With probability γ (1-γ)(1-q) the incumbent is good, while the challenger is bad and 
undiscovered, in which case equilibrium actions are as outlined in 𝒈𝑰𝒈𝑪. From the voters’ 
perspective, this is the posterior belief induced if they observe 𝛷𝐼𝑏𝐶 in the media or from their 
preferred outlet. The bad challenger may attempt to silence all media outlets, in which case no 
voters, informed or otherwise, observe the bad signal about the challenger. However, upon 
seeing no signal about either politician, following Lemma 1, both types of voters prefer the 
incumbent. Since media persuasion is both costly and ineffective, it is a strictly suboptimal 
strategy. Therefore 𝝉𝑪,𝒊 = 0, ∀𝑖 and the best response of the incumbent is to also set 𝝉𝑰,𝒊 = 0, ∀𝑖. 
Should they receive an offer larger than 1 and 𝝉𝑰,𝒊 < 𝝉𝑪,𝒊, the media outlets would decide to 
report 𝛷𝐼𝛷𝐶 . The incumbent wins and obtains utility 2B, while the challenger obtains 0. A 
special case where the challenger can suppress the media completely exists, but it is a strictly 
suboptimal strategy to do so. These equilibrium strategies and beliefs are consistent for all 
realisations of B, 𝑛, 𝛿 and 𝛼 > 0.5. 
Case 3: 𝒈𝑪𝒃𝑰 
This can occur if the incumbent is bad and discovered with probability γ (1-γ)q or if 
both politicians are bad and only the incumbent is discovered, with probability (1 − 𝛾)2𝑞(1 −
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𝑞). With probability γ (1-γ)(1-q) the challenger is good, while the incumbent is bad and 
undiscovered, in which case equilibrium actions are as outlined in 𝒈𝑰𝒈𝑪. From the voters’ 
perspective, this is the posterior belief induced if they observe 𝑏𝐼𝛷𝐶 in the media or from their 
preferred outlet. 
We know that since at least half of the voters are informed in this scenario, the bad 
politician needs to manipulate all media outlets in order to avoid certain defeat in the election. 
Consequently, the challenger only needs to ensure at least 1 outlet remains ‘free’ and reports 
that the incumbent is bad. 
In this case, the incumbent has B- (𝑛 − 1) revenue leftover from attempting to 
manipulate (𝑛 − 1) outlets, which is the maximum budget available to persuade the final outlet. 
To ensure that one outlet strictly prefers to report honestly and he wins the election, the 
challenger can offer B- (𝑛 − 1) to one outlet, as the incumbent is unable to afford suppressing 
the final outlet. It is therefore a suboptimal strategy for the incumbent to attempt media 
persuasion since it is strictly utility reducing and ineffective. The resulting equilibrium is for 
the incumbent to offer 𝜏𝐼,𝑖 = 0, ∀I, and the corresponding best response from the challenger is 𝜏𝐶,𝑖 = 0, ∀𝑖. The incumbent would not deviate from this strategy since any spending will never 
lead to electoral victory, ensuring the incumbent’s utility is less than B. The challenger will not 
deviate given the action of the incumbent since he already wins the election. Both politicians 
obtain utility B in the first period. The media outlets report honestly. These equilibrium 
strategies and beliefs are consistent for all realisations of B, n, 𝛿 and 𝛼 > 0.5. 
If the realisation of B is such that the incumbent is unable to afford any meaningful 
media interference, the equilibrium strategies remain unchanged. Therefore, the equilibrium 
strategy for the incumbent and the challenger is 𝜏𝐼,𝑖 = 𝜏𝐶,𝑖 = 0 ∀𝑖 and any realisation of B. 
Case 4: 𝒃𝑰𝒃𝑪 
With probability (1 − 𝑞)2, neither politician is discovered as bad and the analysis 
collapses to that observed in case 𝒈𝑰𝒈𝑪. With probability 1-q the challenger is not discovered 
as bad and the analysis collapses to that observed in case 𝒃𝑰𝒈𝑪 and with probability 1-q the 
incumbent is not discovered and the analysis collapses to that observed in case 𝒈𝑰𝒃𝑪. With 
probability 𝑞2 both politicians are discovered as bad. The challenger needs to capture all the 
outlets in the market to ensure his victory whereas the incumbent only needs to prevent one 
outlet from being captured. 
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As outlined above, the challenger needs to persuade all outlets to misreport his state for 
him to win the election. Consequently, the incumbent needs to persuade only one outlet to 
report the state of the challenger honestly. In this case, the challenger would have B- (𝑛 −1) revenue leftover from attempting to manipulate (𝑛 − 1) outlets, which is the maximum 
budget available to persuade the final outlet. The incumbent can then achieve electoral victory 
in two ways: full disclosure or media suppression. Under the latter, the incumbent would 
‘silence’ enough outlets such that sufficient rationally inattentive voters do not observe that his 
type is bad. 
Under full disclosure, the incumbent can achieve electoral victory by ensuring enough 
outlets know the challenger is bad, rather than suppressing news about his own type. Should 
either type of voter observe that both politicians are bad, they would both prefer the incumbent. 
If both signals are released across the media outlets, the incumbent would obtain 𝛼 votes from 
informed voters and a share of rationally inattentive voters proportional to the number of outlets 
that report honestly. If the incumbent were to offer 𝝉𝑰,𝒊 ≥ 𝝉𝑪,𝒊 + 1 for a given challenger offer 𝝉𝑪,𝒊, he could induce the outlet to report honestly the status of both politicians even if 𝝉𝑪,𝒊 is 
acceptable, i. e. 𝝉𝑪,𝒊 > 1 . As in 𝒈𝑪𝒃𝑰, the outlet does not risk losing second period revenue 
since the resulting reporting strategy is sincere. As a result, it is a best response for any outlet 
to accept such an offer for a given 𝝉𝑪,𝒊 and report honestly 𝒃𝑰𝒃𝑪. Under full disclosure, the 
equilibrium strategy for the challenger is to offer 𝝉𝑪,𝒊 = 𝟎, ∀𝒊 which means that neither 
politician attempts any media suppression. If feasible, neither politician would attempt signal 
suppression and all media outlets would report honestly. 
The incumbent is then able to ensure one outlet reports 𝛷𝐼𝑏𝐶 by offering any outlet B- (𝑛 − 1). 
Since B- (𝑛 − 1) < 𝐵, this offer is affordable and results in the incumbent winning the election. 
Under full disclosure, the incumbent can ensure that enough voters know both politicians are 
bad, i.e. 𝑏𝐼𝑏𝐶 by offering one outlet 𝝉𝑰,𝒊 = 𝐵 − (𝑛 − 1), which is also affordable, as: 𝐵 − (𝑛 − 1) < 𝐵 
Full disclosure is an optimal strategy for the incumbent. He will not deviate and spend 
lower since it will allow the challenger to achieve total media suppression. The incumbent will 
not spend more since he gains strictly lower utility if he does so. Given the actions of the 
incumbent, the best response of the challenger is to set 𝜏𝐶,𝑖 = 0, ∀𝑖. He will not deviate since 
he will be unable to achieve total market suppression. The incumbent obtains revenue equal 
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to 2𝐵 − (𝑛 − 1), while the challenger obtains 0. The equilibrium in the media market is that 
all outlets report honestly, 𝑏𝐼𝑏𝐶. 
These equilibrium strategies and beliefs are consistent for all realisations of B≥n, n, 𝛿 and 𝛼 >0.5. 
In pure strategy Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium media and political competition and electoral 
standards ensure that the true state of politicians is always revealed to a subset of the electorate. 
This implies that a good politician always wins the election whenever he is present. The 
assumption that bad signals cannot be fabricated is crucial to this result. When both politicians 
are revealed as bad, the assumptions about incumbency advantage result in the incumbent being 
able to win the election, while still allowing a subset of the electorate to be correctly informed. 
Interestingly, in this equilibrium, full disclosure is optimal both in the media market and from 
the winning politician’s perspective, if and only if at least half the voters are informed. This 
arises due to the presence of political competition with constant budgets when the ‘bad’ 
politician needs to capture the entirety of the media whereas his opponent only has to ensure 
one outlet remains honest. If the share of informed voters is less than half, even when media 
market capture is rational full media capture is suboptimal as victory can be achieved with 
fewer funds and fewer captured outlets. This reveals that politician competition is the main 
driver behind the results obtained in the main section of the paper rather than the revenue 
structure of the outlets. 
Proposition 2: 
Under the baseline assumptions, total media suppression never occurs as an equilibrium 
outcome.  
Proof: 
Assume such an equilibrium exists and that no media outlets report 𝛷𝑗𝑏−𝑗 or 𝑏𝑗𝑏−𝑗 where 𝑗 ∈{𝐼, 𝐶}. Four cases can be discerned. Note that whenever 𝛷𝑗𝑏−𝑗 is overserved, rational Bayesian 
updating leads voters to prefer politician j as he is good with probability strictly larger than 
zero, whereas -j is bad with certainty. 
Case 1: 𝜶 < 𝟎. 𝟓 and 𝐏𝐫 (𝜽𝑰 = 𝒈|𝜱𝑰𝜱𝑪) ≥ 𝐏𝐫 (𝜽𝑪 = 𝒈|𝜱𝑰𝜱𝑪) 
In this case, media silence benefits the incumbent, who is preferred by all voters when media 
outlets report 𝛷𝐼𝛷𝐶. However, when the signal outlets received is 𝑏𝐼𝛷𝐶, the challenger has an 
incentive to provide outlets with inducements such that they report honestly,  𝑏𝐼𝛷𝐶. In this 
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baseline specification, outlets do not obtain any revenue from their readership and therefore 
any positive transfer from a politician is enough to influence their report. Their optimal strategy 
is then to report honestly if neither 𝜏𝐼𝑖 > 0 nor 𝜏𝐶𝑖 > 0 holds or accept the higher political bribe 
and report accordingly otherwise. Let 𝜏𝐼 denote a vector of payments from the incumbent such 
that total media suppression occurs. The following conditions then hold: 
∑𝜏𝐼𝑖 ≤ 𝐵𝑛𝑖=1  & ∀ 𝜏𝐼𝑖 ≥ 1 
The α informed voters purchase all outlets that publish a signal, whereas the 1-α 
uninformed voters are split equally across all n outlets. The politicians determine the optimal 
number of outlets to ‘manipulate’ based on the behaviour of both types of voters. For the 
incumbent to win in  𝑏𝐼𝛷𝐶, he requires at least half the votes exclusively from rationally 
inattentive voters and the number of outlets he needs to ‘manipulate’, m, is given by: (1 − 𝛼)𝑚𝑛 ≥ 0.5 
𝑚/𝑛 ≥ 𝟎. 𝟓𝟏 − 𝜶 → 𝜞 = 𝟎. 𝟓𝟏 − 𝜶 
Therefore, the incumbent needs at least ⌈𝛤𝑛⌉ outlets to report 𝛷𝐼𝛷𝐶, where ⌈𝛤𝑛⌉ denotes the 
smallest integer larger or equal to 𝛤𝑛. Consequently, the challenger needs n-⌈𝛤𝑛⌉ + 1 outlets 
to report honestly in order to win. Given the vector 𝜏𝐼 of incumbent payments defined above, 
it is then possible to construct a challenger vector of payments 𝜏𝐶 in the following way. Without 
loss of generality, order the 𝜏𝐼𝑖 in ascending order, and offer: 𝝉𝑪,𝒊 = {𝜏𝐼𝑖 + 1 𝑡𝑜 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑠𝑡 𝑛 − ⌈Γn⌉ + 1 outlets0 otherwise  
Since:  𝑑𝛤(α)𝑑𝛼 > 0 and 𝛤(0) = 0.5 → 𝑛 − ⌈𝛤𝑛⌉ + 1 ≤ ⌈𝛤𝑛⌉ and 
∑𝜏𝐼𝑖 ≤ 𝐵𝑛𝑖=1  
This entails that: 
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∑𝜏𝐶𝑖 ≤ 𝐵𝑛𝑖=1 & 𝜏𝐶𝑖 > 𝜏𝐼𝑖 for 𝑛 − ⌈𝛤𝑛⌉ + 1 outlets 
This vector 𝜏𝐶 is optimal for the challenger as it ensures his electoral victory at minimal cost. 
The existence of 𝜏𝐶 therefore contradicts that total media suppression can occur as an 
equilibrium outcome when 𝛼 < 0.5 and Pr (𝜃𝐼 = 𝑔|𝛷𝐼𝛷𝐶) ≥ Pr (𝜃𝐶 = 𝑔|𝛷𝐼𝛷𝐶). 
Case 2: 𝜶 ≥ 𝟎. 𝟓 and 𝐏𝐫 (𝜽𝑰 = 𝒈|𝜱𝑰𝜱𝑪) ≥ 𝐏𝐫 (𝜽𝑪 = 𝒈|𝜱𝑰𝜱𝑪) 
As in the previous case, media silence benefits the incumbent, who is preferred by all voters 
when media outlets report 𝛷𝐼𝛷𝐶. However, when the signal outlets received is 𝑏𝐼𝛷𝐶, the 
challenger has an incentive to provide outlets with inducements such that they report honestly,  𝑏𝐼𝛷𝐶. In this case, when the signal media outlets received is 𝛷𝑗𝑏−𝑗, politician -j needs to 
‘manipulate’ all outlets in order to win. Should one or more outlets report honestly, more than 
half the electorate will prefer to vote for j as his type is good with positive probability, but -j is 
bad with certainty. In this baseline specification, outlets do not obtain any revenue from their 
readership and therefore any positive transfer from a politician is enough to influence their 
report. Their optimal strategy is then to report honestly if neither 𝜏𝐼𝑖 > 0 nor 𝜏𝐶𝑖 > 0 holds or 
accept the higher political bribe and report accordingly otherwise. 
In 𝛷𝐼𝑏𝐶, total media suppression is not an optimal strategy for the challenger as he will still 
lose the election and media interference is costly. In  𝑏𝐼𝛷𝐶, let 𝜏𝐼 denote a vector of payments 
from the incumbent such that total media suppression occurs. The following conditions then 
hold: 
∑𝜏𝐼𝑖 ≤ 𝐵𝑛𝑖=1  & ∀ 𝜏𝐼𝑖 ≥ 1 
Total media suppression is achieved in this case, but it is not an optimal strategy for the 
incumbent, as the challenger can win by selecting the outlet with the smallest 𝜏𝐼,𝑖 and offering 𝜏𝐶,𝑖 = 𝜏𝐼,𝑖 + 1. Both 𝛷𝑗𝑏−𝑗 outcomes contradict the existence of a total media suppression 
equilibrium in the baseline specification. 
Case 3: 𝜶 < 𝟎. 𝟓 and 𝐏𝐫(𝜽𝑰 = 𝒈|𝜱𝑰𝜱𝑪) < 𝐏𝐫 (𝜽𝑪 = 𝒈|𝜱𝑰𝜱𝑪) 
In this case, media silence benefits the challenger, who is preferred by all voters when media 
outlets report 𝛷𝐼𝛷𝐶. However, when the signal outlets received is 𝛷𝐼𝑏𝐶, the incumbent has an 
incentive to provide outlets with inducements such that they report honestly,  𝛷𝐼𝑏𝐶. In this 
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baseline specification, outlets do not obtain any revenue from their readership and therefore 
any positive transfer from a politician is enough to influence their report. Their optimal strategy 
is then to report honestly if neither 𝜏𝐼𝑖 > 0 nor 𝜏𝐶𝑖 > 0 holds or accept the higher political bribe 
and report accordingly otherwise.  
The α informed voters purchase all outlets that publish a signal, whereas the 1-α 
uninformed voters are split equally across all n outlets. The politicians determine the optimal 
number of outlets to ‘manipulate’ based on the behaviour of both types of voters. For the 
challenger to win in  𝛷𝐼𝑏𝐶, he requires at least half the votes exclusively from rationally 
inattentive voters and the number of outlets he needs to ‘manipulate’, m, is given by: (1 − 𝛼)𝑚𝑛 ≥ 0.5 
𝑚/𝑛 ≥ 𝟎. 𝟓−𝜶 → 𝜞 = 𝟎. 𝟓𝟏 − 𝜶 
Let 𝜏𝐶 denote a vector of payments from the challenger such that total media suppression 
occurs. The following conditions then hold: 
∑𝜏𝐶𝑖 ≤ 𝐵𝑛𝑖=1  & ∀ 𝜏𝐶𝑖 ≥ 𝜏𝐼𝑖& ∀ 𝜏𝐶𝑖 > 0 
Since he moves second and is preferred by voters who observe 𝛷𝐼𝛷𝐶, there exists a vector of 
payments from the challenger which ensures the challenger wins. Since this holds for any 
vector of payments from the incumbent 𝜏𝐼, it is an optimal strategy for the incumbent to set 𝜏𝐼,𝑖 = 0, ∀𝑖. This in turn renders total media suppression a strictly suboptimal strategy for the 
challenger, who can win the election by only ‘manipulating’ ⌈𝛤𝑛⌉ at minimum price, which 
contradicts the initial hypothesis. 
Case 4: 𝜶 ≥ 𝟎. 𝟓 and 𝐏𝐫(𝜽𝑰 = 𝒈|𝜱𝑰𝜱𝑪) < 𝐏𝐫 (𝜽𝑪 = 𝒈|𝜱𝑰𝜱𝑪) 
In this case, media silence benefits the challenger, who is preferred by all voters when 
media outlets report 𝛷𝐼𝛷𝐶. However, when the signal outlets received is 𝛷𝐼𝑏𝐶, the incumbent 
has an incentive to provide outlets with inducements such that they report honestly,  𝛷𝐼𝑏𝐶. In 
this baseline specification, outlets do not obtain any revenue from their readership and therefore 
any positive transfer from a politician is enough to influence their report. Their optimal strategy 
is then to report honestly if neither 𝜏𝐼𝑖 > 0 nor 𝜏𝐶𝑖 > 0 holds or accept the higher political bribe 
and report accordingly otherwise. In this case, when the signal media outlets received is 𝛷𝑗𝑏−𝑗, 
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politician -j needs to ‘manipulate’ all outlets in order to win. Should one or more outlets report 
honestly, more than half the electorate will prefer to vote for j as his type is good with positive 
probability, but -j is bad with certainty. 
In 𝑏𝐼𝛷𝐶, total media suppression is not an optimal strategy for the incumbent as he will still 
lose the election and media interference is costly. For the challenger to win in  𝛷𝐼𝑏𝐶, the 
challenger needs to manipulate all outlets. Let 𝜏𝐶 denote a vector of payments from the 
challenger such that total media suppression occurs. The following conditions then hold: 
∑𝜏𝐶𝑖 ≤ 𝐵𝑛𝑖=1  & ∀ 𝜏𝐶𝑖 ≥ 𝜏𝐼𝑖& ∀ 𝜏𝐶𝑖 > 0 
Total media suppression is achieved in this case, but it is not an optimal strategy for the 
challenger, as the incumbent can win by selecting any outlet and offering 𝜏𝐼,𝑖 = 𝐵 − 𝑛 + 1. 
Both 𝛷𝑗𝑏−𝑗 outcomes contradict the existence of a total media suppression equilibrium in the 
baseline specification. 
It has been shown that total media suppression cannot arise as an equilibrium outcome 
irrespective of the realisation of α in all possible Bayesian updating scenarios. Several 
assumptions were critical to reach this result: the fact that the challenger moves second; the 
incumbent preference tie breaking assumption; and that the budgets are equal. It can be shown 
that these assumptions are also sufficient in all other possible specifications. 
QED Proposition 2∎ 
Section 3.5: Extensions to the benchmark model 
Section 3.5.1: Analysis with unequal budgets 
In this section I relax the constant budget assumption to analyse whether a similar PBE 
arises. This extension follows a similar method to the benchmark specification, with the model 
being solved backwards and while the equilibrium is also being stated in a series of lemmas. 
Note that if the budget of the incumbent is much larger than that of the challenger, the model 
approximates that of Trombetta and Rossignoli (2020).  The resulting equilibrium has similar 
features to the benchmark specification if the budget difference is not too large. The incumbent 
wins if the signal observed by the media is 𝛷𝐼𝛷𝐶 or 𝛷𝐼𝑏𝐶, irrespective of the difference in 
budget. This arises from the fact that Bayesian updating still indicates the incumbent is 
preferred by voters if they observe 𝛷𝐼𝛷𝐶 from their media outlet(s). However, if the budget 
asymmetry is large enough, a bad incumbent can win the election should the signal observed 
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by media outlets be 𝑏𝐼𝛷𝐶. This is not surprising and mirrors the results obtained by Besley and 
Prat (2006) and Trombetta and Rossignoli (2020). Obviously, this requires the incumbent to 
have more funds and that voters do not know which politician has more funds.  
If the latter condition does not hold and the voters know which politician has more 
funds, the resulting equilibrium is quantatively similar to the benchmark specification. If one 
politician is discovered as bad while the other is not, we obtain the same equilibrium as in the 
benchmark case. The special case where both politicians have the same budget was considered 
in the previous section. If the bad politician has lower funds, media capture is trivially 
decreasing their utility since any attempt can be countered by the good politician. Therefore, 
media manipulation by the bad politician will not lead to their election victory while decreasing 
their funds, hence decreasing their utility. If the bad politician has more funds, the Bayesian 
updating lemma, the voters prefer the politician with fewer funds if they observe their media 
outlet reporting 𝛷𝐼𝛷𝐶.  
If the signal received by media outlets is 𝑏𝐼𝑏𝐶, the resulting equilibrium strategy is 
dependent on the realisations of both the politician’s budgets and the share of informed voters. 
Again, if the budget of the incumbent is considerably larger than that of the challenger, the 
model approximates those of Besley and Prat (2006) and Trombetta and Rossignoli (2020). If 
the budget of the challenger is sufficiently larger than that of the incumbent, he can win by 
‘enticing’ enough outlets to report 𝑏𝐼𝛷𝐶. 
Section 3.5.2: Analysis with constant budgets, audience and credibility 
In this extension, I relax the assumption of zero audience revenue for the outlets and introduce 
the credibility extension. The model assumptions for politicians and voters stay the same, 
however two features are added in the media section. Firstly, keeping in line with Trombetta 
and Rossignoli (2020), the outlets now can get audience revenues in addition to potential 
transfers from politicians. Their audience revenue is dependent on their readership, which in 
turn is determined by the actions of all media outlets. 
Then the payoff structure of outlets in the first period is the following: 
Ρ1𝑖 =
{   




As in Trombetta and Rossignoli (2020), 𝛿 ≥ 0 is a coefficient aimed at capturing 
different types of returns to scale in terms of readership. If no signal is received or no signal is 
reported, both voters act as if they are inattentive. Therefore, all outlets receive an equal share 
of the audience and the associated revenue is 
1𝑛𝛿 . Alternatively, if the outlets receive a signal 
and at least one other outlet reports it, their audience depends on whether they depend to report 
the bad signal themselves. Should they report a bad signal, their audience is an equal share of 
the rationally inattentive voters, 
1−𝛼𝑛 , and the share of informed voters. Should they accept an 
offer from a politician, they lose the audience share from informed voters, but they receive 
payment 𝜏𝑖 from the sender politician. 
For each outlet that misreported in the first period, they are publicly revealed to all 
agents as dishonest with probability 𝜆, in which case it loses their second period audience 
revenue. In this context, a ‘dishonest’ or ‘captured’ media outlet denotes an outlet that does not 
report the signal truthfully in order to benefit one of the politicians. Since it is optimal for the 
elected politician to keep the entire second period budget to himself, this revelation eliminates 
second period revenue from the media outlets revealed to be dishonest in the first period. The 
assumption that the λ is constant across publication types is made to simplify the initial analysis, 
but it could be relaxed as a possible extension. 
Extending the analysis of Besley and Prat (2006), media outlets are interested in the 
second period revenues, which are purely audience driven. Since there is no election in the 
second period, all voters act like rationally inattentive voters and split equally across the outlets. 
For each outlet that misreported in the first period, they are publicly revealed to all agents as 
dishonest with probability 𝜆, in which case it loses their second period audience revenue. In 
this context, a ‘dishonest’ or ‘captured’ media outlet denotes an outlet that does not report the 
signal truthfully in order to benefit one of the politicians. Hence, the expected second period 
payoff for each of the x outlets ‘captured’ in the first period is given by: 
𝐸[Ρ2𝑖] = (1 − 𝜆)∑ 1(𝑛 − 𝑖)𝛿 𝑥! 𝜆𝑖(1 − 𝜆)𝑥−𝑖𝑖! (𝑥 − 𝑖)!𝑥𝑖=0  






  ∑ 1(𝑛 − 𝑖)𝛿 𝑥! 𝜆𝑖(1 − 𝜆)𝑥−𝑖𝑖! (𝑥 − 𝑖)!𝑥𝑖=0  if outlet i was honest and x outlets misreported(1 − 𝜆)∑ 1(𝑛 − 𝑖)𝛿 𝑥! 𝜆𝑖(1 − 𝜆)𝑥−𝑖𝑖! (𝑥 − 𝑖)!𝑥𝑖=0  if outlet i and other x − 1 outlets misreported1𝑛𝛿  if no signal was received in the first period or if all outlets reported honestly
 
The updated timing of the game is: 
• Nature determines the types of the politicians 𝜃𝑖, where 𝑖 ∈ {𝐼, 𝐶} and 𝜃𝑖 ∈ {𝑔, 𝑏}. Only the 
politicians know their type and their opponent’s type prior to the signal. The prior probability 
that a politician is good is γ for both the incumbent and the challenger and is known by all 
agents. The shares of informed voters 𝛼 is determined and is known to all agents.  
• Outlets receive a composite signal about the state of the politicians, with each bad politician 
being revealed with probability q. The signal set outlets may receive 
is {𝛷𝐼𝛷𝐶 , 𝑏𝐼𝑏𝐶,𝑏𝐼𝛷𝐶 , 𝛷𝐼𝑏𝐶,}. The voters do not know that all outlets received the signal, and 
their prior belief that a politician is bad is γ. If a politician is revealed as bad, all media agents 
know it, but the voters do not. Additionally, both politicians know which has been exposed as 
bad.   
• Politicians decide successively on two vectors of bribes 𝜏𝐼 and 𝜏𝐶 towards the media outlets 
and they specify a reporting strategy towards the outlets they are bribing, with the incumbent 
moving first. These vectors are unknown only to the voters. 
• Media outlets decide simultaneously whether to accept the bribe and report accordingly. The 
voters do not observe this stage and do not know which, if any, outlets have accepted 
compensation from the politician. If a news outlet is approached by both politicians, its best 
response is to adopt the strategy which maximises the outlet’s revenue. Should both politicians 
make equal acceptable offers, it will report the truth. Should the expected payoff after receiving 
donations from either politician match, they prefer the incumbent. 
• Voters simultaneously observe the signal from the media according to their type and vote to 
maximise their expected utility.  
Second period begins. 
• The election results are announced along with politician types and are known to all agents.  
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• For each outlet that supressed a bad signal , it can be revealed as untrustworthy with probability 
λ. All agents are aware if an outlet is exposed as untrustworthy. Second period audience 
becomes 0 for any discredited outlet. 
• Voters simultaneously consume media and the game ends. 
This extension follows a similar method to the benchmark specification, with the model 
being solved by backward induction and while the equilibrium also being stated in a series of 
lemmas. The incumbent wins if the signal observed by the media is 𝛷𝐼𝛷𝐶 ,𝛷𝐼𝑏𝐶 or 𝑏𝐼𝑏𝐶. The 
challenger wins if the signal observed by the outlets is 𝑏𝐼𝛷𝐶. This arises from the fact that 
Bayesian updating still indicates the incumbent is preferred by voters if they observe 𝛷𝐼𝛷𝐶 
from their media outlet(s). As a result, the resulting PBE displays qualitatively the same 
features as the one in the benchmark specification, with the addition that there now exists a 
minimum amount that a bad politician would have to pay to ‘capture’ outlets.  
Although this extension features more elements than the benchmark specification, it is 
easier to prove since the addition of audience revenues and credibility considerations both 
increase the minimum ‘bribe’ a bad politician would have to pay a single outlet for them to 
report dishonestly, relative to the benchmark specification. Furthermore, the introduction of 
credibility considerations additionally hinders the ‘capture’ efforts of the bad politician to 
capture media outlets. For a given transfer from the bad politician towards outlet i, 𝜏𝐵,𝑖, the 
amount the good politician needs to spend to counter it is now always strictly smaller than 𝜏𝐵,𝑖. 
The intuition behind this result is that while the bad politician needs to account for the potential 
second period revenue loss in his offer towards the outlet, the good politician does not since 
honest reporting entails outlets retain their second period revenue with certainty. As a result, 
the outlet would prefer to accept the smaller transfer and report honestly since first period 
readership includes the informed voters, they receive a political transfer and keep their second 
period revenue too.  
Section 3.5.3: Analysis with credibility, audience and unequal budgets 
Again, I relax the constant budget assumption to analyse whether a similar PBE arises. 
This extension follows a similar method to the benchmark specification, with the model being 
solved backwards and while the equilibrium is also being stated in a series of lemmas. Note 
that if the budget of the incumbent is much larger than that of the challenger, the model 
approximates that of Trombetta and Rossignoli (2020).  The resulting equilibrium has similar 
features to the previous specification if the budget difference is not too large. The incumbent 
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wins if the signal observed by the media is 𝛷𝐼𝛷𝐶 or 𝛷𝐼𝑏𝐶, irrespective of the difference in 
budget. This arises from the fact that Bayesian updating still indicates that the incumbent is 
preferred by voters if they observe 𝛷𝐼𝛷𝐶 from their media outlet(s). However, if the budget 
asymmetry is large enough, a bad incumbent can win the election should the signal observed 
by media outlets be 𝑏𝐼𝛷𝐶. This is not surprising and mirrors the results obtained by Besley and 
Prat (2006) and Trombetta and Rossignoli (2020). Obviously, this requires the incumbent to 
have more funds and that voters do not know which politician has more funds.  
If the latter condition does not hold and the voters know which politician has more 
funds, the resulting equilibrium is quantitavely similar to the previous specification. If one 
politician is discovered as bad while the other is not, we obtain the same equilibrium as in the 
benchmark case. The special case where both politicians have the same budget was considered 
in the previous section. If the bad politician has lower funds, media capture is trivially 
decreasing their utility since any attempt can be countered by the good politician. Therefore, 
media manipulation by the bad politician will not lead to their election victory while decreasing 
their funds and, hence decreasing their utility. If the bad politician has more funds, the Bayesian 
updating lemma, the voters prefer the politician with fewer funds if they observe their media 
outlet reporting 𝛷𝐼𝛷𝐶.  
If the signal received by media outlets is 𝑏𝐼𝑏𝐶, the resulting equilibrium strategy is 
dependent on the realisations of both the politician’s budgets and the share of informed voters. 
Again, if the budget of the incumbent is considerably larger than that of the challenger, the 
model again approximates those of Besley and Prat (2006) and Trombetta and Rossignoli 
(2020). If the budget of the challenger is sufficiently larger than that of the incumbent, he can 
win by ‘enticing’ enough outlets to report 𝑏𝐼𝛷𝐶. Full equilibrium and proofs are available in 
Appendix B. 
Section 3.6: Results and Discussion 
The seminal paper of Besley and Prat (2006) suggests that the main method employed 
in curtailing the media’s role in spreading political information shifted from outright 
censorships towards offering economic incentives for more favourable coverage. The papers 
of Trombetta and Rossignoli (2020), Corduneanu-Huci, and Hamilton (2018) bring evidence 
of this both theoretically and empirically.  
The theoretical model analysed in this paper extends the work of Besley and Prat 
(2006), Trombetta and Rossignoli (2020), Corduneanu-Huci, and Hamilton (2018) by 
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providing a rationale for the empirically observed heterogeneous levels of interference. 
However, a key difference is that the results indicate that in pure strategy Perfect Bayesian 
Equilibria, media and political competition and electoral standards ensure that the true state of 
politicians is always revealed to a subset of the electorate. However, if the proportion of voters 
who actively seek political news is high enough, full disclosure occurs in the media market 
even if both politicians are bad. The present model can be seen as a generalisation of the 
previous models as it collapses to that of Trombetta and Rossignoli (2020) if the politician’s 
budgets are highly asymmetrical and to that of Besley and Prat (2006) with the additional 
assumption that the share of informed voters is zero.  
These findings are relevant given the recent attention given to the proliferation of 
possibly distorted media via the internet and its effects on political results and resulting voter 
welfare. The results presented in this paper suggest that while media competition mediates the 
propensity of media suppression, political competition and electoral standards help eliminate 
total media suppression. In line with the results of Corduneanu-Huci and Hamilton (2018), the 
politicians prefer the most cost effective alternative when interfering in the media market, 
which in their framework never occurred in the pure strategy Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium. 
However, their result relied on the assumption that the politically motivated audience is 
relatively small and serviced by their own section of the media. In my model, the addition of 
political competition renders total media suppression strictly suboptimal in pure strategy PBE. 
With constant budgets and relatively small politically interested audiences, a good politician 
always prevents a bad politician from winning via media interference and hence full disclosure 
is observed in the media. Furthermore, the results hold even when the share of informed voters 
exceeds 50%, in which case the pure strategy equilibrium suggests full media disclosure 
regardless of the type of the politicians. This result relies on the assumption that voters would 
prefer one politician when they observe both alternatives as bad. The choice of the incumbent 
as the favourite in this situation is not crucial as full disclosure is still the equilibrium should 
voters prefer the challenger.  
Similar results hold with asymmetric politician budgets if the differences in budgets are 
not too large. The results indicate that unlike the constant budget case, a bad politician would 
be able to achieve meaningful media suppression that would allow him to win the election. 
Similar to the results of Trombetta and Rossignoli (2020), the model predicts heterogeneous 
levels of media suppression, with total media suppression only occurring if the share of 
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informed voters is at least half. This result approximates those of Trombetta and Rossignoli 
(2020) and holds despite reputation concerns in the media market. 
The results found in previous literature on the effects of political interference in media 
markets indicate that the effects on voter welfare are at best neutral whenever media 
interference is possible, as a bad politician is able to win an election by capturing the media 
and concealing his type to the electorate. If the challenger politician is good, the effect on voter 
welfare is negative. Examples of this are the models of Besley and Prat (2006) and Corduneanu-
Huci and Hamilton (2018), where increasing the number of media outlets decreases the 
probability of successful media capture. The results of Trombetta and Rossignoli (2020) show 
that the cost of capture is non-monotonic and goes to zero as the number of outlets goes to 
infinity, which lowers voter welfare by making capture more likely. The policy implications 
arising from these results is that political interference in media markets is unambiguously bad 
and should be prevented. However, the results of this paper challenge this policy implication, 
as the presence of a challenger also involved in the media markets results in a good politician 
always winning the election whenever he is present. A bad challenger never wins against a 
good incumbent and a bad incumbent always loses to a good challenger, and therefore, political 
interference in media markets is voter welfare reducing if and only if the interference is a 
monopsony. The policy implication is that political involvement in media markets can be 
beneficial if it is transparent and open to all candidates, rather than just the incumbent. 
These results become important in the context of internet proliferation of new media 
outlets and sliding democratic standards observed in autocracies and democracies alike. They 
give evidence that larger politically involved sections of the electorate together with political 
competition can help reduce the likelihood of distortions in the media markets and voter 
misinformation. Furthermore, it provides evidence that political competition can help promote 




Chapter 4: Does longer EU membership improve migrant labour market integration? 
Section 4.1: Introduction 
Labour market discrimination and integration of immigrants are contentious issues in 
the UK, which has experienced a migrant growth from 6.4% to 13.4% between 1990 and 2017, 
according to the 2017 edition of the UN’s trend in immigrant stock. Previous literature such as 
Ottaviano and Peri (2012) suggests that migrant and native labour are not perfect substitutes 
and as a result different outcomes in the labour market are observed for the two groups, whereas 
Dustmann, Glitz and Vogel (2010) and Clark and Drinkwater (2008) indicate that non-OECD 
migrants in the UK are relatively higher educated and better remunerated than their native 
counterparts. It is therefore important to ask to what extent is it possible for migrants to 
integrate in the UK labour market, and to analyse whether their labour market performance is 
fair given their characteristics. As migrants accumulate experience and social capital in the 
receiving country, their labour market outcomes are also expected to improve. Is this observed 
in the UK? 
In this paper I examine differences in labour market outcomes between UK natives and 
immigrants from 10 countries that joined the European Union in 20044 (hereafter also referred 
to as EU10 countries). In this context, the absence of wage gaps can be interpreted as a measure 
of the UK’s efficiency at attracting and integrating successful immigrants, whereas the 
presence of a gap can indicate discrimination. The presence of wage gaps between natives and 
EU migrants can also give an indication of the extent to which the UK is integrated in the EU 
labour market.  
As a member of the European Union until 2020, the UK was bound by legislation 
surrounding the freedom of movement that outlaws discrimination of workers from member 
states. Therefore, it becomes interesting to analyse how changes in the EU membership in 2004 
for 10 European countries affected the degree of discrimination and integration in the UK 
labour market of immigrants from these countries. To assess such changes, I carry out an 
empirical analysis on whether EU migrant-native wage gaps exist and how they evolve after a 
country joins the EU.   
The European Union (EU) is a unique economic and political partnership between 27 
European countries, aiming to increase trade, reduce regional disparities and improve the 
 
4 Czech Republic, Estonia, Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Malta, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia. 
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labour market prospects of workers across the union. One avenue through which it operates is 
the free movement of workers, a fundamental principle enshrined in Article 45 of the Treaty 
on the Functioning of the European Union (introduced in 1951 as part of the Treaty of 
Paris). One of the key principles behind the European Single Market is that of the free 
movement of labour, which can theoretically act as an adjustment mechanism in the face of 
asymmetric shocks. According to Article 45, Paragraph 2: freedom of labour movement ‘shall 
entail the abolition of any discrimination based on nationality between workers of Member 
States as regards employment, remuneration and other conditions of work and employment’. 
Whether the normative prescription of Article 45 holds in practice is also expected to 
affect the net present value of migration and consequently the decision to migrate to or remain 
in the UK from the perspective of potential EU migrants. This also has implications on the 
larger discussion on intra-EU brain drain, the dynamics of internal EU migration, its long-term 
effects on the development of sending countries and the sustainability of freedom of movement.  
The normative prescription of Article 45 indicates that any pre-existing discrimination 
in the British market for citizens of countries that have not yet joined the EU should dissipate 
and/or disappear after accession. In order to test this hypothesis, I propose focusing on the 2004 
EU enlargement episode and analyse three periods, namely 1994-2003, 2004-2008 and 2009-
2013. The choice of the British labour market is motivated by EU legislation, which allows 
member states to impose restrictions on workers from new members for up to 7 years after 
accession. In the context of the accession of the countries which joined the EU in 2004 (see 
Table 4.1, henceforth referred to EU10 or A10 countries), restrictions were not implemented 
in Ireland, Sweden and the United Kingdom. This policy choice allowed A10 nationals to enjoy 
the full benefits of freedom of movement and the protections of Article 45 immediately in these 
three countries, creating a discontinuity in their legal status which can be used to analyse the 
benefits of EU membership. In the case of the 2007 and 2013 enlargements, labour restrictions 
were imposed by all pre-existing member states except Sweden.  
Given these considerations, what is the extent of labour market convergence of EU 
migrants in the UK? Does longer EU membership improve convergence? More generally, does 
the behaviour of migrants in the labour market change post accession? Do they work second 
jobs disproportionately to natives? Is labour market convergence different for newer and more 
established migrants? Are their labour market opportunities converging to those of natives?  
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Given these questions, this paper makes the following contributions. Firstly, this study 
adds to the literature of the integration of migrant workers in the British labour market by using 
the Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition to estimate wage differentials and ascertain to what extent 
they are motivated by differences in characteristics. It is therefore important to analyse the 
explained part of the decomposition to understand to what extent the differentials are 
attributable to different characteristics distributions across groups. Furthermore, this paper 
analyses whetherEU membership improves the integration prospects of migrant men, both 
newly arrived and those present in the UK for at least five years. .  Secondly, study proposes 
using the Logit-Oaxaca decomposition proposed by Fairlie (2005) to split the differences in 
the probability of working a second job into explained and unexplained parts. Thirdly, it adopts 
an extension proposed by Firpo et al. (2007) to decompose the wage differentials at different 
quantiles on the wage distribution to analyse which subgroups are better integrated in the 
British labour market.  
In order to correctly interpret the unexplained component of the decompositions as 
discrimination, every factor which could be reasonably thought to influence individual 
productivity and wages needs to be taken into consideration. These include differences in 
education, tenure, occupation type and its characteristics, among others. Even if the 
unexplained component remains statistically significant, it can be attributed to discrimination 
only if all relevant characteristics have been included and none present any measurement error.  
If the remaining unexplained component is statistically insignificant, it can be inferred that the 
observed differentials are not due to discrimination, but to observed characteristics. In the 
literature, the unexplained component is usually thought to include discrimination, but it may 
be biased either way due to unobserved productivity differences or job-market discrimination 
in the form of job self-selection. These regressions could also provide evidence on whether 
people with foreign qualifications are disadvantaged in the British labour market, the degree of 
integration of post-2004 EU migrants, and whether unexplained differences are prominent at 
the top or bottom of the distribution. 
I use the British Labour force Survey (LFS) between 1994-2013 to compare the labour 
market performance and behaviour of EU10 migrants before and two periods after enlargement 
to analyse whether two avenues of convergence between natives and migrants occur. This study 
finds that the wage gap between natives and all EU10 migrant men was 2%, before 2004, which 
is relatively small and statistically insignificant. This gap however increases immediately after 
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accession to 46% in 2004-2008, which is statistically significant and explained by the relatively 
large influx of relatively lower skilled and less experienced migrant men. Differences in 
characteristics account for 47% of the observed wage differential in this period. In the third 
period, this decreases to 42%, but remains statistically significant, while 52% of this difference 
is explained by heterogeneous characteristics between the groups. This suggests that overall, 
longer EU membership improved the integration prospects of EU10 migrants, but these effects 
were not homogenous across the migrant group. Generally speaking, migrants who were 
present in the UK for at least 5 years are better integrated in the British labour market. The 
results suggest that the large and statistically significant wage differential observed between 
natives and all migrants in the second period is overwhelmingly composed of wage gaps 
between natives and migrant men who were present in the UK for less than 5 years, which is 
of 50%, half of which is explained by differences in characteristics. The equivalent gap 
between natives and migrants who were in the UK for at least five years is significantly lower 
and statistically insignificant at 4%. In the third period, the observed wage gap becomes 
positive and statistically significant for both migrant groups relative to the native population, 
staying roughly constant at 49% for migrants present for less than 5 years. Differences in 
characteristics account for 61% of this gap. On the other hand, the gap for migrants present for 
more than 5 years is 36%, which indicates that migrants present in the UK longer are better 
integrated in all periods.  
 The quantile decomposition reveals that prior to 2004, EU10 migrants experienced 
sticky floors, with a 59% native wage advantage observed between natives and migrants at the 
bottom of the income distribution, with a statistically significant 53% gap arising from the 
unexplained component. EU accession is found to have alleviated this phenomenon, both at 
the bottom and middle of the income distribution. In the former case, this is manifested both 
through a reduction in the total observed wage gap and an increase in the proportion explained 
by differences in observed characteristics. At the middle of the income distribution, the 
difference increases significantly relative to the first period, but it is 97% explained by 
differences in characteristics. The share explained decreases slightly in the third period to 87%. 
However, EU accession created a strongly statistically significant ‘glass ceiling’ for EU10 
migrants, with a quantile gap of 60% observed in both post-accession periods. The unexplained 
components are large and statistically significant in both periods, accounting for 45% and 60% 
wage gaps in favour of natives. The Logit-Oaxaca results surprisingly indicate that natives are 
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more likely to work a second job in all periods, with the difference being statistically significant 
in the second and third periods. 
Section 4.2: Literature Review 
The literature on the expected labour market outcomes of immigrants is rich. 
Theoretically, the first benchmark model is the human capital of Becker (1964), in which 
human capital is a function of education, qualifications, labour market experience, and training. 
An investment in human capital increases productivity in the labour market and remuneration 
is a positive function of human capital. Individuals are assumed to be utility maximizing and 
choose their human capital accordingly, and the resulting wage differentials are due to 
differences in human capital and innate ability. In this model, intuitively, people with higher 
innate ability also choose higher levels of human capital investment.  However, capital acquired 
in the home country is not always equivalent to capital obtained in the receiving country. As 
indicated in Constant and Zimmerman (2009), in the case of immigrants, human capital 
investment undertaken in the host country is an avenue through which they can converge on 
the earnings of similar natives, but full convergence may not happen because of imperfect skill 
substitutability. Kahanec (2012) suggests that in this model, heterogeneity in human capital 
stocks affect individual abilities to integrate, resulting in either positive or negative immigrant 
self-selection. 
Borjas (1987) suggests that immigration from poorer countries suffers from negative 
selection inasmuch as the workers are relatively lower skilled since higher skilled workers are 
less likely to migrate. This is supported by Longhi & Rokicka (2012), who observe that pre-
2004 EU85 migrants ‘seem to be negatively selected in terms of education’. Comparing 
education levels is not straightforward as harmonizing qualification levels across countries can 
be difficult (Nickell & Salaheen (2017), see Table 4.8), which in turn can make immigrant 
labour less substitutable to native labour. This may be one of the main factors causing 
immigrant labour in the UK to be employed below their capabilities, and a main factor causing 
imperfect migrant integration in the British labour market as seen in Nickell and Salaheen 
(2017), Longhi and Rokicka (2012), Kahanec (2012), and Dustmann, Frattini and Preston 
(2007). Baas et al. (2010) also find that the low skilled immigrant subset is more susceptible to 
wage variations, which could lead to widening gaps relative to the rest of the population when 
a labour market shock occurs. This would result in widening migrant wage gaps particularly 
 
5 Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia 
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versus skilled natives. Since previous immigrants are more affected by subsequent immigration 
that natives, this creates a channel via which widening gaps may be observed, shown by 
Kahanec (2012). Drinkwater et al. (2009) argue that EU8 migrants faced reduced travel costs 
post accession, which renders the increased inflow feasible and in accordance with migration 
theory via reducing migration cost and increasing the expected benefit of migration.  
Longhi & Rokicka (2012) provide descriptive statistics indicating that EU10 migrant 
outflow towards the UK was positively affected by newly acquired EU membership. 
Furthermore, they indicate that the skills composition of the EU10 migrant flow deteriorated 
after 2004 relative to before EU accession. Further evidence is found by Drinkwater et al. 
(2009), who indicate that migrants were more positively self-selected in terms of education 
before the 2004 expansion. Kahanec (2012), using a human capital model, shows that factors 
which influence the decision to migrate do not have a constant effect on all groups of potential 
migrants.  
Further evidence is given by Longhi and Rokicka (2012) observe who ‘larger 
heterogeneity in more recent migrants’ with respect to knowledge of the English language, 
restricting the potential jobs a migrant could accept, possibly leading to increased wage 
differentials observed. These gaps can also occur as migrant returns to education may be lower 
than those of natives as shown by Drinkwater et al. (2009) in the case of Polish workers. 
Dustmann, Fratinni and Preston (2007) bring further evidence by showing that skills are not 
perfectly substitutable between natives and migrants and as a result, the latter group are likely 
to ‘temporarily downgrade to less skilled occupations than they are qualified for’.  
Longhi & Rokicka (2012), using a probit model, provide evidence that EU8 migrants 
are more likely to occupationally segregate, with migrants more likely to ‘work in 
manufacturing and financial services and less likely to work in construction, transport and the 
public sector’; ‘immigrants from EU8 countries arrived after the 2004 enlargement work in 
different types of jobs than those arrived before’. Manacorda et al. (2012) and Baas et al. (2010) 
provide evidence that immigration more likely ‘depresses the earnings of previous immigrants 
more than those of natives, indicating imperfect substitutability between native and migrant 
labour. Manacorda et al. (2012) further argue that since the immigrant share is still low and 
relatively better educated, the effect of reducing the returns to education has been lower on 
natives than on previous immigrants. This is because these migrants are more substitutable 
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with previous migrants and that the degree of substitutability between immigrant and native 
labour increases with the length of time spent by the former in the UK. 
Section 4.3: Decomposition Methodology 
One of the main methods used in the literature aimed at quantifying potential 
discrimination is the Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition (see Blinder (1973) and Oaxaca (1973)). 
Due to its simplicity, it can be used to gain valuable insight into the nature of the gaps, and 
their evolution over time if each wave is treated as an independent cross-section. Built upon 
Becker’s (1964) Human Capital Theory, starting with usual wage regressions for the groups 
considered of the form: 
𝑦𝑖 = 𝛽0𝑗 + 𝛽1𝑗𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑖 + 𝛽2𝑗𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖 + 𝛽3𝑗𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖2 + µ𝑖𝑗𝐷𝑖 +∑𝜌𝑗𝑙12𝑙=1 𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑙 +∑𝜏𝑘𝑗5𝑘=2 𝑤𝑘 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗 
[Eq 1] 
where the i subscript indexes individuals, k indexes the year, l indexes government regions, 
and j indexes the groups under consideration. Here 𝑦𝑖 denotes log hourly wages, 𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑖 and 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖 denote years of education (defined as age-education-6) and employment duration at 
current employer respectively, 𝐷𝑖 is a vector of personal characteristics other than education 
and experience, 𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑙 are location dummies (control=London), 𝑤𝑘 is a year binary variable 
(control=first year in the period). The location and period dummies are added to account for 
time and period specific effects which may influence earnings. The wage measure used is 
inflation adjusted using a GDP deflator from the HM treasury website.  
 The gap is then defined at the mean, µ, as: (𝑦1̅̅ ̅ − 𝑦0̅̅ ̅ ) = ( 𝑋1̅̅ ̅ − 𝑋0̅̅ ̅) 𝜷𝟏(µ)+( 𝑋0̅̅ ̅ 𝛽1(µ)- 𝑋0̅̅ ̅ 𝜷𝟎(µ)) 
[Eq 2] 
where the first term of the right-hand side represents the part attributable to differences in mean 
characteristic differences, generally perceived as representing valid wage differentials arising 
from differences in characteristics, and the second part which is the unexplained effect. In this 
context, subscript 1 denotes the group of natives whereas subscript 0 denotes migrants.  It is 
tempting to attribute the entirety of the unexplained component to discrimination, but a better 
interpretation is that the unexplained component includes all the relevant and omitted factors, 
amongst which is discrimination. Furthermore, I have:  
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(𝑋1̅̅ ̅ − 𝑋0̅̅ ̅) 𝜷𝟏(µ)=∑ (𝐾𝑘=1 𝑥1,𝑘̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ − 𝑥0,𝑘̅̅ ̅̅ ̅) 𝜷𝟏,𝒌(µ) 
[Eq 3] 
which allows the estimation of contribution for each variable separately. While the Blinder-
Oaxaca decomposition has the advantage of being intuitive and easily implementable, its 
disadvantage is compounding the effect of any unaccounted factor together with discrimination 
in the unexplained component. Additionally, this decomposition can only analyse mean 
differences, it relies on out of sample predictions when the range for the variables X is different 
across groups, which can lead to misleading results (see Barsky et al., 2002, Longhi, Nicoletti 
and Platt 2013, Nandi and Nicoletti 2014). Despite these shortcomings, the method still remains 
widely used because of its intuitiveness and capacity to analyse the contribution of each 
characteristic individually. 
Section 4.3.1 Logit Decomposition 
Following Fairlie (2005) for the non-linear decomposition analysis, given a non-linear equation  ?̅? = 𝐹(𝑋, 𝛽), the gap can be defined as: 
(𝑦1̅̅ ̅ − 𝑦0̅̅ ̅ ) = [∑ 𝐹(𝑋𝑖1𝜷𝟎)𝑁1𝑁1𝑖=1  − ∑ 𝐹(𝑋𝑖0𝜷𝟎)𝑁0𝑁0𝑖=1 ] + [∑ 𝐹(𝑋𝑖1𝜷𝟏)𝑁1𝑁1𝑖=1  − ∑ 𝐹(𝑋𝑖1𝜷𝟎)𝑁1𝑁1𝑖=1 ] 
[Eq 4] 
In the equation above 𝑁1 and 𝑁0 denote the sizes of groups 1 and 0 respectively. As in 
the standard Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition, the first term denotes the part attributable to group 
differences in the distributions of X, while the second term is the unexplained component, 
attributable to differences in the group processes in determining levels of y. The standard 
Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition is a special case of this decomposition. Here, the alternative 
expression is used since 𝑦?̅? need not equal 𝐹(?̅??̂?). 
Following Fairlie (2005), I define 𝑦?̅? as the average probability of the binary variable 
of interest for group j and let F denote the cumulative distribution function from the logistic 
distribution. Estimating the first term in the equation above, the total explained component, is 
achieved by calculating the two sets of predicted probabilities and taking the difference 
between the average values of the two. As opposed to the standard Blinder-Oaxaca 
decomposition, identifying the contribution of various variable groups to the observed gap in 
probability is not straightforward. If the group sizes are equal and there exists a “natural one-
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to-one matching” (Fairlie (2005)), coefficient estimates from a logit regression run on a pooled 
sample, ?̂?∗, can be used to determine independent contribution of 𝑋1 to the observed gap:  1𝑁0∑𝐹(?̂?∗𝑁0𝑖=1 + 𝑋𝑖1?̂?∗𝟏 + 𝑋𝑖1?̂?∗𝟎) − 𝐹(?̂?∗ + 𝑋𝑖0?̂?∗𝟏 + 𝑋𝑖1?̂?∗𝟎) 
[Eq 5] 
 The contribution of each variable to the gap is equal to the change in the average 
predicted probability from replacing the group 0 distribution with the group 1 for that variable 
while holding constant the contributions of the rest of the variables. This also has the property 
that the sum of individual contributions equals the total contribution of all variables evaluated 
in a full sample regression. However, unlike in the linear case, the independent contributions 
of the groups depend on the value of the other variable, implying that which variable set is 
chosen as 𝑋1 matters. This is known as path dependence. 
Following Fairlie (2005) standard errors are approximated using the delta method. 
Letting F denote the logistic probability density function and rewriting equation 5 as:  
𝐷1̂ = 1𝑁0∑𝐹(𝑁0𝑖=1 𝑋𝑖11?̂?∗) − 𝐹(𝑋𝑖01?̂?∗) 
[Eq 6] 
where: 𝐹(𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑘?̂?∗) = 𝐹(?̂?∗ + 𝑋𝑖𝑗?̂?∗𝟏 + 𝑋𝑖𝑘?̂?∗𝟎) 
 
The variance of 𝐷1̂ can be approximated as: 





𝜕𝐷1̂𝜕?̂?∗ = 1𝑁0∑𝐹(𝑁0𝑖=1 𝑋𝑖11?̂?∗)𝑋𝑖11 − 𝐹(𝑋𝑖01?̂?∗)𝑋𝑖01 
[Eq 8] 
In this application, however, the size of the migrant subgroup is smaller than that of 
natives in all three periods. This issue is addressed by first using pooled coefficient estimates 
to compute predicted probabilities 𝑦?̂? for each native or migrant observation in the sample. Then 
a random subsample of natives of size equal to that of the group of migrants and each 
observation in both groups are separately ranked by the predicted probabilities of being in the 
top/bottom of their respective distributions. The observations are then matched by their 
respective relative rankings. Fairlie (2005) however notes that this method yields fairly similar 
results to matching observations across the two groups randomly. Naturally, the estimated 
results depend on the choice of natives in the subsample, and optimally the results should 
approximate those obtained by matching the entire native sample to the migrant one. This is 
circumvented by drawing a large number of random subsamples, calculating separate 
decomposition estimates and using the mean estimates to approximate the entire native 
population results. In the results section below, I use 100 random subsamples in each regression 
to calculate the means. 
This decomposition technique has two drawbacks. Firstly, the unexplained portion of 
the gap is inherently difficult to interpret, which renders subsequent analysis reliant only on 
the explained component. The second is the path dependence. 
Section 4.3.2: Quantile Decomposition 
The paper of Firpo et al. (2007) proposes an extension which permits the decomposition 
to be extended at any percentiles of the wage distribution. The method entails usage of a Re-
Centred Influence Function (RIF), given by: 
o RIF(y,𝑞𝜏)= 𝑞𝜏 + [𝜏−𝑑𝜏]𝑓𝑌(𝑞𝜏)       
where the denominator denotes the density distribution function of the log hourly pay variable, 𝑞𝜏denotes the quantile at which the regression is run while 𝑑𝜏 is a binary variable recording 1 
if y≤ 𝑞𝜏 and zero otherwise. This transformation ensures that the outcome variable, here log 
of hourly pay, at the mean equals 𝑞𝜏. In this paper the RIF (y,𝑞𝜏) is estimated by superseding 
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𝑞𝜏with the sample estimate of 𝑞𝜏 and using a non-parametric kernel estimation to compute the 
density distribution.6 The RIF also satisfies the following properties: 
i) The mean equals the 𝜏-quantile: 𝐸𝑌[RIF(y,𝑞𝜏)]= 𝑞𝜏 
ii) The expectation mean given the vector X also equals 𝑞𝜏: 𝐸𝑋[𝐸𝑌[RIF(y,𝑞𝜏)]|X] = 𝑞𝜏 
According to Firpo et al. (2009), Longhi, Nicoletti and Platt (2013) and Nandi & Nicoletti 
(2014), if a linear relationship is assumed between the RIF and X, 𝐸𝑌[RIF (y,𝑞𝜏)] can be 
estimated by: 
o RIF(y,𝑞𝜏)= 𝛽𝑗(𝑞𝜏)𝑋𝑗+𝑢𝑗 , where j is the group indicator (here 1 if British, 0 
otherwise), X is a n*k vector of explanatory variables, and 𝛽𝑗(𝑞𝜏) is the vector of 
estimated coefficients at quantile 𝑞𝜏 
The authors prove that, given i) and ii), that the Blinder-Oaxaca equivalent at quantile 𝑞𝜏is: 
o 𝑞1,𝜏 − 𝑞0,𝜏 = 𝐸𝑌[RIF (𝑦1,𝑞𝜏)]|𝑋1]- 𝐸𝑌[RIF (𝑦0,𝑞𝜏)]|𝑋0]= 𝛽1(𝑞𝜏)𝑋1̅̅ ̅-𝛽0(𝑞𝜏)𝑋0̅̅ ̅ 
Re-arranging the above equation, I arrive at an equivalent of the original Oaxaca 
decomposition, which the authors call the ’generalized Oaxaca’: 
o 𝑞1,𝜏 − 𝑞0,𝜏 = (𝑋1̅̅ ̅ − 𝑋0̅̅ ̅) 𝛽1(𝑞𝜏)+ 𝑋0̅̅ ̅(𝛽1(𝑞𝜏) − 𝛽0(𝑞𝜏)) 
Because of property i), the generalized Oaxaca decomposition also includes the 
standard Oaxaca decomposition as a special case. It can also be shown that the generalized 
Oaxaca permits observing the individual influence of each variable in the decomposition: 
o 𝑞1,𝜏 − 𝑞0,𝜏=∑ (𝐾𝑘=1 𝑥1,𝑘̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ − 𝑥0,𝑘̅̅ ̅̅ ̅) 𝛽1,𝑘(𝑞𝜏) +  𝑋0̅̅ ̅(𝛽1(𝑞𝜏) − 𝛽0(𝑞𝜏)) 
Nandi and Nicoletti (2014) points out that this decomposition still has to rely on a 
linearity assumption and out of sample predictions, but it has the benefit of allowing 
estimations at quantiles other than the mean, providing a more complete analysis. Furthermore, 
Longhi, Nicoletti and Platt (2013) indicate that the inferences are ‘robust to arbitrary forms of 
heteroscedasticity’, which increases the efficiency of the estimations. 
 
6 The RIF is estimated using an STATA file rifreg.ado found at: http://faculty.arts.ubc.ca/nfortin/datahead.html 
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Section 4.4: Data 
For this study, I use successive Labour Force Survey (LFS) quarterly surveys of 
households, comprising a large amount of information on demographic indicators, labour 
market, and job characteristics for individuals older than 16 who have a private address in the 
UK. However, according to Longhi and Rokicka (2012) and Saleheen and Shadforth (2006), 
as the LFS is not focused on immigration, immigrants may be less likely to have a private 
address in the UK and be less willing to partake in the survey, and therefore be under-
represented in the dataset. I define a person interviewed in the dataset born in one of the 
countries which joined the European Union in 2004 as a A10 national/migrant. For the present 
study, individuals who are neither a British native nor a national of one of the A10 member 
states are ignored. I separate the pooled data in three datasets, one before accession (1994-
2003) and two after (2004-2008 and 2009-2013). The latter period coincides with the second 
round of member states reducing immigration restrictions for workers from the 2004 
enlargement countries, which should ease the migratory pressure on the UK, Ireland and 
Sweden. Additionally, the late 2000s recession had settled in the UK, the unemployment rate 
was increasing in late 2008-early 2009.The third period is thus characterized by a decrease in 
pull factors in the UK as well as push factors diminishing in the A10 countries, particularly 
Poland. 
The LFS has a rotating structure, with individuals being interviewed in five consecutive 
quarters, and samples released quarterly. Individuals are asked wage questions in the first and 
fifth waves of each quarter. To ensure that for each dataset each individual has a unique 
observation, I use the first wave responses for all years except 1994, 2004 and 2009, for which 
I also use the fifth wave. The addition of the fifth wave of observations in 1994 2004 and 2009 
does not lead to individuals being represented twice in the sample since they correspond to new 
entrants in 1993, 2003 and 2008 respectively. I restrict the dataset to the subsets of individuals 
aged 18-65, employed and not in education. I omit outliers in hourly wages by dropping from 
the sample individuals whose hourly pay exceeds £100. I also restrict the sample by keeping 
only the men with observations for those with available information on nationality, 
qualifications and wages data. Any observations with nationalities other than British or one of 
the A10 set are dropped. Tables 4.3 to 4.9 provide summary statistics for each dataset.  
Tables 4.3 to 4.5 outline summary statistics for both the native and migrant populations 
in the three periods considered in this study. It can be observed that the stock of A10 citizens 
is relatively small in the period before the expansion, increasing after 2004 and stabilizing in 
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the third period. Since this is a stock variable, it does not offer any indication whether the 
change is due to increased inflows, outflows or both. The changes in the immigrant stock are 
in accordance with the theory outlined above, increasing after the restrictions were lifted in 
2004, an increase in the pull factor, and stabilizing after the second period, due to reduced 
expected gain from migrating to UK, caused by the recession, better macroeconomic conditions 
in the largest sender and other EU countries lifted the working restrictions for A10 workers, 
increasing pull factors elsewhere.  
 Table 4.3 shows that in the first period (1994-2003), the mean age for natives is 39.67, 
while the mean age for migrants of 39.88, and they are not statistically significantly different. 
However, the migrant population who arrived in the UK less than five years prior is 
significantly younger with a mean of 29 years. Conversely, migrants who resided in the UK 
for more than five years have a mean age of 41.5 years, which is also statistically significant. 
Table 4.4 shows that in the second period, the mean age of the immigrant population is 
significantly lower, with an average age of 30.6 years which may indicate an inflow of 
relatively younger workers in this period. I also find a lower immigrant age in the third period, 
2009-2013 (Table 4.5). The differential in age between the native and overall migrant men are 
strongly statistically significant in both the second and third periods. When separating the 
migrant population based on time since arriving in the UK, a similar pattern persists in both 
post-accession periods, where more recent migrants are on average younger than migrants 
living in the UK for more than five years. In contrast with the first period, both categories of 
migrants are significantly younger than the native population.  
The summary statistics for log hourly pay in the first period indicates no significant 
difference between the pay received by migrants and natives, when comparing natives with 
both the whole migrant population or with either migrant subgroup, which suggests that both 
populations were similarly rewarded in the labour market and good integration of the migrants. 
The native population in the second period is higher paid relative to the first period, and 
significantly better paid than the overall migrant population and the migrant population who 
was present in the UK for less than five years. The migrant population who arrived in the UK 
before their country’s accession to the EU in 2004 are not statistically differently paid relative 
to natives, indicating this subgroup was relatively better integrated in the British labour market. 
However, this pattern is not observed in the third period, where the native population is 
significantly higher paid than the migrant one both when considering recent migrants and 
migrants who reside in the UK for more than 5 years. However, this is not sufficient to indicate 
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the presence of discrimination as relevant characteristics may also be significantly different 
between the two populations. This is analysed in the next section.  
The values for the length of continuous employment also suggests an inflow of new 
migrant men in the second period, a drop from 76 to 19.4 months for the mean values of A10 
migrants in the first and second periods respectively.  The average length of employment for 
immigrants increases by 89% in the third period to 3 years, which may be indicative of an 
improvement in their labour market conditions relative to that of natives. The native mean 
figure increases slightly but remains roughly constant across the periods. In the case of the 
migrant subgroups, by construction in all periods, the mean value for the migrants who arrived 
in the UK more than 5 years prior is significantly higher than that of those who did not. Data 
in Tables 4.3 to 4.5 also reports comparative statistics on experience in the British labour 
market. In this context, I define labour market experience as age-education-6 for natives and 
the difference between the year they arrived in the UK and the year in which they are 
interviewed. The mean labour market experience for natives in the first period is 22.4 years, 
while migrants on average have more years of experience in the labour market with 24.87 years. 
The mean years of British labour market experience increases for natives across the three 
periods, but falls dramatically for migrants, indicating a large migration inflow in the second 
and third periods. The mean for the whole migrant population drops to 2.97 and 5.5 years in 
the second and third periods respectively and as indicated in the literature, may be a vector 
through which wage differentials between natives and migrants can occur. In both post-
accession periods, this holds even for established migrants who were present in the UK for at 
least 5 years, indicating that migrant workers are less substitutable to natives, in line with the 
result of Manacorda et al. (2012). Years of experience in the British labour market offer an 
indication of how integrated a migrant is in the British labour market, due to improved 
knowledge of language and other local characteristics, improved connections, a longer period 
in which they could engage in (on the job) job search or longer tenure. 
 Summary statistics suggest that natives have a relatively higher chance of being 
employed in the public sector, being a manager and to have been offered training in the three 
months prior to interview. The figure for natives in the public sector remains roughly constant 
at 20%, while the immigrant counterpart starts at 23% and stabilises at 4% in the second and 
third periods. In both post accession periods, the figure for established migrants is relatively 
higher. The share of natives offered training is stable in all periods at around 26%. On the other 
hand, share of migrants offered training in the first period is not statistically significantly 
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different to that of natives, which holds for the migrant population as a whole and both 
subgroups. However, after accession, the overall figure for migrants is significantly lower in 
both periods compared to natives, but more established migrants are offered training more.  
It can be noticed from Table 4.6 that the distribution of A10 migrants changed over the 
three periods, particularly in London where it decreased from 36.6% in the first period to 
18.83% in the third. Post accession migrants display a more even distribution across the 
country, especially in the Midlands and North of England. Drinkwater et al. (2009) and Longhi 
& Rokicka (2012) also find that EU10 migrants are “more likely to be self-employed but earn 
less than their counterparts who arrived before”. If region fixed effects are significant in 
determining one’s wage, the additions of location dummies in the regressions should lead to 
more precise estimates. The descriptive statistics found in Tables 4.3 to 4.6 suggest that the 
2004 expansion had a significant effect on both the number of A10 immigrants and their 
distribution across the UK.  
Table 4.7 illustrates the distribution of migrants in industry sectors. Prior to the 2004 
accession, the largest share of immigrant labour was under the managers and administrators 
and elementary occupations categories (both 17.3%) followed by professional occupations and 
skilled trades (19.18% and 13.7% respectively) and plant and machine occupations (12%). The 
statistics suggest that the distribution of immigrants into job categories significantly changed 
after the 2004 expansion. The share of A10 workers in the managerial and professional 
occupation categories, likely associated with higher remuneration, drops significantly to 3% 
and 5.2% respectively. Associate and technical occupation and the clerical categories also 
suffer similar decreases, although of a lesser magnitude to 3.27 and 1.41% respectively, while 
sales occupations and skilled trades decrease slightly over the three periods.  The share of A10 
workers in the plant and elementary occupation increases significantly in the second period, 
which may indicate job self-selection or a larger share of low skilled labour, for whom the net 
expected benefit of migration has increased, which can indicate an increase in the mean gap. 
The share of immigrant workers in managerial positions and professional occupations stay 
roughly constant in the third period while the share of migrants in clerical occupations rises 
slightly in the third period to 2.63%. The majority share still lies in elementary and plant 
occupations. Although the share of immigrants in elementary occupations increases, the 
summary statistics suggests a slight improvement in the job allocation of the immigrant stock. 
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The substantial drop in the share of managers in the last two periods can indicate a 
negative self-selection of migrants into lower paid jobs. The results of Dustman, Fratinni and 
Preston (2007) indicate that newer migrants may be temporarily underemployed given their 
human capital, and therefore the distribution of migrants into lower job categories post 
expansion cannot be, prima facie, as evidence of negative immigrant self-selection in terms of 
education. The results of Longhi and Rokicka (2012) and Rosso (2013) suggest, however, some 
negative self-selection of immigrants, at least in the period immediately after accession. One 
potential issue is endogeneity between wages and occupation, which this decomposition 
method does not account for. As a result, the results should not be used to deduce any casual 
relationships. 
Table 4.8 illustrates the qualification levels of natives and immigrants in the three 
periods. Longhi and Rokicka (2012) provide evidence of negative self-selection in the A10 
stocks, seen in the prevalence of the “other qualifications” category, which is presumably either 
not easily comparable to a British equivalent or unrecognized in the British Labour Market. 
Thus, the other qualification can be interpreted as a proxy for other migrant specific 
characteristics which may result in a disadvantage in the British labour market. Furthermore, 
while it may indicate a relatively lower qualification level for the native population, this may 
not hold in the case of the migrants. The other qualification category represents more than half 
of the immigrant stock in the first two periods (49.2% and 57.36% respectively) but drops 
significantly in the third period to 45%. With respect to qualifications corresponding to a degree 
or equivalent including postgraduate qualifications, the immigrant stock is initially comparable 
to the native population but suffering a significant shock after the 2004 expansion, providing 
evidence of negative immigrant self-selection with respects to education.  
The share of migrants with qualifications equivalent to a degree or equivalent increases 
in the third period, becoming relatively comparable to the first period population, but the 
immigrant stock has now become less represented in this category relative to the British 
population. A similar trend can be observed for immigrants reporting qualifications in the 
Higher Education category, but they are relatively less represented in this group in the second 
period. With regards to secondary education, the share of migrants having qualifications 
equivalent to an A level varies slightly across the periods, from around 10% in the first and 
third periods to 7.47% in the second, while the share of those having completed only GCSEs 
remains roughly constant at around 4.5%. In both categories, they are under-represented 
relative to natives. Interestingly, the only categories where the immigrant share is larger than 
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its native counterpart are the ‘other’ and no qualifications, whose trends are inverse for the 
native and migrant subsets respectively. The share of natives in the last two categories is 
progressively declining in both, the share of the immigrant stock in the latter is increasing in 
the second (from 15.77% to 17.9%), before stabilizing slightly in the third. Based on these 
considerations, it can be inferred that the human capital of the immigrant stock has been 
negatively impacted by the 2004 expansion relative to the native, but stabilized in the third 
period 
Table 4.9 attempts to provide a preliminary view of the differences in the return to 
human capital between the two populations in the sample over the three periods. Overall, the 
values suggest that the native subsets have a higher mean wage in each qualification, group 
and time cell except Higher Education and Other qualification individuals in the first period. 
In the first period, there are only slight mean differentials between native/immigrant men in all 
categories except for higher education and no qualification brackets. 
 In the second period, the wages of immigrants with degree education, higher education 
and A levels cells fall relative to the first, while the wages of other immigrant with GCSE or 
equivalent and no qualifications rise relative to the first period. Mean wages in all British cells 
rise slightly, becoming larger than their A10 equivalents. This pattern also holds in the third 
period, even though the mean wages of all the British cells decrease relative to the second 
period.  The third period also presents an increase in all immigrant cells relative to the second 
period, which may lead to a smaller mean wage differential compared to the second period. 
The overall decrease in immigrant mean wages is in accordance with the negative self-selection 
of migrants after 2004 observed by Longhi and Rokicka (2012) and Rosso (2013) and their 
observed tendency to be underemployed (also highlighted in Dustmann et al. (2007)). To what 
extent these patterns explain differentials in wages and hours worked is analysed in the next 
section. 
Section 4.5: Decomposition Analysis Results 
In the decomposition analysis I consider the wage gap between UK natives (group 1) 
and EU10 immigrants (group 0), therefore a positive sign indicates an advantage for the UK 
natives. The wage gaps are in terms of log wages; therefore, gaps approximate relative, not 
absolute, changes in wage. I also consider the gap in the probability to work a second job 
between UK natives (group 1) and EU10 immigrants (group 0). I decompose these gaps into 
the explained part, differentials arising from differences in explanatory variables, and the 
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residual unexplained part. If the latter is insignificant, I can conclude that there is no discernible 
discrimination against A10 migrants. All regressions are run separately for the periods 1994-
2003, 2004-2008, 2009-2013. The explanatory variables are grouped together in six categories: 
personal characteristics (including age, age squared, and dummies on marital status, dependent 
children, and disability binary variable); qualifications (years of education); and occupation (9 
industry division dummies). The last three categories are time and region binary variables, and 
job characteristics, which includes experience, experience squared, dummies on firm sizes, 
managerial roles, employment in the public sector and having received job-related training in 
the last three months. 
Section 4.5.1: Blinder-Oaxaca Decomposition of the Wage Gap 
Tables 4.10-4.12 display the results of the basic Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition of the 
difference in the men’s log wave between natives and EU10 immigrants separately for the three 
periods (1994-2003, 2004-2008, 2009-2013). The first table compares natives and all migrants, 
whereas Tables 4.11 and 4.12 compare natives with newer and more established migrants 
separately for the three periods.   
When comparing wage differentials at the mean for the entire migrant population the 
differences in the logarithm of earnings increased in the second and third period relative to the 
first, from 0.02 to 0.46 and 0.42 respectively, the latter two statistically significant at 5% level. 
In the first period, 1994-2003, there the wage gap is small and not statistically significant 
different from zero at 5% and 10% levels and neither is the part of the gap explained by 
differences in characteristics between the two groups nor the residual gap are statistically 
significant. This does not indicate that migrants are relatively underpaid in the first period, the 
unexplained component is relatively large. The explained component is statistically 
insignificant, but negative, indicating an expected wage advantage for migrants in the first 
period. This result is mainly driven by relatively higher levels of education (-0.041) and 
location effects (-0.059), both of which are statistically significant. The latter result follows 
from the statistics in Table 4.6, indicating that migrants are relatively more concentrated in 
London and the South East of England. These effects are offset by natives having relatively 
better job characteristics, accounting for a positive native wage advantage of 5%. Furthermore, 
natives have a significant 41% unexplained advantage given relative qualifications in the first 
period, despite migrants being relatively better educated. This coefficient accounts for the 
majority of the unexplained component in the decomposition between natives and all migrants 
in the first period.  
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In the second period, the difference in the mean log wage increases considerably to 0.46 
and becomes strongly statistically significant, which may be due to the negative self-selection 
of the immigrant population pointed out in Longhi and Rokicka (2012). Differences in 
characteristics statistically significantly explain 47.8% of this gap, whereas the remainder is 
unaccounted for and may include discrimination. Like in the first period, differences in 
qualifications indicate that migrants have a small wage advantage of 3%, while natives display 
a large unexplained advantage given their relative educations. The latter coefficient is 
comparable to its first period equivalent and strongly statistically significant. This result might 
indicate that native and migrant labour may not be perfectly substitutable.  As opposed to the 
first period, industry has become strongly statistically significant and accounts for 6.5% of the 
differential in log wages between natives and all migrants.  It indicates a 3.1 percentage point 
advantage for natives, suggesting negative migrant selection across occupations as outlined in 
Nickell and Salaheen (2017), Longhi and Rokicka (2012) and Dustmann, Frattini and Preston 
(2007). Given their relative distribution of persona characteristics, the decomposition explains 
another 10-percentage point advantage for natives, however, its respective unexplained 
component is significantly larger at 0.6. Differences in job characteristics indicate a positive 
and statistically significant native wage advantage of 15%, a significant increase from its first 
period counterpart. On the other hand, differences in job characteristics do not indicate any 
significant unexplained component in regard to the difference in log wages between natives 
and EU10 migrants.  
The unexplained component attributed to personal characteristics is the largest 
contributor to the overall unexplained component in the second period. As opposed to its first 
period counterpart, the unexplained component of the decomposition containing time and 
region effects both become positive but not statistically significant. Given their distribution 
across occupations, there is a statistically significant unexplained wage advantage for natives 
of 22%. This result is consistent with previous literature which pointed out the relative skill 
diminishment and underemployment of EU10 migrants after the 2004 accession. 
In the third period, the wage differential stays relatively constant relative to the second 
period at 42%, but the proportion explained by differences in characteristics increases slightly 
to 52%. The pattern explained components in the variable groups is similar to their second 
period equivalent, with differences in personal characteristics, industry and job characteristics 
predicting positive gaps of 6.2%, 6.3% and 12% respectively. One notable exception occurs in 
the positive sign in the unexplained component for education, which reduces 71% between the 
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two periods, which indicates better integration of migrants in the labour market in the third 
period. Similarly, the unexplained wage advantage of natives given occupational distribution 
becomes statistically insignificant in the third period, further indicating improved integration 
of EU10 migrants relative to the second period. The decomposition again indicates an 
explained wage advantage for migrants given their educational endowment of 1.3%, a decrease 
from the second period. Time and region fixed effects both report small but significant positive 
wage differentials for migrants, at 0.6 and 0.4% respectively. Overall, in the third period I 
observed relatively constant migrant wage handicaps compared to the second period as well as 
unexplained wage deficits. The mean Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition suggest that the observed 
wage differentials are largely explained by variations in qualifications, job characteristics and 
occupation and the unobserved differentials are significant and relatively small in magnitude 
post accession. However, these unexplained differentials should not be immediately interpreted 
as discrimination, since the effects of unobservable and unmeasurable characteristics relevant 
in wage determination are also present here. Overall, the results indicate that before the 
accession there was no statistically significant wage gap between the native and migrant male 
workers. After accession, a positive and statistically significant gap is observed at the mean, 
but the evidence suggests that EU10 migrants become better integrated in the UK labour market 
in the third period. Interestingly, differences in qualifications explain a small wage advantage 
for migrants in all period, while the unexplained component attributed to qualifications drops 
significantly in the third period. The unexplained component attributable to personal 
characteristics reduces between the second and third periods, bringing further evidence in 
favour of better EU10 migrant integration in the UK labour market. 
Table 4.11 displays the results of the standard Oaxaca decomposition when comparing 
natives with recently arrived migrants who were present in the UK for less than five years. In 
the first period, the gap becomes positive, but remains statistically insignificant, indicating a 
10% advantage for natives, out of which 33% is explained by differences in characteristics. As 
opposed to the whole population decomposition, newer migrants have relatively less valuable 
personal characteristics relative to natives, for whom the decomposition predicts a 12% wage 
advantage. Relative to the results in Table 4.10, the migrant wage advantage explained by 
education is relatively larger, at 15%, while the equivalent unexplained component indicates a 
statistically insignificant positive wage gap for natives. As expected, differences in job 
characteristics explain a 16-percentage point wage advantage for natives, which arises because 
the amount of experience migrants have in this decomposition is limited by construction. As in 
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the results in the first two columns of Table 4.10, migrants display a small wage advantage of 
4% due to their concentration in London and the South of England. However, the unexplained 
component coefficient for location suggests this migrant subgroup is less geographically 
concentrated. It is important to note that while not statistically significant, the observed wage 
in the first period is significantly larger than the one observed between natives and all migrants, 
and significantly smaller than the ones observed in Table 4.10 in the second and third periods. 
This suggests that migrants who were in the UK for more than five years were significantly 
better integrated in the UK labour market than more recent migrants, even before their country 
acceded to the EU.  
The equivalent wage gaps for the second and third periods are larger than those 
observed in Table 4.10 but follow the same pattern. In both periods, the observed log wage gap 
remains roughly constant at 0.5, out of which 50% and 60% are explained by differences in 
characteristics in the second and third periods respectively. On the other hand, the unexplained 
component is positive in all three periods, but statistically significant in the second and third 
periods. However, the unexplained component decreases in magnitude in the third period, 
which follows the pattern observed in the overall decomposition, indicating worsened labour 
market integration in the second period and improved labour market integration in the third 
period. Similar to the results observed in the first period, the explanatory pattern of personal 
characteristics remains constant at 12% in the second period, and at 10% in the third period. 
However, in the periods post accession, the unexplained component attributed to this category 
increases and becomes statistically significant, at 0.51 and 0.43 in the second and third periods 
respectively. Similar to the results in Table 4.10, differences in education indicate a positive 
wage differential of 3.7% for migrants in the second period and 1.2% in the third. As observed 
in the analysis in Table 4.10, the unexplained component attributed to this category reduces 
significantly between the second and third period, indicating relatively improved market 
integration of migrant skills. Occupational heterogeneity is significant in explaining positive 
native wage gaps in both post-accession periods, explaining gaps of 16% and 14% respectively. 
However, in the third period, there is an 8.2 percentage point unexplained wage deficit for 
migrants. Even though I observe a large and statistically significant wage gap between natives 
and migrant men from EU10 countries, the same result as in Table 4.10 is observed, with a 
larger proportion of the gap being attributable to observable characteristics. Again, it is 
noteworthy that while differences in qualifications indicated an explained statistically 
significant wage advantage for migrants in all three periods, but significantly reduced post 
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accession. This is in accordance with Longhi and Rokicka (2012) and Drinkwater et al. (2009) 
since the stock of new migrants in the second and third periods are relatively less educated. 
Furthermore, the results indicate that more recent migrants are not as well integrated in the 
labour market as the overall stock of migrants, suggesting that more established migrants are 
better integrated and face smaller wage gaps in all three periods.  
Table 4.12 displays the decomposition results when comparing natives with established 
migrants who are present in the UK for at least five years. In the first period, the observed wage 
differential between natives and the subset of migrant men is negative, statistically insignificant 
and insignificant in magnitude. Notice this is not consistent with the first period wage 
differentials observed in Tables 4.10 and 4.11. The observed wage differential indicates a 0.3% 
advantage for migrants, while differences in characteristics explain a gap of roughly 3% in 
favour of migrants. 
As opposed to the newer migrant decomposition, established migrants have relatively 
more valuable personal characteristics relative to natives, for whom the decomposition predicts 
a 2.4% wage advantage. In the second and third periods, differences in personal characteristics 
now account for roughly 2.9 percentage point wage advantages for natives. However, the 
unexplained component attributed to personal characteristics decreases relative to the 
decompositions in Tables 4.10 and 4.11 but remains statistically significant in the third period. 
While the unexplained component attributed to personal characteristics is statistically 
significant and positive, it is smaller than the equivalent for migrants present in the UK for less 
than five years. This can be indicative of more established migrants being better integrated in 
the labour market in the third period. Unlike the results in Tables 4.10 and 4.11, the migrant 
wage advantage explained by education becomes statistically insignificant while natives 
display a large unexplained advantage given their relative educations in the first period. This 
unexplained native advantage given heterogeneity in education persists in the second period, 
but changes sign and remains statistically significant in the third period. The explained 
component attributable to education is negative and strongly statistically significant in the 
second and third period, indicating migrant wage advantages of 6% and 1% respectively. This 
indicates that more established, migrants display better returns to education in the British 
labour market in the third period and are more easily integrated as their experience increases. 
This result suggests that while some gaps persist even for more established migrants in the third 
period, there is no evidence of discrimination in terms of education for this group of migrants.  
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However, it is important to notice that a smaller percentage of the observed wage 
differential in the third period is explained by differences in observable characteristics in the 
third period in this decomposition relative to that in Table 4.11. As expected, differences in job 
characteristics explain a significantly lower native wage advantage, of 3%, 6% and 9% in the 
three periods respectively. However, in the third period, natives display an unexplained wage 
advantage resulting from job characteristic, potentially indicating discrimination. As in the 
results in the first two columns of Table 4.10, migrants display a small wage advantage in all 
periods due to their concentration in London and the South of England. However, the 
unexplained component coefficient for location controls suggest this migrant subgroup is again 
more geographically concentrated in London and the south of England.  
Overall, in the third period I observed a significant increase in the observed wage 
differential between natives and migrants who were in the UK for at least five years, which is 
statistically significant. This is smaller in magnitude than the one observed in the 
decomposition in Table 4.11, indicating that more established migrant men are better integrated 
in the labour market. However, the percentage of the observed gap that is explained by 
observed characteristics is smaller for more established migrants whereas the unexplained 
component is roughly equal between the two decompositions, which may indicate an upper 
limit on the labour market integration an EU10 migrant might achieve. The positive and 
significant unexplained coefficients for industry and job characteristics may indicate 
occupational sorting amongst lower paying positions, consistent with restricted job 
opportunities and the (temporary) underemployment suggested by Nickell and Salaheen 
(2017), Longhi, Nicoletti and Platt (2013) Longhi and Rokicka (2012), Kahanec (2012), 
Dustmann, Frattini and Preston (2007). Quantile regressions are carried out in the next 
subsection to test whether there are sticky floors and glass ceilings, as well as analysing whether 
the source of the unexplained differences lies at the bottom of the distribution or towards the 
top.  
Section 4.5.2 Quantile Blinder-Oaxaca Decomposition Results 
All decomposition results listed in this section are inclusive of time and region effects. 
Table 4.13 displays the results for wage decomposition over the three periods. In the first 
period, the decomposition suggests that natives enjoy a 10% wage advantage relative to 
migrants at the mean, which is statistically significant. Differences in characteristics explain, 
however, a wage differential of 21.7%, which suggests that migrants enjoy an unattributable 
wage benefit of 11%. The former is partially explained by region effects (9.1% advantage, 
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significant at 1% level), and the relative propensity of migrants to settle in London and the 
south of England in the first period. Similar to the regressions in Table 4.10, job characteristics 
explain a significant 13.1% wage penalty relative to natives, while qualifications explain a 
further gap of 9.8% (significant at 1% level). Interestingly, at the bottom 10th quantile, a 
negative statistically significant migrant wage gap of 60% is observed, of which a significant 
10% is explained by differences in explanatory variables (mainly by qualifications and job 
characteristics). Region fixed effects indicate a 4.1% wage advantage for migrants. The 
significantly larger quantile gap and resulting unexplained wage penalty of 54% brings weak 
evidence of sticky floors for migrants in the first period. At the 90th quantile, the overall gap 
indicates a 10.9% wage advantage for natives, out of which 14.7% is attributable to differences 
in characteristics. All coefficients at this quantile are significant except for occupation. Region 
fixed effect which explain a migrant wage advantage of 9.8%. The significant wage advantages 
may indicate the relative propensity of migrants to settle in London and the south of England 
in the first period. The results at this quantile bring evidence against the idea of glass ceilings. 
However, the quantile results in this period are not as strong due to the relatively small migrant 
sample size. 
In the second period, the 50th quantile migrant gap is smaller than at the mean (39.3%) 
and statistically significant at 99% confidence interval, while the explained components 
account for the majority of the gap at 38% (also strongly significant). Occupational distribution 
accounts for a 1.1% native wage advantage, while job characteristics and qualifications explain 
gaps of 18.8% and 17% respectively; these indicate negative migrant self-selection in terms of 
qualifications and job distribution. The gap is significantly smaller at the 10th quantile (13.9 %) 
and strongly significant, although larger than in the first period. However, differences in 
characteristics explain a strongly significant gap of 7.3%, indicating a positive, significant and 
unexplained native wage advantage 6.6%. Job characteristics explain most of the explained 
gap each with 9.4% significant wage penalty, consistent with the relatively lower quality inflow 
after 2004 and temporary underemployment observed by Longhi and Rokicka (2012). At the 
90th quantile, the migrants face a relative and significant wage penalty of 60.3%, of which only 
32.6% (or 54%, and significant) is attributable to observable differences, which results in an 
unexplained and significant wage penalty of 27.6%, which includes unobserved characteristics, 
including discrimination. However, quantifying discrimination is not within the scope of this 
paper. The largest contributors to the gap are differences in job characteristics (9.1%), personal 
traits (12.7%) and qualifications (14.2%), all of which are statistically significant. Like the first 
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period, region effects are significant at all quantiles, despite the change in location distribution 
(see Table 4.6). Meanwhile, time effects become significant in all quantiles due to the 
sensitivity of the migrant stock to macroeconomic conditions (Blanchflower and Shadworth 
(2009)). These results disprove the existence of sticky floors in the second period but provide 
evidence of glass ceilings for migrants. 
In the third period, a significant (at 99% confidence interval) migrant wage penalty of 
3.8% is observed at the 50th quantile. Similar to the second period, differences in explanatory 
variables explain most of the migrant gap (3.3%), resulting in a significant and unexplained 
migrant wage disadvantage of 5.1%. Occupation distribution explains 49% of the total 
explained gap (1.6%), while job characteristics and qualifications also contribute 16% and 
12.6% each towards explaining the observed gap. Personal traits indicate a migrant wage gap 
of 3.1%, which indicates a reduction in the negative migrant self-selection observed after 2004. 
At the 10th quantile, migrants suffer a statistically significant wage penalty of 12.3% (as 
opposed to 13.9% in the second period), while differences in characteristics predict a penalty 
of 10.3%, and thus an unexplained wage advantage of 2% (both are significant at 99% 
confidence interval). Similar to the second period, a substantial amount of the explained 
component is due to the coefficient of occupation (2.3%) and job characteristics (7%). Personal 
traits indicate a smaller migrant wage penalty relative to the second period (1.7%), indicating 
a relative improvement in the set of migrant characteristics. The 90th quantile decomposition 
indicates an even negative and significant wage differential for migrants (relative to the second 
period), while the explained component is relatively smaller at 24.2%. Personal characteristics 
explains the largest share of the gap at 9.6%, and qualifications (8.6%). The wage penalty 
explained by job characteristics is now smaller at 5.7%, which may indicate a lower share of 
new migrants in this period. The unexplained component is also relatively larger at 36.5%, 
giving evidence of a glass ceiling for the migrant population. Interestingly, the pattern of 
migrant relative wage advantages explained by time effects observed in the second period no 
longer applies. Instead, they predict negligible and significant wage penalties of 0.6%, 0.5% 
and 0.6% in the 10th, 50th and 90th quantiles respectively. 
When analysing the pattern of integration in the British labour market across periods, 
two findings emerge. Firstly, the integration of migrants at the bottom of the income 
distribution improves significantly immediately after accession (period 1 to period 2), and 
between the second and third period. The proportion of the observed gap explained by 
differences in observable characteristics increases from 10% in the first period to 83% in the 
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third period, indicating that low income EU10 migrants are considerably better able to integrate 
as a result of their country’s accession in 2004. The unexplained component remains positive 
and statistically significant for this migrant subset across all three periods, but it reduced greatly 
from a 53% wage disadvantage in the first period, to a 2% wage disadvantage in the third. This 
suggests that not only did migrants not display ‘sticky floors’ after their country joined the EU, 
their joining did in fact greatly enhance their labour market integration. At the 50th quantile, 
the observed wage differential between natives and migrants increased significantly from 10% 
in the first period to roughly 39% in the second and third periods. Whereas in the first period, 
the decomposition indicated that the observed wage gap should be even higher at 21%, in the 
second and third period, the majority of the observed gap is explained by differences in 
observed characteristics. In the second period, the proportion explained by the decomposition 
is 97%, whereas in the third period 87% is explained. The unexplained component is positive 
in both post-accession periods and increases from 1% in the second period to 5% and 
statistically significant in the third. While this suggests slightly worse integration five years 
after the accession, migrants in the middle of the income distribution are considerably better 
integrated in the British labour market relative to before 2004.  
Secondly, for migrants at the top of the income distribution, we observe a glass ceiling 
after the 2004 EU enlargement. In the first period, the observed differential of 10% is positive 
but not statistically significant. However, the observed differential in the second and third 
period increases to 60% which is strongly statistically significant in both periods. The evolution 
of the explained component follows a similar pattern. In the period before the accession, the 
decomposition results suggest an expected wage differential of 14% in favour of natives. In the 
second period it increases to indicate an expected wage differential of 32%, while the third 
period equivalent results decreased to indicate a 24% explained wage advantage for natives. 
This result compounds the diminished integration observed from the 60% wage advantage for 
natives as a smaller percentage of the observed differential is explained by differences in 
observed characteristics. The unexplained component evolves in a similar manner, from 
negative and statistically insignificant (3% migrant wage advantage) before the accession, 
increasing to 27% and 36% in the second and third periods respectively. These results are 
significant, indicating that the proportion of the observed wage differential not attributable to 
observed characteristics increases from 45% in the second period to 60% in the third. These 
three results indicate that the integration of migrant men from the EU10 countries deteriorated 
significantly after their country joined the EU and that a ‘glass ceiling effect’ is observed. These 
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results indicate that UK policy intervention is required to address this effect and improve EU10 
migrant integration at the top of the income distribution. 
Section 4.5.3 Decomposition of the Gap in the Probability to Work a Second Job 
Table 4.14 displays the results of the Logit-Oaxaca decomposition of the gap in the 
probability of working a second job between UK natives and EU10 immigrant for the pre-
accession period 1994-2003 and the two post-accession periods 2004-2008 and 2009-2013.  
The decomposition results are expressed in terms of the difference in probability of working a 
second job.   
As mentioned previously this methodology uses pooled coefficient estimates to 
compute predicted probabilities𝑦?̂? for each native or migrant observation in the sample and then 
matches them by their respective relative rankings. Since the sample of natives is larger, the 
estimates obtained depend on the choice of natives sampled. To alleviate this, I draw 100 
random subsamples, calculate separate decomposition estimates and use the mean estimates to 
approximate the entire native population results. The contribution estimates reported below are 
the mean values obtained from replicating the decomposition 100 times. One potential 
drawback of this methodology is that coefficient order can potentially affect the results. To 
alleviate the concern of path dependence, all models are run with a randomised variable order 
and therefore the reported results are approximations across all possible orders. 
In the first period, the Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition reveals that in the first period the 
gap in the probability of working unpaid overtime is 0.0037% where a positive sign indicates 
natives were more likely to work a second job. Alternatively, natives in the first period were 
12.2% more likely to work a second job. However, heterogeneity in endowments across the 
two groups predicts that migrants should be more likely to work a second job at 0.046%, 
although this result is not statistically significant. In the second and third periods, the observed 
gap in the probability of working a second job increases to 1.78% and 1.5% respectively 
(natives were 34% and 36% more likely to work a second job), with the percentage explained 
by heterogeneity in characteristics at 62% and 71.3% respectively. In the second period, the 
differential increases may be due to the negative self-selection of the immigrant population 
pointed out in Longhi and Rokicka (2012) and the migrant downgrading suggested by Rosso 
(2013). 
 In the first period, differences in personal and job characteristics indicate that migrants 
are expected to be more likely to work a second job, predicting probability differences of 
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0.025% and 0.047% respectively. In the second and third periods, personal characteristics 
predict natives are more likely to work a second job at roughly 0.1% in both periods. 
Differences in job characteristics become positive and insignificant in the third period, but still 
predict a small increase in the probability that a migrant is working a second job (0.08%). 
Differences in education indicate that natives are more likely to work a second job in all 
periods, by 0.13% in the first period and increasing to 0.55% and 0.36% in the latter two. This 
is consistent with the migrant stock post accession becoming relatively less skilled or less 
substitutable to native labour compared to the migrant population in the first period. 
Differences in occupation initially are statistically insignificant in the first period. In the second 
and third periods, they indicate that given occupational distribution, natives are more likely to 
work in sectors which are more likely to be supplemented by a second job. The increase in 
probability in the latter two periods is of 0.46% and 0.53% respectively. The persistent hours 
gaps suggested by the occupation category in the latter two periods provides evidence against 
occupational sorting of migrants amongst lower paying positions which may require to be 
supplemented by a second income. This can also be consistent with restricted job opportunities 
and the (temporary) underemployment suggested by Nickell and Salaheen (2017), Longhi, 
Nicoletti and Platt (2013) Longhi and Rokicka (2012), Kahanec (2012), Dustmann, Frattini and 
Preston (2007). The results in this section suggest that the probability of working a second job 
is correlated with lower education, as it is a mean to supplement one’s income, but is correlated 
with longer hours and lower pay.   
This can be interpreted as homogenization of the two groups post expansion, but the 
persistent unexplainable difference indicates that migrant work substitutability remains 
imperfect. However, the unexplained differentials in all periods should not be immediately 
interpreted as discrimination since the effects of unobservable and unmeasurable 
characteristics relevant in wage determination are also present here.  
Section 4.6 Conclusion 
This paper quantified and analysed the wage differentials between native and immigrant 
men from countries which joined the European Union in 2004, as well as analysing whether 
more established migrants are better integrated in the British labour market, both before and 
after 2004. To discern if EU membership had any effect on the relative outcomes of the 
migrants, I compare the hourly wage of natives and migrants in the period immediately 
preceding accession and two post-accession periods, 2004-2008 and 2009-2013. This study 
provides evidence of remuneration gaps between natives and A10 immigrants in the post-
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accession periods, but not in the pre-accession period. While the observed wage differential is 
statistically insignificant in the first period, I find a difference in hourly wage between natives 
and migrants of about 46% in the second period and of about 42% in the third period. The 
increase in the gap in the post-accession periods can be seen as a result of a relatively lower 
skilled immigrant inflow after 2004, as also indicated in Longhi and Rokicka (2012) and by 
the increase in the percentage of EU10 migrants with Other Qualifications (Table 4.8) .  
Secondly, the paper attempted to ascertain to what extent these differentials are arising 
because of differences in the distribution of characteristics across the two populations. Using 
the Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition method, the paper provides evidence that the differences in 
education, job and personal characteristics explain about 50% of the afore-mentioned gaps in 
earnings in the post accession periods.  
The paper then uses the Re-Centred Influence Function extension proposed by Firpo et 
al. (2007) to extend the analysis into a decomposition at the quantiles of the wage distribution 
and provide a more detailed examination of the relative labour market outcomes of immigrants 
in the three periods. The results suggest that joining the European Union improved the labour 
market outcomes of A10 nationals at the bottom of the wage distribution at the cost of creating 
a glass ceiling for the migrants at the top. 
The quantile Oaxaca decomposition results indicate that migrants at the bottom of the 
wage distribution (10th percentile) faced a large and unexplained wage gap in the first period 
of 53%. This unexplained wage gap at the bottom of the distribution is reduced to only 6% and 
2% in the post accession periods. On the contrary, in the post-accession periods, there seems 
to be a large unexplained wage gap at the top of the wage distribution suggesting that policy 
interventions are needed to reduce this glass ceiling effect for EU10 immigrants. The results in 
the middle of the distribution indicate that while the observed wage gap increased in the second 
period and decreased slightly in the third, better labour market integration for EU10 migrants 
is observed relative to the period before the 2004 enlargement. 
This paper also looks at the difference between natives and immigrants in the 
probability of having a second job and uses the Logit-Oaxaca decomposition to analyse if this 
difference is explained by differential characteristics.  The results indicate that natives are more 
likely to work a second job in all three periods, with the predicted probability gap of 3.8% in 
the pre-accession period and of 1.8% and 1.5% in the two post-accession periods. Contrary to 
expectations, migrants do not seem to work a second job to increase their low earnings.  These 
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differences are however small in magnitude and indicate some convergence in the labour 




Tables referenced in the fourth chapter 
Table 4.1: EU Membership Enlargements 
Date Existing members New members Number of member states 
01.01.1957 None Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, The Netherlands 6 
01.01.1973 The above Denmark, Ireland, United Kingdom 9 
01.01.1981 The above Greece 10 
01.01.1986 The above Spain, Portugal 12 
01.01.1995 The above Austria, Finland, Sweden 15 
01.05.2004 The above 
Czech Republic, Estonia, Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, 
Malta, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia 
25 
01.01.2007 The above Romania, Bulgaria 27 







Table 4.2: Macroeconomic Characteristics of A10 Countries 2004 
Country 





Czech Republic 11 947.09 19.9 8.3 10.1971 
Cyprus 22 781.79 8.7 4.6 1.0158 
Estonia 8 849.32 26.5 10.1 1.3626 
Hungary 10 102.5 14.4 6.1 10.1071 
Latvia 6 080.79 19.3 11.7 2.2631 
Lithuania 6 709.74 21.2 10.9 3.3771 
Malta 14 064.02 18.3 7.2 0.4012 
Poland 6 639.39 40.1 19.1 38.1822 
Slovakia 10 491.81 32.8 18.4 5.3723 
Slovenia 17 316.17 14 6.3 1.997 








Table 4.3: Summary Statistics by Period and Subgroup, First Period (1994-2003) 
 Natives All migrants 
Migrants present for up to five 
years  
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Table 4.4: Summary Statistics by Period and Subgroup, Second Period 
 Natives All migrants 
Migrants present for less than 
five years 
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Table 4.5: Summary Statistics by Period and Subgroup, Third period 
 Natives All migrants 
Migrants present for less than 
five years 
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Table 4.6: Distribution of A10 Migrants Across the UK (Percentages) 
Aggregate Region Period 1 (1994-2003) Period 2 (2004-2008) Period 3 (2009-2013) 
1. Scotland 3.42 6.71 9.41 
2. Northern Ireland 1.02 5.74 5.40 
3. North England 13.01 23.14 21.27 
4. Midlands 6.16 19.94 18.40 
5. Wales 4.1 2.91 2.67 
6. South of England 35.61 27.38 30.78 










Table 4.7: Distribution of Migrants by Occupation Group (Percentages) 
Major Occupation Group Period 1 (1994-2003) Period 2 (2004-2008) Period 3 (2009-2013) 
 EU10  Natives EU10  Natives EU10  Natives 
1. Managers and Administrators 20.21 19.35 3 20.57 3.3 16.6 
2.Professional Occupations 19.18 12.33 5.21 14.64 5.21 18.7 
3.  Associate Professional and 
Technical Occupations 7.88 10.73 3.27 14.14 3.78 15.77 
4. Clerical, Secretarial 
Occupations 5.82 7.2 1.41 5.4 2.63 5.48 
5.Skilled Trades Occupations 13.7 17.63 17.76 15.13 17.78 14.3 
6. Personal Services 10.27 5.5 2.47 2.53 1.63 3.05 
7. Sales Occupations 6.85 4.08 2.12 3.62 2.39 4.51 
8. Plant and Machine Occupations 11.99 14.94 27.3 12.93 28.39 11.37 








Table 4.8: Highest Qualification for Both Subgroups (Percentages) 
Highest qualification Period 1 (2000-2003) Period 2 (2004-2008) Period 3 (2009-2013) 
 UK EU10 UK EU10 UK EU10 
1. Degree or Equivalent 17.23 14.19 21.2 10.13 25.79 17.81 
2. Higher Education 9.77 3.15 9.77 2.7 10.25 5.57 
3. GCE A Level or Equivalent 24.07 10.1 24.4 7.47 23.17 10.04 
4. GCSE Grades A-C or 
Equivalent 
21.42 4.41 22.5 2.29 22.42 4.66 
5. Other Qualifications 12.51 49.21 9.68 57.36 8.52 45.03 




Table 4.9: Mean Log (Wages) by Qualification Cell and Group 
Highest Qualification Period 1 (1994-2003) Period 2 (2004-2008) Period 3 (2009-2013) 





























1. Degree or 
Equivalent 
2.57 0.56 2.37 0.78 2.79 0.56 2.31 0.60 2.88 0.57 2.41 0.55 
2. Higher Education 2.31 0.51 2.46 0.42 2.57 0.49 2.25 0.56 2.66 0.51 2.28 0.43 
3. GCE A Level or 
Equivalent 
2.07 0.52 2.04 0.54 2.34 0.49 1.96 0.40 2.44 0.51 2.11 0.33 
4. GCSE Grades A-C 
or Equivalent 
1.96 0.56 1.94 0.46 2.22 0.52 2.06 0.40 2.32 0.51 2.13 0.36 
5. Other Qualifications 1.83 0.49 2.00 0.62 2.12 0.46 1.92 0.41 2.22 0.46 2.03 0.40 






Table 4.10: Oaxaca decomposition of the difference in mean log wage. All EU10 immigrants. 
Comparison 
Groups 
First Period, all migrants (1994-
2003) 
Second Period, all migrants (2004-
2008) 




natives and EU10 
immigrants 
0.020                   
   (0.03) 
   0.46***  








































-0.00 0.18 0.10*** 0.60*** 0.06*** 0.47*** 
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Migrants arrived before 
2004 











0.41  0.38  0.35  
Adjusted R2 
Migrants 
 0.38  0.30  0.27 
Standard errors in parentheses; Notes: *** Significant at 1% confidence interval                 **Significant at 5% confidence interval        
*Significant at 10% confidence interval 
Personal Characteristics: age, age squared, years in the UK, dummies on dependent children; Qualifications: Years of education; Reference 
category: No qualifications; Industry Sector: 9 industry sector dummies. Job Characteristics: current employment duration, current employment 
duration squared, dummies on firm sizes, managerial roles, employment in the public sector and having received job-related training in the last 
three months’ time: Yearly dummies; Location: Region dummies; Control Location=London; Control wave=1994, 2004 and 2008 
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Table 4.11: Oaxaca decomposition of the difference in mean log wage. EU10 immigrants resident in the UK for 5 years or less.  
Comparison 
Groups 
Natives and Migrants present for 5 
years or less (1994-2003) 
Natives and Migrants present for 5 
years or less years (2004-2008) 

























































































































































0.398  0.38  0.34  
Adjusted R2 
Migrants 
 0.70  0.19  0.23 
Standard errors in parentheses; Notes: *** Significant at 1% confidence interval                 **Significant at 5% confidence interval        
*Significant at 10% confidence interval 
Personal Characteristics: age, age squared, years in the UK, dummies on dependent children; Qualifications: Years of education; Reference 
category: No qualifications; Industry Sector: 9 industry sector dummies. Job Characteristics: current employment duration, current employment 
duration squared, dummies on firm sizes, managerial roles, employment in the public sector and having received job-related training in the last 
three months’ time: Yearly dummies; Location: Region dummies; Control Location=London; Control wave=1994, 2004 and 2008 
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Table 4.12:  Oaxaca decomposition of the difference in mean log wage. EU10 immigrants resident in the UK for more than 5 years. 
Comparison 
Groups 
Natives and Migrants present for 
more than 5 years (1994-2003) 
Natives and Migrants present for 
more than 5 years (2004-2008) 


















































-0.02** 0.25 0.03** 0.03 0.02*** 0.12** 
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Observations 124.472 250 69.241 121 96.544 1218 
Adjusted R2 
Natives 










 0.36  0.20  0.22 
Standard errors in parentheses; Notes: *** Significant at 1% confidence interval                 **Significant at 5% confidence interval        
*Significant at 10% confidence interval 
Personal Characteristics: age, age squared, years in the UK, dummies on dependent children; Qualifications: Years of education; Reference 
category: No qualifications; Industry Sector: 9 industry sector dummies. Job Characteristics: current employment duration, current employment 
duration squared, dummies on firm sizes, managerial roles, employment in the public sector and having received job-related training in the last 
three months’ time: Yearly dummies; Location: Region dummies; Control Location=London; Control wave=1994, 2004 and 2008 
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Explained Unexplained Explained by 
    Personal 
Qualificatio
ns 































































































































































































Standard errors in parentheses; 
Legend: *** Significant at 1% confidence interval                 **Significant at 5% confidence interval                               *Significant at 10% confidence 
interval 










Table 4.14: Decomposition of the difference in the probability of working a second job between UK natives and EU10 immigrants.  
 First Period: 1994-2003 Second Period:2004-2008 Third Period:2009-2013 
Comparison group Natives and all EU10 immigrants Natives and all EU10 immigrants Natives and all EU10 immigrants 
Average probability 
of working a second 
job 
4.32% 3.82% 3.97% 
 Decomposition Decomposition Decomposition 
Overall Difference .00377 0.0178** 0.015*** 
Total Explained -.00046 0.0111*** 0.0107*** 























Job Characteristics -0.00047*** -0.00088* 0.00052 
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Standard errors in parentheses; 
Notes: *** Significant at 1% confidence interval                 **Significant at 5% confidence interval                               *Significant at 10% confidence interval 
Personal Characteristics: age, age squared, years in the UK, dummies on marital status, dependent children, gender, and disability 
Qualifications: Years of education; Reference category: No qualifications 
Industry Sector: 9 industry sector dummies. 
Job Characteristics: current employment duration, current employment duration squared, dummies on firm sizes, managerial roles, employment in the public 
sector and having received job-related training in the last three months, basic usual hours 






Chapter 5: Conclusion 
 
The fundamental result of the first paper is that economic indicators were the main 
predictors of Leave vote percentages, whereas total weighted media coverage had a relatively 
small and overall statistically insignificant effect on aggregate. The first set of results is in line 
with the literature of Becker et al (2017) and Fetzer (2018). My results found that constituencies 
which experienced a decrease in public spending and EU funding and those which experienced 
increases in unemployment in the year preceding the referendum were estimated to vote more 
in favour of exiting the EU. These effects are statistically significant and significant in 
magnitude. The results of Fetzer (2018) with regards to the effects of austerity on the propensity 
to vote Leave are also found in this paper as one percentage point decrease in public spending 
in the year before the referendum has strong effect in all specifications, larger in magnitude 
than 2.3 percentage points. A one percentage point increase in the unemployment rate at the 
2011 census is estimated to have significantly increased the propensity to vote to Leave by 
approximately four percentage points in the benchmark specifications. Furthermore, a 
constituency level of one percentage point decrease in unemployment in the year before the 
referendum is estimated to have decreased the Leave vote by roughly 2.2 to 2.4 percentage 
points in all specifications. 
The use of the weighted media variables proposed in this paper mitigates the drawbacks 
of the relevant article count variable (defined in Equation 1) used in previous literature such as 
Lamla and Lein (2008) and van der Wiel (2009), leading to more accurate estimates and thus 
eliminating bias resulting from measurement error.  
The benchmark weighted media results indicate that newspaper coverage of migrant 
crime had an initial small, positive, and statistically insignificant effect on the constituency 
level percentage Leave votes regardless of the version of coverage used.  Further analysis 
reveals heterogeneities of effects both from relative population qualifications and from 
coverage type. The estimates suggest that negative coverage had a small, statistically 
significant and positive effect in constituencies in the bottom three quartiles of the qualification 
distribution. This provides evidence in favour of information bias since overall media coverage 
had a statistically significant effect which persists after accounting for migration and economic 
indicators. However, this effect dissipates in the top quartile of the qualification distribution 
for all coverage types and all periods. Furthermore, the estimated results of the dummies 
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indicating the relative qualification levels of the electorates are all negative and strongly 
statistically significant in all specifications. This suggests that the percentage of Leave votes is 
significantly lower in constituencies with higher proportions of highly educated people. 
Analysis on publication type and stance reveals a heterogeneous pattern of effects. 
Coverage originating in broadsheets which favoured Remain was not found to have 
significantly altered the referendum vote. On the other hand, tabloids which supported Remain 
were successful at dissuading voters from voting Leave, which is significant in all 
specifications. Coverage originating in broadsheets which supported Leave is estimated to have 
increased the Leave vote percentage in the last six months before the referendum for all 
coverage types and in both periods in the case of anti-EU coverage. Anti-EU coverage is also 
found to be positive and statistically significant if originating in Leave-supporting tabloids, but 
not if found in the other two definitions. This finding is similar to that of Chiang and Knight 
(2011) in the sense that credibility affects the effect of media coverage. These results are also 
in line with the studies of Williams and Dickinson (1993), Banerjee et al. (2013), and Larreguy 
et al. (2014), among others, where being exposed to information can alter both the perception 
and voting actions of individuals in line with the message being relayed. Furthermore, this 
study finds evidence that not only are more qualified electorates less prone to media persuasion, 
but also that voters are aware of the reputation of a newspaper. This result is strengthened by 
Larreguy et al. (2014) and Chiang and Knight (2011), who also find evidence of voter 
sophistication along the lines of reputation and expected bias. A further analysis of this manner 
in the context of the 2014 Scottish independence referendum would be an interesting avenue 
for further research, with a specific focus on pro-independence coverage 
Looking at the effects of migrant shares, only the migrant stock from the post-2004 
accession countries is estimated to have had a positive statistically significant effect on the 
propensity to vote Leave, which is consistent across specifications. On the other hand, the 
estimated effects of the pre-2004 accession EU migrants and non-EU migrants is still strongly 
statistically significant and negative, indicating the propensity to vote Leave is lower in areas 
that are more cosmopolitan and possible migrant self-selection. On the other hand, recent net 
migration is not a significant predictor of the percentage of Leave votes. Overall, the effects of 
economic coefficients are largely identical between the regressions involving all types of 
negative coverage considered in this paper. Although there is some evidence of significant 
media effects in this study, the results on economic factors are significant predictors of the 
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constituency level Leave votes in all specifications. The results on migrant shares are similar 
to those obtained by Becker et al. (2017). 
The first paper has two main limitations. The first is the endogeneity issue outlined 
above, since the resulting OLS estimates would be biased upwards. However, given that the 
results are already relatively small, this reinforces the finding that the overall media effect is 
insignificant in magnitude. The Leave voting intention variable obtained from the May 2015 
British Election Study survey is added to account for potential differences in latent 
Euroscepticism and to alleviate concerns about endogeneity. 
The second paper generalises the seminal paper of Besley and Prat (2006) and those of 
Trombetta and Rossignoli (2020) and Corduneanu-Huci, and Hamilton (2018). However, a key 
difference is that my theoretical results indicate that in pure strategy Perfect Bayesian 
Equilibria, media and political competition and electoral standards ensure that the true state of 
politicians is always revealed to a subset of the electorate. However, if the proportion of voters 
who actively seek political news is high enough, full disclosure occurs in the media market 
even if both politicians are bad. The present model can be seen as a generalisation of the 
previous models as it collapses to that of Trombetta and Rossignoli (2020) if the politician’s 
budgets are highly asymmetrical and to that of Besley and Prat (2006) with the additional 
assumption that the share of informed voters is zero.  
These findings are relevant given the recent attention given to the proliferation of 
possibly distorted media via the internet and its effects on political results and resulting voter 
welfare. The results presented in this paper suggests that while media competition mediates the 
propensity of media suppression, political competition and electoral standards help eliminate 
total media suppression. In line with the results of Corduneanu-Huci and Hamilton (2018), the 
politicians prefer the most cost-effective alternative when interfering in the media market, 
which in their framework never occurred in the pure strategy Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium. 
However, their result relied on the assumption that the politically motivated audience is 
relatively small and serviced by their own section of the media. In my model, the addition of 
political competition renders total media suppression strictly suboptimal in pure strategy PBE. 
With constant budgets and relatively small politically interested audiences, a good politician 
always prevents a bad politician from winning via media interference and hence full disclosure 
is observed in the media. Furthermore, the results hold even when the share of informed voters 
exceeds 50%, in which case the pure strategy equilibrium suggests full media disclosure 
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regardless of the type of the politicians. This result relies on the assumption that voters would 
prefer one politician when they observe both alternatives as bad. The choice of the incumbent 
as the favourite in this situation is not crucial as full disclosure is still the equilibrium should 
voters prefer the challenger.  
Similar results hold with asymmetric politician budgets if the differences in budgets are 
not too large. The results indicate that unlike the constant budget case, a bad politician would 
be able to achieve meaningful media suppression that would allow him to win the election. 
Similar to the results of Trombetta and Rossignoli (2020), the model predicts heterogeneous 
levels of media suppression, with total media suppression only occurring if the share of 
informed voters is at least half. This result approximates those of Trombetta and Rossignoli 
(2020) and holds despite reputation concerns in the media market. 
These results become important in the context of internet proliferation of new media 
outlets and sliding democratic standards observed in autocracies and democracies alike. They 
give evidence that larger politically involved sections of the electorate together with political 
competition can help reduce the likelihood of distortions in the media markets and voter 
misinformation. Furthermore, it provides evidence that political competition can help promote 
government accountability even in the presence of dishonest politicians and dishonest media. 
The results of this paper challenge this policy implication that media interference is bad, as the 
presence of a challenger also involved in the media markets results in a good politician always 
winning the election whenever he is present. A bad challenger never wins against a good 
incumbent and a bad incumbent always loses to a good challenger, and therefore, political 
interference in media markets is voter welfare reducing if and only if the interference is a 
monopsony. The policy implication is that political involvement in media markets can be 
beneficial if it transparent and open to all candidates, rather than just the incumbent. Given the 
results obtained in the first period, an interesting avenue for future research would be to analyse 
theoretically the trade-off between de facto media independence and the probability of being 
captured by politicians. 
The final paper quantified and analysed the wage differentials between native and 
immigrant men from countries which joined the European Union in 2004, as well as analysing 
whether more established migrants are better integrated in the British labour market, both 
before and after 2004. To discern if EU membership had any effect on the relative outcomes 
of the migrants, I compare the hourly wage of natives and migrants in the period immediately 
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preceding accession and two post-accession periods, 2004-2008 and 2009-2013. This study 
provides evidence of remuneration gaps between natives and EU10 immigrants in the post-
accession periods, but not in the pre-accession period. While the observed wage differential is 
statistically insignificant in the first period, I find a difference in hourly wage between natives 
and migrants of about 46% in the second period and of about 42% in the third period. The 
increase in the gap in the post-accession periods can be seen as a result of a relatively lower 
skilled immigrant inflow after 2004, as also indicated in Longhi and Rokicka (2012) and by 
the increase in the percentage of EU10 migrants with Other Qualifications (Table 4.8).  
Secondly, the paper attempted to ascertain to what extent these differentials are arising 
because of differences in the distribution of characteristics across the two populations. Using 
the Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition method, the paper provides evidence that the differences in 
education, job and personal characteristics explain about 50% of the afore-mentioned gaps in 
earnings in the post accession periods.  
The quantile Oaxaca decomposition results indicate that migrants at the bottom of the 
wage distribution (10th percentile) faced a large and unexplained wage gap in the first period 
of 53%. This unexplained wage gap at the bottom of the distribution is reduced to only 6% and 
2% in the post accession periods. On the contrary, in the post-accession periods, there seems 
to be a large unexplained wage gap at the top of the wage distribution suggesting that policy 
interventions are needed to reduce this glass ceiling effect for EU10 immigrants. The results in 
the middle of the distribution indicate that while the observed wage gap increased in the second 
period and decreased slightly in the third, better labour market integration for EU10 migrants 
is observed relative to the period before the 2004 enlargement. 
This paper also looks at the difference between natives and immigrants in the 
probability of having a second job and uses the Logit-Oaxaca decomposition to analyse if this 
difference is explained by differential characteristics.  The results indicate that natives are more 
likely to work a second job in all three periods, with the predicted probability gap of 3.8% in 
the pre-accession period and of 1.8% and 1.5% in the two post-accession periods. Contrary to 
expectations, migrants do not seem to work a second job to increase their low earnings.  These 
differences are however small in magnitude and indicate some convergence in the labour 
market outcomes of natives and migrants.  
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Appendix A: Appendices to Chapter 2 
Appendix A1: Keywords used to build the main specification variables 
The keywords used to construct the main set of media coverage variables are: 
• For the first version of articles on crime involving migrants  
o ‘Migration’ OR ‘migrant’ OR ‘migrants’ OR ‘immigrant’ OR ‘immigrants’ OR 
‘foreigner’ OR ‘foreigners’ OR ‘refugee’ OR ‘refugees ‘in the main text AND 
o ‘crime’ OR ‘criminal’ OR ‘violent’ OR ‘felon’ OR ‘felony’ OR ‘charged’ OR 
‘arson’ OR ‘arsonist’ OR ‘arrested’ OR ‘crack-down’ OR ‘crook’ OR 
‘smuggling’ OR ‘smuggler’ OR ‘murder’ OR ‘murderer’ in the headline 
• For articles displaying migration pressure on public resources 
o ‘Migration’ OR ‘migrant’ OR ‘migrants’ OR ‘immigrant’ OR ‘immigrants’ OR 
‘foreigner’ OR ‘foreigners’ OR ‘refugee’ OR ‘refugees‘ in the main text 
o ‘Burden’ OR ‘burdened’ OR ‘add to NHS bill’ OR ‘cost the’ OR ‘cripple’ OR 
‘strain’ OR ‘strain on’ OR ‘health tourism’ or ‘bleed the NHS’ OR ‘out of 
control’ OR  ‘NHS charged’  OR ‘Filled’ OR  ‘overrun’ OR ‘over capacity’ OR 
‘full’ OR ‘strain’ OR ‘strained’ OR ‘flooded with’ OR ‘overcrowded’ or 
‘overcrowding’ OR ‘disruption’  OR ‘culture dilution’ OR ‘cultural dilution’ 
OR ‘overwhelmed’ OR ‘at breaking point’ OR ‘cost the taxpayer’ OR ‘bourne 
by the taxpayer’ OR ‘Claiming’ OR ‘claiming credit’ OR ‘getting’ OR 
‘accruing’ OR ‘claim’ OR ‘get’ or ‘accrue’ or ‘obtain’ OR ‘cheap labour’ OR 
‘undercutting’ OR ‘race to the bottom’ OR ‘force wages down’ or ‘forces wages 
down’ or ‘holding wages down’ OR ‘keeps wages down’ OR ‘keeping wages 
down’ in the headline 
o ‘National Health Service’ OR ‘JSA’ OR ‘welfare system’ OR ‘NHS’ OR ‘NHS 
care’ OR ‘health services’ OR ‘hospital’ OR ‘school’ OR ‘schools’ OR 
‘schooling’ OR ‘college’ OR ‘sixth form’ OR ‘6th form’ OR ‘Child Benefit’ 
OR ‘Unemployment Benefit’ OR ‘council tax benefit’ OR ‘disability Benefit’ 
OR ‘Child Benefits’ OR ‘council tax Benefits’ OR ‘disability Benefits’ OR 
‘welfare’ OR ‘job seekers allowance’ OR ‘income support’ OR ‘universal credit 
employment’ OR ‘support allowance’ OR ‘social care’ OR ‘housing benefit’ in 
the main text 
o United Kingdom as index 
• For the aggregate anti-EU sentiment variable 
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o ‘crime’ OR ‘criminal’ OR ‘violent’ OR ‘felon’ OR ‘felony’ OR ‘charged’ OR 
‘arson’ OR ‘arsonist’ OR ‘arrested’ OR ‘crack-down’ OR ‘crook’ OR 
‘smuggling’ OR ‘smuggler’ OR ‘murder’ OR ‘murderer’ in the text 
o ‘EU’ or ‘EUSSR’ OR ‘Migration’ OR ‘migrant’ OR ‘migrants’ OR ‘immigrant’ 
OR ‘immigrants’ OR ‘foreigner’ OR ‘foreigners’ OR ‘refugee’ OR ‘refugees’ 
o ‘Burden’ OR ‘burdened’ OR ‘add to NHS bill’ OR ‘cost the’ OR ‘cripple’ OR 
‘strain’ OR ‘strain on’ OR ‘health tourism’ or ‘bleed the NHS’ OR ‘out of 
control’ OR  ‘NHS charged’  OR ‘Filled’ OR  ‘overrun’ OR ‘over capacity’ OR 
‘full’ OR ‘strain’ OR ‘strained’ OR ‘flooded with’ OR ‘overcrowded’ OR 
‘overcrowding’ OR ‘disruption’  OR ‘culture dilution’ OR ‘cultural dilution’ 
OR ‘overwhelmed’ OR ‘at breaking point’ OR ‘cost the taxpayer’ OR ‘bourne 
by the taxpayer’ OR ‘Claiming’ OR ‘claiming credit’ OR ‘getting’ OR 
‘accruing’ OR ‘claim’ OR ‘get’ or ‘accrue’ OR ‘obtain’ OR ‘cheap labour’ OR 
‘undercutting’ OR ‘race to the bottom’ OR ‘force wages down’ OR ‘forces 
wages down’ or ‘holding wages down’ OR ‘keeps wages down’ OR ‘keeping 
wages down’ OR ‘National Health Service’ OR ‘JSA’ OR ‘welfare system’ OR 
‘NHS’ OR ‘NHS care’ OR ‘health services’ OR ‘hospital’ OR ‘school’ OR 
‘schools’ OR ‘schooling’ OR ‘college’ OR ‘sixth form’ OR ‘6th form’ OR 
‘Child Benefit’ OR ‘Unemployment Benefit’ OR ‘council tax benefit’ OR 
‘disability Benefit’ OR ‘Child Benefits’ OR ‘council tax Benefits’ OR 
‘disability Benefits’ OR ‘welfare’ OR ‘job seekers allowance’ OR ‘income 
support’ OR ‘universal credit employment’ OR ‘support allowance’ OR ‘social 
care’ OR ‘housing benefit’ 
o ‘corrupt’ OR ‘autocratic’ OR ‘evil’ OR ‘devil’ OR ‘unelected’ or 
‘unaccountable’ OR ‘technocrat’ OR ‘mafia’ OR ‘dying’ OR ‘incompetent’ OR 
‘unnecessary red tape’ OR ‘useless’ OR ‘red tape’ OR ‘dictator’ OR 
‘dictatorial’ 
The time period used in the construction of the variables is 23-June-2015 to 22-June-






Appendix A2: Analysis with unweighted variables 
Table 2.10 below lists the estimated effects of the exposure to migrant crimes variable, 
with varying controls. The results of the analysis surprisingly indicate negative and statistically 
significant effects in the first five specifications. The first specification includes just age bands 
as controls, one factor commonly thought to have influenced the voting outcome. The result 
indicates a reduction of 0.15 percentage points per unit increase in article count, or a 4.92 
percentage points decrease per standard deviation increase in the number of articles involving 
migrant crime. Unsurprisingly, the age bands are jointly significant in this specification. The 
second column adds constituency controls, which increases the estimated coefficient to 0.148 
percentage point decrease, or a 4.76 percentage point decrease per standard deviation. 
However, the constituency controls are jointly significant at 95% confidence level, but not at 
99%. Interestingly, this specification is the only one where the null is not rejected in the 
Breusch-Pagan heteroskedasticity test, unlike all subsequent sets of results, where the first two 
specifications do not reject the null.  Adding labour market conditions at the time of the census 
as controls significantly increases the predictive power of the model to 61%, increasing the 
estimated coefficient for the effect of exposure to migrant crime to denote a 4.25 percentage 
point reduction per standard deviation increase, which is also statistically significant.  The 
addition of migrant shares and GVA measures induces the same increase in the estimated 
coefficient to 3.84 and 3.76 percent decrease in the estimated constituency level Leave vote 
per standard deviation increase in migrant crime articles.  
Interestingly, adding changes in public spending, unemployment, and EU funding as 
controls changes the sign to denote a 0.33 percentage point increase in the estimated 
constituency Leave vote. The goodness of fit also increases relatively more compared to the 
addition of newer controls in previous specifications. To further test this, the media variable on 
labour market articles is added as an independent variable, which again increases the 
coefficient for migrant crime articles to a 2.14 percentage point increase per standard deviation. 
This result is statistically significant and has the expected sign. The coefficient for the labour 
market articles is also statistically significant, indicating a 3.37 percentage point decrease in 
the estimated Leave vote per 1 standard deviation increase. Adding further media variables as 
controls is not feasible due to multicollinearity concerns. All specifications have been tested 
for the multicollinearity and do not display it. Additionally, joint significance tests have been 
carried out for each pre-existing and new control variable group in all specifications above.  
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The null hypothesis is rejected at 99% significance level in all cases except for constituency 
controls in the second specification, for which it can be rejected at 95% significance level. 
Economic indicators were found to be statistically significant as well. Constituency 
level Gross Value Added (GVA) per head were estimated to decrease the expected vote to 
Leave by 0.79 per standard deviation increase in wage decline article regressions to 0.825 
percentage points per standard deviation in labour market articles regression. Interestingly, 
relative increases in this measure were found to decrease the expected Leave vote, but they are 
statistically insignificant except in the migration level regression, where a percentage point 
increase led to percentage points decreases between 0.017 and 0.052 in expected registered 
Leave votes. Constituency level unemployment changes were also found highly statistically 
significant in all specifications, with estimated effects ranging from a 3.05 to 2.67 percentage 
points decrease in the estimated Leave vote per percentage point increase in unemployment in 
the year preceding the referendum. The coefficients on the effects of changes in EU funding 
indicate that a percentage point decrease in regional EU funding increases the expected Leave 
vote share between 0.022 and 0.053 percentage points. The final set of coefficients indicate a 
correlation between a decrease in regional public spending and Leave vote, with a 1% decrease 
in public spending leading to 3.04 percentage points increase in constituency level Leave vote. 
The estimated effect is weaker in the case of other media variables, and it becomes insignificant 
in the context of migrant level article regressions.  The results indicate that changes in economic 
conditions are strongly statistically significant determinants of the expected constituency level 












Table 2.10: Analysis results with unweighted media coverage  
Dependent Variable: Vote Leave percentage 
VARIABLES Leaveperc Leaveperc Leaveperc 
    
Migrant Crime 1 year, 
unweighted 
-5.602*** -4.921*** -4.329*** 
 (0.325) (0.299) (0.680) 
Constituency Readership 1.898 -0.554 -1.525 
 (1.232) (1.154) (0.991) 
Age 30 to 44 -1.274*** 0.182 0.118 
 (0.309) (0.329) (0.229) 
Age 45 to 59 1.305*** 0.180 -0.988*** 
 (0.373) (0.410) (0.266) 
Age over 60 -0.330* 0.542*** 1.120*** 
 (0.178) (0.182) (0.131) 
Population Density -0.130*** 0.0454 -0.0346 
 (0.0289) (0.0404) (0.0310) 
Male share 0.638 1.216** 1.536*** 
 (0.557) (0.548) (0.374) 
Household Married -0.166 0.00501 0.792*** 
 (0.115) (0.128) (0.0981) 
Share Other Pre 2004 EU  -4.421*** -1.360** 
  (0.749) (0.688) 
Share Post 2004 EU  1.050*** 1.240*** 
  (0.340) (0.296) 
Born Other  -0.259*** -0.535*** 
  (0.0936) (0.0776) 
Net migr. 1 year  0.00164 0.0267 
  (0.0615) (0.0442) 
Unemployed census 2011   5.297*** 
   (0.328) 
Change in Unemployment   -2.988*** 
   (0.929) 
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Decrease in EU funding   0.0238*** 
   (0.00867) 
Change in Public Spending   -0.500 
   (0.419) 
GVA per head   0.0473** 
   (0.0200) 
Change in wage median.   0.0904** 
   (0.0446) 
Constant 34.63 -19.97 -73.18*** 
 (31.60) (30.81) (21.24) 
    
Observations 632 632 632 






Table 2.11: Analysis results with unweighted media coverage Dependent 
Variable: Vote Leave percentage 
VARIABLES Leaveperc Leaveperc Leaveperc 
    
Resource Constraint 1 year, 
unweighted 
-5.905*** -5.430*** -5.134*** 
 (0.376) (0.326) (0.527) 
Constituency Readership 2.838** 0.410 -0.382 
 (1.171) (1.074) (0.915) 
Age 30 to 44 -1.534*** 0.0146 -0.0732 
 (0.301) (0.326) (0.219) 
Age 45 to 59 1.665*** 0.462 -0.715*** 
 (0.385) (0.409) (0.249) 
Age over 60 -0.446** 0.428** 1.026*** 
 (0.178) (0.180) (0.124) 
Population Density -0.117*** 0.0672* -0.0176 
 (0.0279) (0.0398) (0.0291) 
Male share 0.634 1.204** 1.519*** 
 (0.552) (0.555) (0.342) 
Household Married -0.237** -0.0613 0.731*** 
 (0.114) (0.127) (0.0922) 
Share Other Pre 2004 EU  -4.589*** -1.442** 
  (0.771) (0.705) 
Share Post 2004 EU  0.982*** 1.183*** 
  (0.340) (0.293) 
Born Other  -0.292*** -0.576*** 
  (0.0963) (0.0781) 
Net migr. 1 year  -0.0343 -0.00560 
  (0.0611) (0.0422) 
Unemployed census 2011   5.357*** 
   (0.324) 
Change in Unemployment   -2.122** 
   (0.935) 
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Decrease in EU funding   0.0327*** 
   (0.00716) 
Change in Public Spending   -0.415 
   (0.299) 
GVA per head   0.0515** 
   (0.0217) 
Change in wage median.   0.0706 
   (0.0443) 
Constant 36.85 -17.26 -70.66*** 
 (31.83) (31.55) (19.99) 
    
Observations 632 632 632 

















Appendix A3: Results of alternative specifications of the media variables 
The second and the third version of the migrant crime variables are given by the following 
definitions: 
• For the second version of articles on crime involving migrants 
o (‘migrant’ OR ‘immigrant’ OR ‘foreigner’ OR ‘refugee ‘OR ‘migrant crisis’) 
in the main text AND 
o  ‘guilty of’ OR ‘convicted’ OR ‘condemned’ OR ‘sent to prison’ OR 
imprisoned’ in the main text AND  
o ‘delinquent’ OR ‘delinquency’ OR ‘culprit’ OR ‘guilty’ OR ‘crime’ OR 
‘criminal’ OR ‘violent’ OR ‘violence’ OR ‘felon’ OR ‘felony’ OR ‘charged’ 
OR ‘arson’ OR ‘arsonist’ OR ‘arrested’ OR ‘crack-down’ OR ‘crook’ OR 
‘smuggling’ OR ‘smuggler’ OR ‘murder’ OR ‘murderer’ OR ‘rape’ OR ‘rapist’ 
OR ‘riot’ OR ‘theft’ OR ‘thief’ OR ‘pickpocket’ OR ‘stolen’ OR ‘steal’ in the 
headline 
• For the third version of articles on crime involving migrants 
o ‘migrant crime’ OR ‘migrant criminal’ OR ‘migrant criminals’ OR ‘violent 
migrant’ OR ‘migrant involved in violence’ OR ‘migrant felon’ OR ‘migrant 
felony’ OR ‘felony committed by migrant’ OR ‘migrant crook’ OR ‘crook 
migrant’ OR ‘migrant con’ OR ‘con migrant’ OR ‘migrant culprit’ OR ‘migrant 
delinquent’ OR ‘migrant delinquency’ OR ‘migrant charged’ OR ‘migrant 
arsonist’ OR ‘migrant arson’ OR ‘arrested migrant’ OR ‘migrant arrested’ OR 
‘suspected migrant’ OR ‘suspect migrant’ OR ‘crack-down on migrant’ OR 
‘migrant smuggler’ OR ‘migrant smuggled’ OR ‘smuggling migrant’ OR 
‘migrant smuggling’ OR ‘migrant murderer’ OR ‘migrant murderers’ ‘migrant 
killed’ or ‘migrant kills’ or ‘killed by migrant’ OR ‘murdered by migrant’ OR 
‘killer migrant’ OR ‘migrant murders’ OR ‘migrant murdered’ OR ‘migrant 
rapes’ OR ‘raped by migrant’ OR ‘migrant rapist’ OR ‘migrant rapists’ OR 
‘migrant gang’ OR ‘gang of migrants’ OR ‘migrant riot’ OR ‘migrant rioters’ 
OR ‘migrant theft’ OR ‘migrant thief’ OR ‘migrant thieves’ OR ‘stolen by 
migrant’ OR ‘migrant steals’ in the headline OR 
o ‘immigrant crime’ OR ‘immigrant criminal’ OR ‘immigrant criminals’ OR 
‘violent immigrant’ OR ‘immigrant involved in violence’ OR ‘immigrant felon’ 
OR ‘immigrant felony’ OR ‘felony committed by immigrant’ OR ‘immigrant 
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crook’ OR ‘crook immigrant’ OR ‘immigrant con’ OR ‘con immigrant’ OR 
‘immigrant culprit’ OR ‘immigrant delinquent’ OR ‘immigrant delinquency’ 
OR ‘immigrant charged’ OR ‘immigrant arsonist’ OR ‘immigrant arson’ OR 
‘arrested immigrant’ OR ‘immigrant arrested’ OR ‘suspected immigrant’ OR 
‘suspect immigrant’ OR ‘crack-down on immigrant’ OR ‘immigrant smuggler’ 
OR ‘immigrant smuggled’ OR ‘smuggling immigrant’ OR ‘immigrant 
smuggling’ OR ‘immigrant murderer’ OR ‘immigrant murderers’ OR 
‘immigrant killed’ OR ‘immigrant kills’ OR ‘killed by immigrant’ OR 
‘murdered by immigrant’ OR ‘killer immigrant’ OR ‘immigrant murders’ OR 
‘immigrant murdered’ OR ‘immigrant rapes’ OR ‘raped by immigrant’ OR 
‘immigrant rapist’ OR ‘immigrant rapists’ OR ‘immigrant gang’ OR ‘gang of 
immigrants’ OR ‘immigrant riot’ OR ‘immigrant rioters’ OR ‘immigrant theft’ 
OR ‘immigrant thief’ OR ‘immigrant thieves’ OR ‘stolen by immigrant’ OR 
‘immigrant steals’ in the headline OR 
o ‘foreigner crime’ OR ‘foreigner criminal’ OR ‘foreigner criminals’ OR ‘violent 
foreigner’ OR ‘foreigner involved in violence’ OR ‘foreigner felon’ OR 
‘foreigner felony’ OR ‘felony committed by foreigner’ OR ‘foreigner crook’ 
OR ‘crook foreigner’ OR ‘foreigner con’ OR ‘con foreigner’ OR ‘foreigner 
culprit’ OR ‘foreigner delinquent’ OR ‘foreigner delinquency’ OR ‘foreigner 
charged’ OR ‘foreigner arsonist’ OR ‘foreigner arson’ OR ‘arrested foreigner’ 
OR ‘foreigner arrested’ OR ‘suspected foreigner’ OR ‘suspect foreigner’ OR 
‘crack-down on foreigner’ OR ‘foreigner smuggler’ OR ‘foreigner smuggled’ 
OR ‘smuggling foreigner’ OR ‘foreigner smuggling’ OR ‘foreigner murderer’ 
OR ‘foreigner murderers’ OR ‘foreigner killed’ OR ‘foreigner kills’ OR ‘killed 
by foreigner’ OR ‘murdered by foreigner’ OR ‘killer foreigner’ OR ‘foreigner 
murders’ OR ‘foreigner murdered’ OR ‘foreigner rapes’ OR ‘raped by 
foreigner’ OR ‘foreigner rapist’ OR ‘foreigner rapists’ OR ‘foreigner gang’ OR 
‘gang of foreigners’ OR ‘foreigner riot’ OR ‘foreigner rioters’ OR ‘foreigner 
theft’ OR ‘foreigner thief’ OR ‘foreigner thieves’ OR ‘stolen by foreigner’ OR 
‘foreigner steals’ in the headline OR 
o ‘refugee crime’ OR ‘refugee criminal’ OR ‘refugee criminals’ OR ‘violent 
refugee’ OR ‘refugee involved in violence’ OR ‘refugee felon’ OR ‘refugee 
felony’ OR ‘felony committed by refugee’ OR ‘refugee crook’ OR ‘crook 
refugee’ OR ‘refugee con’ OR ‘con refugee’ OR ‘refugee culprit’ OR ‘refugee 
197 
 
delinquent’ OR ‘refugee delinquency’ OR ‘refugee charged’ OR ‘refugee 
arsonist’ OR ‘refugee arson’ OR ‘arrested refugee’ OR ‘refugee arrested’ OR 
‘suspected refugee’ OR ‘suspect refugee’ OR ‘crack-down on refugee’ OR 
‘refugee smuggler’ OR ‘refugee smuggled’ OR ‘smuggling refugee’ OR 
‘refugee smuggling’ OR ‘refugee murderer’ OR ‘refugee murderers’ OR 
‘refugee killed’ OR ‘refugee kills’ OR ‘killed by refugee’ OR ‘murdered by 
refugee’ OR ‘killer refugee’ OR ‘refugee murders’ OR ‘refugee murdered’ OR 
‘refugee rapes’ OR ‘raped by refugee’ OR ‘refugee rapist’ OR ‘refugee rapists’ 
OR ‘refugee gang’ OR ‘gang of refugees’ OR ‘refugee riot’ OR ‘refugee rioters’ 
OR ‘refugee theft’ OR ‘refugee thief’ OR ‘refugee thieves’ OR ‘stolen by 








Table 2.12: Summary Statistics for the Unweighted Media variables 
Variable Observation
s 
Mean  Std. Dev. Min Max 
Vote Leave percent 632 52.11 11.4 18.48 74.96 
Un-weighted media 
variables 
     
Migrant crime 
articles 
632 713.97 32.17 668 782 
Migrant crime 
articles, 2nd version 
632 149.55 7.33 130 172 
Migrant crime 
articles, 3rd version 





articles, 1st version 
632 442.08 71.79 190.66 745.46 
Migrant crime 
articles, 2nd version 
632 96.54 11.32 32.62 145.38 
Migrant crime 
articles, 3rd version 










Table 2.13: Estimation of the effect of first alternative unweighted newspapers coverage of migrant induced 
crime in the year before the EU referendum: 
Dependent Variable: Vote Leave percentage 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Unweighted migrant crime 
version 2 
-4.672*** -4.834*** -2.988*** -2.933*** -2.968*** 
 (0.277) (0.276) (0.521) (0.521) (0.517) 
Constituency Readership -2.191*** -2.238*** -2.147*** -2.117*** -2.289*** 
 (0.815) (0.804) (0.794) (0.793) (0.789) 
Age 30 to 44 0.175 0.123 0.136 0.149 0.169 
 (0.216) (0.213) (0.210) (0.210) (0.210) 
Age 45 to 59 -1.301*** -1.288*** -1.048*** -1.066*** -1.143*** 
 (0.276) (0.272) (0.275) (0.275) (0.274) 
Age over 60 1.180*** 1.198*** 1.117*** 1.117*** 1.124*** 
 (0.149) (0.147) (0.146) (0.146) (0.145) 
Population Density -0.0280 -0.0288 -0.0392 -0.0426* -0.0419* 
 (0.0247) (0.0243) (0.0241) (0.0242) (0.0243) 
Male share 1.769*** 1.743*** 1.501*** 1.490*** 1.345*** 
 (0.374) (0.369) (0.369) (0.368) (0.371) 
Household Married 0.847*** 0.813*** 0.776*** 0.772*** 0.791*** 
 (0.0926) (0.0917) (0.0910) (0.0908) (0.0905) 
Unemployed census 2011 5.430*** 5.340*** 5.198*** 5.174*** 5.161*** 
 (0.295) (0.292) (0.290) (0.290) (0.289) 
Share Other Pre 2004 EU -1.184*** -1.144*** -0.937*** -0.920*** -1.336*** 
 (0.339) (0.335) (0.334) (0.334) (0.363) 
Share Post 2004 EU 1.049*** 1.058*** 1.145*** 1.127*** 1.218*** 
 (0.207) (0.205) (0.203) (0.203) (0.205) 
Born Other -0.554*** -0.552*** -0.514*** -0.514*** -0.515*** 
 (0.0679) (0.0670) (0.0668) (0.0666) (0.0674) 
Change in Unemployment -1.448 -2.173** -2.703*** -2.560*** -2.478*** 
 (0.881) (0.887) (0.884) (0.886) (0.880) 
Decrease in EU funding  0.0347*** 0.0454*** 0.0460*** 0.0439*** 
  (0.00823) (0.00852) (0.00851) (0.00849) 
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Change in Public Spending   -1.355*** -1.396*** -1.347*** 
   (0.326) (0.326) (0.325) 
Change in GVA     -0.0512 
     (0.0452) 
GVA per head     4.81e-05*** 
     (1.60e-05) 
Change in wage median.    0.0871* 0.0848* 
    (0.0477) (0.0474) 
Constant -82.68*** -78.94*** -67.34*** -66.24*** -58.67*** 
 (21.46) (21.20) (21.11) (21.08) (21.24) 
      
Observations 632 632 632 632 632 


















Table 2.14: Estimation of the effect of 2nd alternative unweighted newspapers coverage of migrant crime in 
the year before the referendum 
Dependent Variable: Vote Leave percentage 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Unweighted migrant crime 
version 3 
-5.068*** -5.060*** -4.284*** -4.231*** -4.250*** 
 (0.274) (0.274) (0.671) (0.670) (0.668) 
Constituency Readership -0.737 -0.780 -0.978 -0.961 -1.119 
 (0.803) (0.803) (0.818) (0.816) (0.813) 
Age 30 to 44 0.146 0.131 0.136 0.149 0.158 
 (0.209) (0.209) (0.209) (0.209) (0.209) 
Age 45 to 59 -1.039*** -1.053*** -1.003*** -1.022*** -1.101*** 
 (0.270) (0.270) (0.273) (0.273) (0.272) 
Age over 60 1.098*** 1.111*** 1.096*** 1.097*** 1.099*** 
 (0.145) (0.145) (0.145) (0.145) (0.144) 
Population Density -0.0298 -0.0289 -0.0324 -0.0360 -0.0337 
 (0.0238) (0.0238) (0.0240) (0.0240) (0.0241) 
Male share 1.490*** 1.493*** 1.442*** 1.433*** 1.273*** 
 (0.364) (0.364) (0.366) (0.365) (0.368) 
Household Married 0.829*** 0.823*** 0.809*** 0.805*** 0.821*** 
 (0.0897) (0.0897) (0.0903) (0.0902) (0.0899) 
Unemployed census 2011 5.426*** 5.395*** 5.331*** 5.306*** 5.285*** 
 (0.286) (0.287) (0.291) (0.291) (0.289) 
Share Other Pre 2004 EU -1.062*** -1.055*** -0.990*** -0.973*** -1.405*** 
 (0.329) (0.329) (0.333) (0.332) (0.362) 
Share Post 2004 EU 1.072*** 1.077*** 1.109*** 1.090*** 1.188*** 
 (0.201) (0.201) (0.202) (0.202) (0.204) 
Born Other -0.523*** -0.523*** -0.513*** -0.513*** -0.520*** 
 (0.0659) (0.0659) (0.0663) (0.0661) (0.0670) 
Change in Unemployment -2.811*** -3.061*** -3.135*** -2.976*** -2.898*** 
 (0.852) (0.869) (0.871) (0.873) (0.868) 
Decrease in EU funding  0.0113 0.0190* 0.0199** 0.0180* 
  (0.00800) (0.0100) (0.0100) (0.00996) 
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Change in Public Spending   -0.526 -0.568 -0.536 
   (0.415) (0.415) (0.413) 
Change in GVA     -0.0307 
     (0.0451) 
GVA per head     4.88e-05*** 
     (1.59e-05) 
Change in wage median.    0.0903* 0.0889* 
    (0.0474) (0.0471) 
Constant -72.52*** -71.90*** -68.72*** -67.60*** -59.11*** 
 (20.86) (20.85) (20.99) (20.95) (21.11) 
      
Observations 632 632 632 632 632 












































































































































































































































































































Appendix B: Appendices to Chapter 3 
In this appendix, I analyse the benchmark specification of the model, as outlined in 
section 3.2. Extending the analysis of Besley and Prat (2006), media outlets are interested in 
the second period revenues, which are purely audience driven. The revenue function in the 
second period has the same form as in the first, with the addendum that all voters act rationally 
inattentive in the absence of an election. With probability 𝜆, an outlet can be revealed to have 
been dishonest, in which case it loses all audience revenues. Once an outlet is discredited, their 
status becomes public knowledge. 
Proposition 3 
In the Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium, the incumbent wins in cases 𝛷𝐼𝛷𝐶, 𝛷𝐼𝑏𝐶, 𝑏𝐼𝑏𝐶, 
while the incumbent wins if case 𝑏𝐼𝛷𝐶. Consequently, a good politician always wins the 
election if he is present and a bad incumbent defeats a bad challenger. Outlets report honestly 
if at in all cases. The minimum share of outlets a bad challenger needs to ‘influence’ to win the 
election is 𝛤 = 𝟎.𝟓𝟏−𝜶, unless both politicians are revealed as bad. If both politicians are bad, the 
number of outlets the incumbent needs to capture 𝛤∗ = 𝟎.𝟓−𝜶𝟏−𝜶 ≤ 𝛤. 
Focusing first on the voter side, the following lemma outlines the equilibrium Bayesian 
updating if voters use weakly undominated strategies.. Note that inattentive voters only notice 
the bad signal if their publication is publishing it, while attentive voters if it is published by at 
least one outlet.  
Corollary 1. 
The turnover of politicians is non-decreasing in q, n, τ, λ and α 
Proof of Proposition 3 
Depending on the realisation of α, two cases can be distinguished, which alter the 
strategies and outcomes in case 𝑏𝐼𝑏𝐶. The perfect Bayesian equilibrium is composed of two 
parts occurring successively: a bargaining component between the politicians and media outlets 
and the electoral game. The bargaining equilibrium determines whether the media is an 
accurate purveyor of information. Denote the event that an outlet reports a received bad signal 
as ‘captured media’ or ‘captured outlet’ and if all outlets are captured ‘total media capture’ 












𝛾2+ 2(1 − 𝛾)𝛾𝑞+ (1 − 𝛾)2(1− 𝑞)2 
𝛾(1 − 𝛾)𝑞+ (1 − 𝛾)2𝑞(1− 𝑞) 




    Informed voters: 
Believe incumbent is 
good if they observe Φ𝐼Φ𝐶 or Φ𝐼b𝐶 in the 
media. Believe 
challenger is good if 
observe Φ𝐼Φ𝐶 or b𝐼Φ𝐶 in 
the media. Believe both 
politicians are bad if they 




 𝝉𝑰,𝒊 = 0, ∀𝑖, ∀𝐵, ∀ 𝐸(𝜏𝐶)  𝝉𝑰,𝒊 = 0, ∀𝑖, ∀𝐵 ∀ 𝐸(𝜏𝐶)  𝝉𝑰,𝒊 = 0, ∀𝑖 ∀𝐵, 𝑎𝑛𝑑 ∀ 𝐸(𝜏𝐶) 𝑠𝑢𝑐ℎ 𝑡ℎ𝑎𝑡 𝝉𝑪,𝒊 <𝜏∗∗(𝝉𝑰,𝒊) for 𝑛 + 1 − ⌈Γn⌉ outlets 
Otherwise, a) if 𝐵 ≥⌈Γn⌉𝜏∗(⌈Γn⌉) 
𝝉𝑰,𝒊 = {𝜏∗(⌈Γn⌉) 𝑡𝑜 ⌈Γn⌉ outlets0 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒  
b) if 𝐵 <⌈Γn⌉𝜏∗ 𝜏𝐼,𝑖 = 0, ∀𝑖 
If ⌈Γn⌉ − ⌈Γ∗n⌉ = 0 and 𝐵 ⌈Γn⌉−1⌈Γn⌉ >𝜏∗(𝑛)⌈Γn⌉  
𝜏𝑖,𝐼 = {𝜏∗(𝑛) 𝑡𝑜⌈Γn⌉ 𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑙𝑒𝑡𝑠0 𝑡𝑜 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡  
If ⌈Γn⌉ − ⌈Γ∗n⌉ = 0 and 𝐵 ⌈Γn⌉−1⌈Γn⌉ ≤𝜏∗(𝑛)⌈Γn⌉  𝝉𝑰,𝒊 = 0, ∀𝑖 
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If ⌈Γn⌉ − ⌈Γ∗n⌉ ≥ 1 𝝉𝑰,𝒊
= {𝜏∗(𝑛) + (𝑙 + 𝑘)𝜏∗(𝑛)⌈Γ∗n⌉  𝑡𝑜 ⌈Γ∗n⌉ outlets0 𝑡𝑜 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡
if 𝐵 ≥⌈Γn⌉𝜏∗(𝑛) 
If 𝐵 ∈ [⌈Γ∗n⌉𝜏∗(𝑛), ⌈Γn⌉𝜏∗(𝑛)) 
𝜏𝑖,𝐼 = {𝜏∗(𝑛) 𝑡𝑜⌈Γ∗n⌉ 𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑙𝑒𝑡𝑠 0 𝑡𝑜 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡  
If 𝐵 ∈ [⌈Γ∗n⌉𝜏∗(⌈Γ∗n⌉), ⌈Γ∗n⌉𝜏∗(𝑛)) 
𝜏𝑖,𝐼 = {𝜏∗(⌈Γ∗n⌉) 𝑡𝑜⌈Γ∗n⌉ 𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑙𝑒𝑡𝑠 0 𝑡𝑜 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡  
Otherwise 𝝉𝑰,𝒊 = 0, ∀𝑖 
Uninformed voters: 
Believe incumbent is 
good if observe Φ𝐼Φ𝐶 or Φ𝐼b𝐶 from their outlet. 
Believe challenger is 
good if they observe Φ𝐼Φ𝐶 or b𝐼Φ𝐶 from their 
outlet. Believe both 
politicians are bad if they 





 𝝉𝑪,𝒊 = 0, ∀𝑖, ∀𝐵, ∀ 𝜏𝐼  𝝉𝑪,𝒊 =0, ∀𝑖∀𝐵, ∀ 𝜏𝐼  If 𝜏𝐼,𝑖 < 𝜏∗(⌈Γn⌉) for ⌈Γn⌉ outlets, then 𝝉𝑪,𝒊 = 0, ∀𝑖 ∀𝐵. 
If 𝜏𝐼,𝑖 ≥ 𝜏∗(⌈Γn⌉) for 𝑥 ≥⌈Γn⌉ outlets, 
pick the x+1 outlets with the smallest 𝜏𝐼,𝑖 ≥ 𝜏∗(⌈Γn⌉) , 𝜏𝐼,𝑖∗, and 
If ⌈Γn⌉ − ⌈Γ∗n⌉ = 0 and 𝐵 ⌈Γn⌉−1⌈Γn⌉ >𝜏∗(𝑛)⌈Γn⌉  𝝉𝑪,𝒊 = 0 , ∀𝑖 
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𝝉𝑪,𝒊 = {𝜏∗∗(𝝉𝑰,𝒊) 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑖 ∈ 𝜏𝐼,𝑖∗0 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒  If ⌈Γn⌉ − ⌈Γ∗n⌉ = 0 and 𝐵 ⌈Γn⌉−1⌈Γn⌉ ≤𝜏∗(𝑛)⌈Γn⌉  
Order the outlets in ascending order 
of offers received from the incumbent 
and offer: 𝜏𝐶,𝑖
= { 𝜏∗(𝑛) 𝑡𝑜 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑠𝑡 𝑛 − ⌈Γn⌉ 𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑙𝑒𝑡𝑠𝐵⌈Γn⌉ + 1 𝑡𝑜 1 𝑜𝑓 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑙𝑒𝑡𝑠
If ⌈Γn⌉ − ⌈Γ∗n⌉ ≥ 0 𝝉𝑪,𝒊 = 0 , ∀𝑖 if 𝐵 <⌈Γn⌉𝜏∗(⌈Γn⌉) 
If 𝐵 ≥⌈Γn⌉𝜏∗(⌈Γn⌉), let x denote the 
number of outlets for which 𝜏𝐼,𝑖=0 and 
order the remaining outlets 
ascendingly. Then if 1)x≥⌈Γn⌉ or 2) 
x<⌈Γn⌉ and  
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𝐵 − 𝑥𝜏∗(⌈Γn⌉) ≥ ∑ 𝜏𝐼,𝑗 + (⌈Γn⌉⌈Γn⌉𝑗=𝑥+1− x) 𝜏𝐶,𝑖
= {𝜏∗(min(𝑥, ⌈𝛤𝑛⌉)) 𝑡𝑜min(𝑥, ⌈𝛤𝑛⌉)  𝑡𝑜 𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑙𝑒𝑡𝑠 𝑠. 𝑡 𝜏𝐼,𝑖 = 0𝜏𝐼,𝑖 + 1 𝑡𝑜 the first max(⌈𝛤𝑛⌉ − 𝑥, 0)  𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑙𝑒𝑡𝑠0 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒









for ∀ 𝜏𝐼 𝑎𝑛𝑑 ∀ 𝜏𝐶. If 𝜏𝑖,𝐼 ≠ 0 and 
or 𝜏𝐶,𝑖 ≠ 0, they 
would accept the 
higher offer and 
Report honestly Φ𝐼b𝐶 if 𝜏𝐶,𝑖 <𝜏∗(𝑥), ∀ 𝜏𝐼  
Or if 𝜏𝐶,𝑖 ≥𝜏∗(𝑥) and 𝜏𝐼 ≥𝜏∗∗(𝝉𝑪,𝒊) 
Report honestly b𝐼Φ𝐶 unless 
 {𝜏𝐼,𝑖 ≥ 𝜏∗(𝑥) 𝐚𝐧𝐝𝜏𝐶,𝑖 < 𝜏∗∗(𝝉𝑰,𝒊)   
then report Φ𝐼Φ𝐶 
Report honestly b𝐼b𝐶 if either set of 
conditions holds 𝜏𝐼,𝑖 < 𝜏∗(𝑥)𝐚𝐧𝐝 𝜏𝐶,𝑖 < 𝜏∗(𝑥) 𝑶𝑹𝜏𝐼,𝑗 > 𝜏∗(𝑥) 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝜏𝐼,−𝑗 > 𝜏∗∗(𝜏∗(𝑥)) 





Report Φ𝐼Φ𝐶 if 𝜏𝐶,𝑖 ≥ 𝜏∗(𝑥) 
and 𝜏𝐼 <𝜏∗∗(𝝉𝑪,𝒊(𝒙)) 
 
Report Φ𝐼b𝐶 if 𝜏𝐼,𝑖 ≥𝜏∗(𝑥)𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝜏𝐼,𝑖 ≥ 𝜏𝐶,𝑖 










in the media 
Vote challenger if they observe b𝐼Φ𝐶 in 
the media. Vote incumbent if they 
observe Φ𝐼Φ𝐶 in the media 
Vote challenger if they observe b𝐼Φ𝐶 
in the media. Vote incumbent if they 






from their outlet 
Vote incumbent 
unless observe b𝐼Φ𝐶 from their 
outlet 
Vote challenger if they observe b𝐼Φ𝐶 
from their outlet. Vote incumbent if they 
observe Φ𝐼Φ𝐶 from their outlet 
Vote challenger if they observe b𝐼Φ𝐶 
from their outlet. Vote incumbent if 





In any Perfect Bayesian equilibrium with weakly undominated strategies, voters will 
prefer to vote for the incumbent unless he is revealed as bad and the challenger is not.  
Proof: 
For the purposes of this proof, a distinction between how informed and uninformed 
voters update their beliefs needs to be made. 
From the perspective of any voter: Pr (𝜃𝐼 = 𝑔|𝑠𝑖 = 𝑏𝐼𝑏𝐶) = 0 < 𝛾 Pr (𝜃𝐼 = 𝑔|𝑠𝑖 = 𝑏𝐼Φ𝐶) = 0 < 𝛾 Pr (𝜃𝐶 = 𝑔|𝑠𝑖 = 𝑏𝐼𝑏𝐶) = 0 < 𝛾 Pr (𝜃𝐶 = 𝑔|𝑠𝑖 = Φ𝐼b𝐶) = 0 < 𝛾 
which results from the structure of the game for both politicians and for both voter types and 
all histories. Therefore, upon observing a bad signal, a voter knows the politician is bad and 
that he would get utility of 0 if said politician is in office. It is therefore an optimal decision for 
the voter to not vote for a politician revealed as bad. If both politicians are revealed as bad, the 
voters prefer the incumbent due to the incumbency advantage. 
Voters are aware that bad politicians could attempt to ‘silence’ outlets, but they update 
their beliefs differently. An attentive voter acts like one in Besley and Prat (2006) and can be 
misled only by total media suppression.  
Applying Bayes’ rule for both the incumbent and the challenger from the perspective 
of an informed voter based on the politician strategies outlined above: 
Pr (𝜃𝐼 = 𝑔|𝑠𝑖 = Φ𝐼Φ𝐶) = Pr (𝜃𝐼 = 𝑔)Pr (𝑠𝑖 = Φ𝐼Φ𝐶|𝜃𝐼 = 𝑔)Pr (𝑠𝑖 = Φ𝐼Φ𝐶)  
= 𝛾[𝛾 + (1 − 𝛾)(1 − 𝑞)]𝛾2 + (1 − 𝛾)2(1 − 𝑞)2 + 2𝛾(1 − 𝛾)(1 − 𝑞) 
Similarly, about the challenger: 
Pr (𝜃𝐶 = 𝑔|𝑠𝑖 = Φ𝐼Φ𝐶) = Pr (𝜃𝐼 = 𝑔)Pr (𝑠𝑖 = Φ𝐼Φ𝐶|𝜃𝐼 = 𝑔)Pr (𝑠𝑖 = Φ𝐼Φ𝐶)  
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= 𝛾[𝛾 + (1 − 𝛾)(1 − 𝑞)]𝛾2 + (1 − 𝛾)2(1 − 𝑞)2 + 2𝛾(1 − 𝛾)(1 − 𝑞) 
 
This is because an informed voter observes a pair of null signals in the following three 
situations only: both politicians are good, both politicians are good and undiscovered, or one 
politician is good and the other is bad and undiscovered. Therefore, given politician j is good, 
a null signal can be observed only if a bad signal is not observed about politician -j. 
Now consider Bayesian updating for an informed voter when they observe signal 𝑏𝑗Φ−𝑗 Pr (𝜃𝑗 = 𝑔|𝑠𝑖 = 𝑏𝑗Φ−𝑗) = 0 < 𝛾 
Pr (𝜃𝑗 = 𝑔|𝑠𝑖 = Φ𝑗b−𝑗) = Pr (𝜃𝑗 = 𝑔)Pr (𝑠𝑖 = Φ𝑗b−𝑗|𝜃𝑗 = 𝑔)Pr(𝑠𝑖 = Φ𝑗b−𝑗)  
= 𝛾𝑞(1 − 𝛾)𝛾𝑞(1 − 𝛾) + 𝑞(1 − 𝛾)2(1 − 𝑞) > 0 
This happens that upon observing signal Φ𝑗b−𝑗, informed voters know with certainty 
that politician -j is bad, while there is a strictly positive probability that politician j is good. 
Consequently, they would prefer politician –j as Pr (𝜃−𝑗 = 𝑔|𝑠𝑖 = Φ𝑗b−𝑗) = 0. 
Because of the incumbency advantage assumption, informed voters prefer to vote for 
the incumbent should they observe b𝐼b𝐶. Thus, the only scenario in which an informed voter 
prefers the challenger to the incumbent is if the expected utility from electing the challenger 
exceeds that of electing the incumbent, i.e. after observing 𝑏𝑖Φ𝑐 
I now analyse how an uninformed voter updates their belief. As above, after observing 
a bad signal, the posterior belief that the politician is bad becomes one. The difference with 
respect to the informed voters is that in case 𝑏𝐼𝑏𝐶 some rationally inattentive voters can be 
subscribed to an outlet which misreports one of the politicians. The winning politician depends 
on the realisation of B and α, which in turn determine the fraction of outlets suppressed in 
equilibrium.  
Let n denote the total number of outlets. Therefore, in both histories, the probability 
that an inattentive voter reads a captured outlet is 
⌈Γ𝑛⌉𝑛  or ⌈Γ∗𝑛⌉𝑛 , where 𝑚𝑖 and 𝑚𝑐 denote the 
number of outlets silenced by the incumbent and challenger respectively. For the incumbent: 
212 
 
Pr (𝜃𝐼 = 𝑔|𝑠𝑖 = Φ𝐼Φ𝐶) = Pr (𝜃𝐼 = 𝑔)Pr (𝑠𝑖 = Φ𝐼Φ𝐶|𝜃𝐼 = 𝑔)Pr (𝑠𝑖 = Φ𝐼Φ𝐶)  
= 𝛾[𝛾 + (1 − 𝛾)(1 − 𝑞)]𝛾2 + (1 − 𝛾)2(1 − 𝑞)2 + 2𝛾(1 − 𝛾)(1 − 𝑞) 
Similarly, for the challenger 
Pr (𝜃𝐶 = 𝑔|𝑠𝑖 = Φ𝐼Φ𝐶) = Pr (𝜃𝐼 = 𝑔)Pr (𝑠𝑖 = Φ𝐼Φ𝐶|𝜃𝐼 = 𝑔)Pr (𝑠𝑖 = Φ𝐼Φ𝐶)  
= 𝛾[𝛾 + (1 − 𝛾)(1 − 𝑞)]𝛾2 + (1 − 𝛾)2(1 − 𝑞)2 + 2𝛾(1 − 𝛾)(1 − 𝑞) 
As with informed voters, we can observe that Pr (𝜃𝐼 = 𝑔𝑜𝑜𝑑|𝑠𝑖,𝐼 = Φ) = Pr (𝜃𝐶 =𝑔𝑜𝑜𝑑|𝑠𝑖,𝐼 = Φ), and due incumbency advantage assumption both informed and rationally 
inattentive voters prefer to vote for the incumbent after observing a pair of null signals. 
Now consider Bayesian updating for a rationally inattentive voter when they observe 
signal 𝑏𝐼Φ𝐶. Since outlets cannot fabricate a bad signal, it follows that Pr (𝜃𝐼 = 𝑔|𝑠𝑖 = b𝐼Φ𝐶) = 0 
In the case of the challenger 
Pr (𝜃𝐶 = 𝑔|𝑠𝑖 = b𝐼Φ𝐶) = Pr (𝜃𝐶 = 𝑔)Pr (𝑠𝑖 = b𝐼Φ𝐶|𝜃𝐶 = 𝑔)Pr (𝑠𝑖 = b𝐼Φ𝐶)  
= 𝛾(1 − 𝛾)𝑞𝛾(1 − 𝛾)𝑞 + (1 − 𝛾)2𝑞(1 − 𝑞) + 𝜔(1 − 𝛾)2𝑞2 ⌈Γ∗n⌉𝑛 > 0 
Where 𝜔 denotes the probability that ⌈Γn⌉ − ⌈Γ∗n⌉ ≥ 1. This expression is strictly 
larger than 0 since 𝛾 > 0 and 𝑞 > 0. Therefore, an inattentive voter will prefer to vote for the 
challenger upon observing b𝐼Φ𝐶. A similar argument occurs for the Φ𝐼b𝐶 signal. Since outlets 
cannot fabricate a bad signal, it follows that Pr (𝜃𝐶 = 𝑔|𝑠𝑖 = Φ𝐼b𝐶) = 0. In the case of the 
incumbent, we have: 
Pr (𝜃𝐼 = 𝑔|𝑠𝑖 = Φ𝐼b𝐶) = Pr (𝜃𝐼 = 𝑔)Pr (𝑠𝑖 = Φ𝐼b𝐶|𝜃𝐼 = 𝑔)Pr (𝑠𝑖 = Φ𝐼b𝐶)  
= 𝛾(1 − 𝛾)𝑞𝛾(1 − 𝛾)𝑞 + (1 − 𝛾)2𝑞(1 − 𝑞) > 0 
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Because of the incumbency advantage assumption, rationally inattentive voters prefer 
to vote for the incumbent should they observe b𝐼b𝐶. Thus, the only scenario in which a 
rationally inattentive voter prefers the challenger to the incumbent is if the expected utility from 
electing the challenger exceeds that of electing the incumbent, i.e. after observing 𝑏𝑖Φ𝑐 
QED Lemma 4∎Lemma 4 shows that a voter prefers to vote for a politician not 
revealed as bad, with a preference for the incumbent if both their respective signals match. This 
belief system is compliant with Bayes’ rule and a best response given the strategies of the 
politicians. 
If both politicians are good, neither has an incentive to offer a positive bribe to the 
media outlets as they will receive no signal with probability one and thus eliminating and scope 
for media manipulation. Subsequent analysis will focus on the latter three scenarios with at 
least one bad politician. Given Lemma 7, a bad politician would have an interest in partially or 
totally preventing the media from signalling his type since otherwise he loses the election with 
certainty. In a similar fashion, a good politician whose opponent is bad has an incentive in 
offering 𝜏 > 0 to enough outlets to ensure his opponent does not win. Furthermore, for either 
politician, it is an optimal strategy to not offer any bribe in the second period, rendering 
audience revenue the only source of income for outlets in the second period, which is expected 
to increase the minimum transfer an outlet would accept. In the absence of media interference, 
due to incumbency advantage, the incumbent is expected to win in 𝒈𝑰𝒈𝑪 and if he is good while 
a bad challenger remains undiscovered.  
The α informed voters purchase all outlets that publish a signal, whereas the 1-α 
uninformed voters are split equally across all n outlets. The politicians determine the optimal 
number of outlets to ‘manipulate’ based on the behaviour of both types of voters. First consider 
the case in which the challenger is revealed as bad and the incumbent is not, i.e. 𝑔𝑖𝑏𝑐. In this 
case, even if successful at media persuasion, Lemma 7 indicates the challenger would still lose 
the election as both types of voters prefer the incumbent in the absence of a signal.  
In the case 𝒃𝒊𝒈𝒄, the incumbent benefits from media manipulation as it potentially 
enables him to win the election extract utility B in the second period. Based on Lemma 7, the 
incumbent gains the votes of informed readers, α, if and only if he achieves total media 
suppression. However, it can be shown this cannot occur in equilibrium.  
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If only one politician is discovered as bad, he requires at least half the votes exclusively 
from rationally inattentive voters and the number of outlets he needs to ‘manipulate’, m, is 
given by: (1 − 𝛼)𝑚𝑛 ≥ 0.5 
𝑚/𝑛 ≥ 𝟎. 𝟓𝟏 − 𝜶 → 𝚪 = 𝟎. 𝟓𝟏 − 𝜶 
Silencing additional outlets may not change the election result, but it is costly in terms 
of bribes and hence it is optimal to silence at least ⌈Γn⌉ outlets. In this context, ⌈Γn⌉ denotes 
the smallest integer larger or equal to Γn. If the share of informed voters is at least half, the 
incumbent needs to achieve total media suppression if he is to win. 
Should both politicians be discovered as bad, as shown in Lemma 7, informed voters 
prefer the incumbent and therefore needs to ‘manipulate’ fewer outlets than a bad challenger. 
As before, the bad challenger requires to obtain at least half the votes exclusively from 
rationally inattentive voters and requires to ‘influence’ ⌈Γn⌉ outlets. For the incumbent, he 
needs to ensure that the number of voters that find the challenger is bad is at least half. If m 
denotes the number of outlets the incumbent manipulates: 
𝛼 + (1 − 𝛼)𝑚𝑛 ≥ 0.5 
𝑚/𝑛 ≤ 0.5 − 𝛼1 − 𝛼 → 𝚪∗ = 𝟎. 𝟓 − 𝜶𝟏 − 𝜶 < 𝚪 
Additional definitions: 
Denote by 𝜏’ a bribe. Bribe 𝜏’ is said to be:  
1. ‘acceptable’ if an outlet is willing to accept it in exchange for favourable coverage and 
not deviate.  
2. ‘affordable’ if it allows the politician to ‘manipulate’ at least ⌈Γn⌉ or ⌈Γ∗n⌉ outlets for 
the challenger if both politicians are revealed as bad. 
 
First notice two properties of Γ: 
215 
 
𝑑Γ(α)𝑑𝛼 > 0 𝑎𝑛𝑑 Γ(0) = 0.5 
which indicate that if attempted, the number of outlets a bad politician would have to supress 
is always at least half.  
In all scenarios, a bribe 𝜏 is acceptable to outlet i if: 𝜏 ≥ 𝑃(𝜎𝑖 = 𝑏|𝜎−𝑖) − 𝑃(𝜎𝑖 = 𝜑|𝜎−𝑖) 
i.e. it is higher than the additional revenue a newsagent would earn if he decided to report the 
true signal compared to the revenue earned with false reporting, given the actions of the other 
media agents. A news outlet faces a risk λ of being exposed as untrustworthy in the second 
period if it chooses to misreport either signal. In addition to the analyses of Trombetta and 
Rossignoli (2020) and Besley and Prat (2006), a bribe would have to account for the possibility 
that second period revenues may become zero. Since outlets are interested in maximising the 
sum of revenue in both periods 𝜋, an ‘acceptable’ bribe must hedge the potential loss. As 
observed in the equations above, the acceptable bribe is strictly larger than the difference in 
potential first period revenues. Since in the second period, revenues depend only on being 
revealed as dishonest and not voter distribution, they are accounted for with the second and 
fourth terms of 𝜏∗. The minimal acceptable bribe now depends on the number of outlets that 
accept a bribe from the bad politician. 𝜏(𝑥) ≥ 𝑃(𝜎𝑖 = 𝑏|𝜎−𝑖) − 𝑃(𝜎𝑖 = 𝜑|𝜎−𝑖) 
In this context, if a bad signal is revealed, the outlet gains (1−𝛼𝑛 + 𝛼)𝛿in the first period if it 
reports honestly. Assuming x outlets reported dishonestly outlet i has an expected second 
period payoff of 
𝐸[Ρ2𝑖(𝑥)] =∑ 1(𝑛 − 𝑖)𝛿 𝑥! 𝜆𝑖(1 − 𝜆)𝑥−𝑖𝑖! (𝑥 − 𝑖)!𝑥𝑖=0  
If outlet i misreported without receiving a bribe, it obtains (1−𝛼𝑛 )𝛿in the first period, while it’s 
expected payoff in the second period if x outlets misreported is  
𝐸[Ρ2𝑖(𝑥)] = (1 − 𝜆)∑ 1(𝑛 − 𝑖)𝛿 𝑥! 𝜆𝑖(1 − 𝜆)𝑥−𝑖𝑖! (𝑥 − 𝑖)!𝑥𝑖=0  
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Replacing we obtain 𝜏(𝑥) > 𝑃(𝜎𝑖 = 𝑏|𝜎−𝑖) − 𝑃(𝜎𝑖 = 𝜑|𝜎−𝑖) 
𝜏(𝑥) > (1 − 𝛼𝑛 + 𝛼)𝛿 +∑ 1(𝑛 − 𝑖)𝛿 𝑥! 𝜆𝑖(1 − 𝜆)𝑥−𝑖𝑖! (𝑥 − 𝑖)!𝑥𝑖=0 − (1 − 𝛼𝑛 )𝛿 − (1− 𝜆)∑ 1(𝑛 − 𝑖)𝛿 𝑥! 𝜆𝑖(1 − 𝜆)𝑥−𝑖𝑖! (𝑥 − 𝑖)!𝑥𝑖=0  
𝜏∗(𝑥) > [(1 − 𝛼𝑛 + 𝛼)𝛿 − (1 − 𝛼𝑛 )𝛿] + 𝜆∑ 1(𝑛 − 𝑖)𝛿 𝑥! 𝜆𝑖(1 − 𝜆)𝑥−𝑖𝑖! (𝑥 − 𝑖)!𝑥𝑖=0  
Therefore 𝜏∗𝐽,𝑖(𝑥) = [(1−𝛼𝑛 + 𝛼)𝛿 − (1−𝛼𝑛 )𝛿] + 𝜆∑ 1(𝑛−𝑖)𝛿 𝑥!𝜆𝑖(1−𝜆)𝑥−𝑖𝑖!(𝑥−𝑖)!𝑥𝑖=0 + 1 denotes the 
minimal transfer outlet i would accept from bad politician J in exchange for favourable 
coverage if x outlets misreport and politician –J is inactive. 
Notice, however, that the good politician can influence outlets at a lower cost. Firstly, 
his interest is in the media outlets reporting sincerely the status of the bad politician. Should a 
media outlet accept a 𝜏 > 0 from the good politician, their reporting strategy remains sincere 
and they do not risk losing second period revenue despite being influenced by a politician. 
Secondly, because the reporting strategy remains sincere, the good politician’s ‘bribe’ does not 
have to take into account the loss in audience revenue an outlet would sustain if influenced by 
the other politician. Therefore, the minimum acceptable bribe from the good politician, 𝜏∗∗, is 
defined as: 𝜏∗∗ = P𝜏(𝑥)∗ − Pℎ𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑡 
𝜏∗∗(𝜏𝑏𝑎𝑑) = max (0, (1 − 𝛼𝑛 )𝛿 + 𝜏𝑏𝑎𝑑 − [(1 − 𝛼𝑛 + 𝛼)𝛿 − 𝜆∑ 1(𝑛 − 𝑖)𝛿 𝑥! 𝜆𝑖(1 − 𝜆)𝑥−𝑖𝑖! (𝑥 − 𝑖)!𝑥𝑖=0 ])  < 𝜏𝑏𝑎𝑑 
where P𝜏(𝑥)∗ 𝑎𝑛𝑑 Pℎ𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑡 denote the expected payoff for the outlet if it accepts 𝜏∗(𝑥) from the 
bad politician and if it reports honestly respectively. 
If approached by more than one politician, it is optimal given their information set for 
the outlet to accept the offer which maximises their expected payoff. This implies that any offer 
from a bad politician is rejected if lower than 𝜏∗ in the case of the bad politician. Should 
217 
 
accepting two offers have the same expected return, they would prefer the one which allows 
them to remain honest.  
Lemma 5 
If the budget is constant across politicians and a bad signal is received about only 
one politician, then total media suppression will not occur in equilibrium. 
Proof of Lemma 5:  
Any media interference from the challenger is ineffective since both types of voters 
prefer the incumbent if no signal is observed. It remains to show that total media suppression 
will not occur in case 𝒃𝒊𝒈𝒄. 
Suppose ∃ a vector of payment from the incumbent to the media outlets 𝜏𝐼 such that 
achieves total media suppression. Therefore, it must be the case that it is a winning strategy for 
the incumbent (but not necessarily optimal) and:  
∑ 𝜏𝑖,𝐼𝑖=1,..,𝑛 ≤ 𝐵 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝜏𝐼𝑖 ≥ 𝜏∗(𝑛) > 0 ∀𝑖  
Three cases are distinguished depending on the realisations of B and 𝛼 
1. 𝐵 ≤ 𝑛𝜏∗(𝑛) 
Under this realisation of B, total media suppression is impossible as the incumbent does not 
have enough funds to achieve it even if the challenger is inactive 
1. 𝐵 ≥ 𝑛𝜏∗(𝑛) 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝛼 < 0.5 
If the challenger persuades at least one outlet to report honestly, he gains a share of 𝛼 votes 
from attentive voters and rationally inattentive votes proportional to the share of honest outlets. 
In order for the challenger to win the election, he also needs 0.5- 𝛼 votes from rationally 
inattentive voters. Therefore, allowing m to denote the number of outlets the challenger 
‘manipulates’  (1 − 𝛼)𝑚𝑛 ≥ 0.5 − 𝛼 
𝑚/𝑛 ≥ 0.5 − 𝛼1 − 𝛼 → 𝚪∗ = 𝟎. 𝟓 − 𝜶𝟏 − 𝜶  
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Silencing additional outlets does not change the election result, but it is costly in terms 
of bribes and hence it is optimal to silence ⌈𝑚/𝑛⌉ outlets. In this context, ⌈𝑚/𝑛⌉ denotes the 
smallest integer larger or equal to 𝑚/𝑛. Without loss of generality, order the 𝜏𝐼𝑖 in ascending 
order.  
Given this action from the incumbent and any realisation of B 𝛼 such that 𝐵 ≥𝑛𝜏∗(𝑛) 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝛼 < 0.5 the best response of the challenger is therefore to approach the outlets 
with the ⌈Γ∗𝑛⌉ lowest offers and offer  𝜏𝐶,𝑖 = 𝜏∗∗(𝝉𝑰,𝒊) 
Since the politicians share the same budget, such an offer is affordable for the challenger and 
it ensures his electoral win. This contradicts the original hypothesis. 
2. 𝛼 ≥ 0.5 
If the challenger persuades at least one outlet to report honestly, he gains a share of 𝛼 
votes from attentive voters and rationally inattentive votes proportional to the share of honest 
outlets. Therefore, to win the election, the challenger needs one outlet to report honestly. Total 
media suppression by the incumbent is obviously a suboptimal strategy in equilibrium since 
both politicians share the same budget and the incumbent needs to silence all n outlets while 
the challenger only needs to focus on one. 𝑸𝑬𝑫 𝑳𝒆𝒎𝒎𝒂 𝟓∎ 
Lemma 5 indicates that a good politician always prevents a bad politician from 
achieving total media suppression. Given the minimum number of ‘manipulated’ outlets 
required to win, there is a disparity in politician disposable income after the minimum media 
suppression cost given opponent inaction. This will affect the equilibrium outcome when nature 
exposes both politicians as bad. For Γ = 0.51−𝛼  𝑎𝑛𝑑 Γ∗ = 0.5−𝛼1−𝛼 , the relevant condition will be 
given by: ⌈Γn⌉ − ⌈Γ∗n⌉ ≥ 1 




𝑩 − ⌈𝚪∗𝐧⌉𝝉∗(𝒏) − (𝑩 − ⌈𝚪𝐧⌉𝝉∗(𝒏)) = 𝒌𝝉∗(𝒏) 
Additionally, the politician budgets can be decomposed as: 𝑩− ⌈𝚪𝐧⌉𝝉∗(𝒏) = 𝒍𝝉∗(𝒏) + 𝜺, 𝜺 < 𝝉∗(𝒏) 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒍 ∈ ℕ 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝑩 − ⌈𝚪∗𝐧⌉𝝉∗(𝒏) = (𝒌 + 𝒍)𝝉∗(𝒏) + 𝜺, 𝜺 < 𝝉∗(𝒏) 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒌, 𝒍 ∈ ℕ  
 
Case 1: 𝒈𝑰𝒈𝑪  
This can occur if both politicians are good or if either politician is bad and no signal is 
received by the media. In the absence of a signal, the media outlets are unable to report anything 
and therefore media framing is impossible. Since no signal is received, the best response of all 
outlets is to report honestly, even if they receive a transfer from either politician. Both sets of 
voters observe Φ𝐼Φ𝐶 and their posterior beliefs the politicians are good are both higher than 𝛾. 
As shown in Lemma 7, they both prefer the incumbent. For both politicians, strictly positive 
transfers do not change the result of the election and reduce utility and hence their equilibrium 
actions will be to set 𝜏𝐼,𝑖 = 𝜏𝐶,𝑖 = 0. From the perspective of media outlets, their reporting 
strategy can only be honest even in the presence of positive transfers from the politicians, and 
therefore would accept any positive transfer, if offered. The incumbent wins and obtains utility 
2B, the challenger 0 and all media outlets report honestly. These equilibrium strategies and 
beliefs are consistent for all realisations of B, n 𝛿 and 𝛼. 
Case 2: 𝒈𝑰𝒃𝑪 
This can occur if the challenger is bad and discovered with probability γ (1-γ)q or if 
both politicians are bad and only the challenger is discovered, with probability (1 − γ)2𝑞(1 −𝑞). With probability γ (1-γ)(1-q) the incumbent is good, while the challenger is bad and 
undiscovered, in which case equilibrium actions are as outlined in 𝒈𝑰𝒈𝑪. From the voters’ 
perspective, this is the posterior belief induced if they observe Φ𝐼b𝐶 in the media or from their 
preferred outlet. 
 The bad challenger may attempt to silence the media, in which case more than half the 
voters do not observe the bad signal about the challenger. However, upon seeing no signal 
about either politician, both types of voters still prefer to vote for the incumbent. An informed 
voter would revise his posterior belief to 1, whereas an uninformed voter would still prefer the 
incumbent. Since media persuasion is both costly and ineffective, it is a strictly suboptimal 
strategy. Therefore 𝝉𝑪,𝒊 = 0, ∀𝑖 and the best response of the incumbent is to also set 𝝉𝑰,𝒊 = 0, ∀i. 
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The media outlets then report honestly Φ𝐼b𝐶 . Should they receive an offer larger or at least as 
large as 𝜏∗(𝑥) 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝜏𝐼,𝑖 < 𝜏∗∗(𝝉𝑰,𝒊), the media outlets would decide to report Φ𝐼Φ𝐶 . The 
incumbent wins and obtains utility 2B, while the challenger obtains 0. A special case where 
the challenger can suppress the media completely exists, but it is a strictly suboptimal strategy 
to do so. These equilibrium strategies and beliefs are consistent for all realisations of B, 𝑛, 𝛿 
and 𝛼 < 0.5. 
Case 3: 𝒈𝑪𝒃𝑰 
This can occur if the incumbent is bad and discovered with probability γ (1-γ)q or if 
both politicians are bad and only the incumbent is discovered, with probability (1 − γ)2𝑞(1 −𝑞). With probability γ(1-γ)(1-q) the challenger is good, while the incumbent is bad and 
undiscovered, in which case equilibrium actions are as outlined in 𝒈𝑰𝒈𝑪. From the voters’ 
perspective, this is the posterior belief induced if they observe b𝐼Φ𝐶 in the media or from their 
preferred outlet. 
As above, the condition for market suppression is given by:  𝐵 ≥ [𝜋(𝑛𝑜 𝑏𝑟𝑖𝑏𝑒|𝜎−𝑖) − 𝜋(𝑏𝑟𝑖𝑏𝑒|𝜎−𝑖)]⌈Γn⌉ 
𝐵 ≥ [[(1 − 𝛼𝑛 + 𝛼)𝛿 − (1 − 𝛼𝑛 )𝛿] + 𝜆∑ 1(𝑛 − 𝑖)𝛿 𝑥! 𝜆𝑖(1 − 𝜆)𝑥−𝑖𝑖! (𝑥 − 𝑖)!𝑥𝑖=0 + 1] ⌈Γn⌉ 
while the minimal acceptable bribe from the incumbent is given by:  
𝜏∗(𝑥) = [(1−𝛼𝑛 + 𝛼)𝛿 − (1−𝛼𝑛 )𝛿] + 𝜆∑ 1(𝑛−𝑖)𝛿 𝑥!𝜆𝑖(1−𝜆)𝑥−𝑖𝑖!(𝑥−𝑖)!𝑥𝑖=0 + 1. 
We know from the properties of Γ that in this scenario, the bad politician needs to manipulate 
at least half of the media outlets in order to avoid certain defeat in the election. 
In this case, the incumbent has B- ⌈Γn⌉𝜏∗(⌈Γn⌉) revenue leftover from attempting to 
manipulate ⌈Γn⌉ outlets at the minimum acceptable ‘transfer’. Because of the properties of Γ, 𝑛 − ⌈Γn⌉ ≤ ⌈Γn⌉, i.e.the number of outlets the challenger needs to report honestly is smaller 
than the number of outlets the incumbent needs to ‘manipulate’.  
By construction, an offer of 𝜏∗∗(𝝉𝑰,𝒊) is acceptable from the challenger and preferable 
to an offer of 𝝉𝑰,𝒊 from the incumbent. The outlet does not risk losing second period revenue if 
it accepts 𝜏∗∗(𝝉𝑰,𝒊) from the good politician since the reporting strategy in this case is sincere. 
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Therefore, it is a best response for any outlet approached by the good politician with this offer 
to accept it. Consequently, any outlet approached with 𝜏𝑖,𝐼 ≥ 𝜏∗(𝑥) by the incumbent would 
accept only if the challenger offers less than  𝜏∗∗(𝝉𝑰,𝒊). Because 𝑛 − ⌈Γn⌉ ≤⌈Γn⌉ 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝜏∗∗(𝜏∗) < 𝜏∗(𝑥), offering 𝜏∗∗(𝜏∗(𝑥)) to all outlets is affordable for the challenger, 
which indicates that the challenger can ensure all outlets report honestly given any vector of 
payments from the incumbent. Therefore, the equilibrium action for the incumbent is to set 𝝉𝑰,𝒊 = 𝟎 for all outlets and for all B. Consequently, the equilibrium strategy for the challenger 
is to set 𝝉𝑪,𝒊 = 𝟎 if the incumbent has offered 𝜏𝑖,𝐼 ≥ 𝜏∗(𝑥) to less than ⌈Γn⌉ outlets. If 𝜏𝐼,𝑖 ≥𝜏∗(𝑥) for 𝑥 ≥⌈Γn⌉ outlets, the optimal action of the challenger is to ensure that only ⌈Γn⌉ − 1 
outlets remain ‘manipulated’. This can be achieved by picking the x+1 outlets with the smallest 𝜏𝐼,𝑖 ≥ 𝜏∗(𝑥) , letting 𝜏𝐼,𝑖∗ denote their set, and: 
𝝉𝑪,𝒊 = {𝜏∗∗(𝝉𝑰,𝒊) 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑖 ∈ 𝜏𝐼,𝑖∗0 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒  
For any outlet that was not approached by any politician, it is a best response to report 
honestly, b𝐼Φ𝐶 , and get the higher audience revenues, which benefits the challenger as the 
resulting posterior beliefs induce the voters to prefer the challenger. For any offer from the 
incumbent, 𝜏𝐼,𝑖 ≥ 𝜏∗(𝑥), they would accept it and misreport if and only if 𝜏𝐶,𝑖 < 𝜏∗∗(𝝉𝑰,𝒊), i.e. 
report Φ𝐼Φ𝐶.  
Therefore, since he moves second and 𝜏∗∗(𝜏∗(𝑥)) < 𝜏∗(𝑥) ∀𝑥, for any offer made by 
the incumbent, the challenger can afford to pay a vector of 𝜏𝐶,𝑖 which ensures total media 
transparency. The resulting politician equilibrium is that neither politician attempts any media 
suppression. The incumbent would not deviate from this strategy since any spending can be 
effectively negated at a lower cost by the challenger, ensuring the incumbent’s utility is less 
than B. Given the strategy of the incumbent, the challenger will not deviate for the same reason. 
In this equilibrium, all media outlets report honestly, and the incumbent is revealed as bad by 
all outlets. Based on Lemma 7, all voters prefer the challenger who then wins the election. 
These equilibrium strategies and beliefs are consistent for all realisations of B, n, 𝛿 and 𝛼 <0.5.  
Case 4: 𝒃𝑰𝒃𝑪 
With probability (1 − 𝑞)2 neither politician is discovered as bad and the analysis 
collapses to that observed in case 𝒈𝑰𝒈𝑪. With probability 1-q the challenger is not discovered 
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as bad and the analysis collapses to that observed in case 𝒃𝑰𝒈𝑪 and with probability 1-q the 
incumbent is not discovered and the analysis collapses to that observed in case 𝒈𝑰𝒃𝑪 
With probability 𝑞2 both politicians are discovered as bad. As outlined above, the 
incumbent only needs to capture ⌈Γ∗n⌉ outlets, while the challenger needs to capture⌈Γn⌉. To 
make the subsequent analysis interesting, I assume that B> ⌈Γn⌉𝜏∗(⌈Γn⌉). 
First notice that: ⌈Γn⌉ + ⌈Γ∗n⌉ ∈ {𝑛, 𝑛 + 1} 
Any offer from the incumbent of the type: offer 𝜏∗(𝑥) to 𝑥 ≥ ⌈Γ∗n⌉ outlets is strictly 
suboptimal. Since the challenger moves second, he can gain enough outlets by offering them 𝜏∗(𝑥) + 1 and 𝜏∗(𝑥) to ⌈Γn⌉ − ⌈Γ∗n⌉ for the remaining outlets. This offer is affordable for the 
challenger, for whom it is an optimal strategy.  
A first equilibrium occurs if ⌈Γn⌉ − ⌈Γ∗n⌉ = 0. In this case, for x denoting the number 
of additional outlets the incumbent attempts to silence in excess of the ⌈Γn⌉ required, the 
condition for the incumbent being able to win is:  𝐵⌈Γn⌉ > 𝐵 − (𝑛 − ⌈Γn⌉)𝜏∗(𝑛) 
Re-arranging, the incumbent wins if  
𝐵 ⌈Γn⌉ − 1⌈Γn⌉ > 𝜏∗(𝑛)⌈Γn⌉ 
If the condition above holds, the incumbent utility maximising action with media 
suppression is to offer the following vector of payments: 
𝜏𝑖,𝐼 = {𝜏∗(𝑛) 𝑡𝑜⌈Γn⌉ 𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑙𝑒𝑡𝑠0 𝑡𝑜 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡    
While for the challenger, it is optimal to offer 𝜏𝑖,𝐶 = 0 for all outlets. Consequently, if  𝐵 ⌈Γn⌉ − 1⌈Γn⌉ ≤ 𝜏∗(𝑛)⌈Γn⌉ 
any attempt at media interference from the incumbent is strictly suboptimal as the challenger 
as the challenger can win by capturing the n-⌈Γn⌉ outlets not approached by the incumbent at 
minimum cost while having enough funds to persuade the final outlet. Formally, for the 
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incumbent it is optimal to offer 𝜏𝑖,𝐼 = 0 for all outlets. For the challenger, without loss of 
generality, order the outlets in ascending order of offers received from the incumbent and offer: 
𝜏𝑖,𝐶 = {𝜏∗(𝑛) 𝑡𝑜 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑠𝑡 𝑛 − ⌈Γn⌉ 𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑙𝑒𝑡𝑠𝐵⌈Γn⌉ + 1 𝑡𝑜 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡  
Secondly, if ⌈Γn⌉ − ⌈Γ∗n⌉ ≥ 1 there is a disparity in politician disposable income after 
the minimum media suppression cost given opponent inaction. For Γ = 0.51−𝛼  𝑎𝑛𝑑 Γ∗ = 0.5−𝛼1−𝛼  
denote 𝑘 = (⌈Γn⌉ − ⌈Γ∗n⌉), 𝑘 ∈ ℕ 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑘 ≥ 1 such that 𝑩 − ⌈𝚪∗𝐧⌉𝝉∗(𝑛) − (𝑩 − ⌈𝚪𝐧⌉𝝉∗(𝑛)) = 𝒌𝝉∗(𝑛) 
Additionally, the politician budgets can be decomposed as: 𝑩 − ⌈𝚪𝐧⌉𝝉∗(𝑛) = 𝒍𝝉∗(𝑛) + 𝝁, 𝝁 < 𝝉∗(𝑛) 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒍 ∈ ℕ 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝑩− ⌈𝚪∗𝐧⌉𝝉∗(𝑛) = (𝒌 + 𝒍)𝝉∗(𝑛) + 𝝁, 𝝁 < 𝝉∗(𝑛) 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝒌, 𝒍 ∈ ℕ  
The condition for which the incumbent can win is given by: 
𝜏∗(𝑛) + (𝑙 + 𝑘)𝜏∗(𝑛)𝑥 > 𝜏∗(𝑛) + 𝑙𝜏∗(𝑛)1 + 𝑥 − ⌈Γ∗n⌉ 
Where 𝑥 ≥ ⌈Γ∗n⌉ is the number of outlets approached by the incumbent. 
Re-arranging  (𝑙 + 𝑘)𝜏∗(𝑛)(1 + 𝑥 − ⌈Γ∗n⌉) > 𝑙𝜏∗(𝑛)𝑥 (𝑙 + 𝑘)(1 − ⌈Γ∗n⌉)𝑘 < 𝑥 
which always holds, since (1 − ⌈Γ∗n⌉) ≤ 0 and 𝑙, 𝑘, 𝑥 ∈ ℕ. Therefore, any offer of the type 𝜏𝐼,𝑖 = 𝜏∗(𝑛) + (𝑙+𝑘)𝜏∗(𝑛)𝑥  to 𝑥 ≥ ⌈Γ∗n⌉ 𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑙𝑒𝑡𝑠 will ensure electoral victory for the incumbent.  
The x that maximises the incumbent’s welfare is given by: 
min𝑥≥⌈Γ∗n⌉,𝑥∈ℕ𝑥(𝜏∗(𝑛) + (𝑙 + 𝑘)𝜏∗(𝑛)𝑥 ) 
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Which is solved by 𝑥 = ⌈Γ∗n⌉. Given this strategy for the incumbent, the best response of the 
challenger is 𝜏𝑖,𝐶 = 0, ∀𝑖, since any positive media transfer would decrease his utility without 
resulting in electoral victory. 
Lemma 6: 
This equilibrium strategy is feasible for the incumbent if and only if the minimal 
acceptable vector of bribes for the challenger is affordable. 
Proof of Lemma 6: 
Suppose the minimal acceptable vector of bribes is affordable for the challenger, i.e.: 𝜏∗(𝑛)⌈Γn⌉ ≤ 𝐵 
And the optimal vector of payments for the incumbent described above is not affordable: 
⌈Γ∗n⌉ (𝜏∗(𝑛) + (𝑙 + 𝑘)𝜏∗(𝑛)⌈Γ∗n⌉ )  ≥ 𝐵 ⌈Γ∗n⌉ 𝜏∗(𝑛) + (𝑙 + 𝑘)𝜏∗(𝑛) ≥ 𝐵 (𝑙 + 𝑘)𝜏∗(𝑛) ≥ 𝐵 − ⌈Γ∗n⌉ 𝜏∗(𝑛) 
By definition: 𝐵 − ⌈Γ∗n⌉𝜏∗(𝑛) = (𝑘 + 𝑙)𝜏∗(𝑛) + 𝜇 
Thus (𝑙 + 𝑘)𝜏∗(𝑛) ≥ (𝑘 + 𝑙)𝜏∗(𝑛) + 𝜇 
Contradiction 𝑸𝑬𝑫 𝑳𝒆𝒎𝒎𝒂 𝟔∎ 
 
Therefore, the incumbent utility maximising action with media suppression is to offer 
the following vector of payments: 
𝜏𝑖,𝐼 = {𝜏∗(𝑛) + (𝑙 + 𝑘)𝜏∗(𝑛)⌈Γ∗n⌉ 0 𝑡𝑜 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡  𝑡𝑜⌈Γ∗n⌉ 𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑙𝑒𝑡𝑠  
if 𝐵 ≥ ⌈Γn⌉𝜏∗(𝑛).  
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Contrary to the previous histories, the incumbent can achieve electoral victory by 
ensuring enough outlets know the challenger is bad, rather than suppressing news about his 
own type. Should either type of voter observe that both politicians are bad, they would both 
prefer the incumbent. If both signals are released across the media outlets, the incumbent would 
obtain 𝛼 votes from informed voters and a share of rationally inattentive voters proportional to 
the number of outlets that report honestly. If the incumbent were to offer 𝝉𝑰,𝒊 ≥ 𝜏∗∗(𝝉𝑪,𝒊) for a 
given challenger offer 𝝉𝑪,𝒊, he could induce the outlet to report honestly the status of both 
politicians even if 𝝉𝑪,𝒊 is acceptable, i. e. 𝝉𝑪,𝒊 > 𝜏∗(𝑥), 𝑥 ∈ ℕ. As in 𝒈𝑪𝒃𝑰, the outlet does not 
risk losing second period revenue since the resulting reporting strategy is sincere. As a result, 
it is a best response for any outlet to accept such an offer for a given 𝝉𝑪,𝒊 and report 
honestly 𝒃𝑰𝒃𝑪. Under full disclosure, the equilibrium strategy for the challenger is to offer 𝝉𝑪,𝒊 = 𝟎, ∀𝒊 which means that neither politician attempts any media suppression. If feasible, 
both politicians refrain from signal suppression and all media outlets report honestly. 
Lemma 6.1 
If both politicians are exposed as bad, the share of informed voters is less than half 
and their budgets are equal, full disclosure is always a suboptimal strategy. 
Proof of Lemma 6.1: 
In order for the incumbent to win the election with full disclosure, he needs 0.5- 𝛼 votes 
from rationally inattentive voters, which is equivalent to a share ⌈Γ∗n⌉ of outlets. Since ⌈Γn⌉ +⌈Γ∗n⌉ ∈ {𝑛, 𝑛 + 1}, two cases emerge. If ⌈Γn⌉ + ⌈Γ∗n⌉ = 𝑛 + 1, influencing ⌈Γ∗n⌉ outlets 
ensures the challenger has one fewer outlet than required. If ⌈Γn⌉ + ⌈Γ∗n⌉ = 𝑛, the incumbent 
would still win by ‘influencing’⌈Γ∗n⌉ outlets as the election will result in a tied vote. However, 
the optimal strategy of the incumbent will differ slightly in these cases. 
If ⌈Γn⌉ + ⌈Γ∗n⌉ = 𝑛 + 1, then the challenge has 𝐵 − (⌈Γn⌉ − 1)𝜏∗(⌈Γn⌉) funds 
remaining to persuade the final outlet to misreport his state. The best response for the 
incumbent is to offer any ⌈Γ∗n⌉ outlets the sum: 𝝉𝑰,𝒊 = 𝜏∗∗(𝐵 − (⌈Γn⌉ − 1)𝜏∗(⌈Γn⌉)) 
which simplifies to: 𝝉𝑰,𝒊 = 𝐵 − (⌈Γn⌉ − 2)𝜏∗(⌈Γn⌉) + 1 
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If ⌈Γn⌉ + ⌈Γ∗n⌉ = 𝑛, then the challenge has 𝐵 − (⌈Γn⌉ − 1)𝜏∗(⌈Γn⌉) funds remaining to 
persuade the final outlet to misreport his state. The best response for the incumbent is to offer 
any ⌈Γ∗n⌉ outlets the sum: 𝝉𝑰,𝒊 = 𝜏∗∗(𝐵 − ⌈Γn⌉𝜏∗(⌈Γn⌉)) 
which simplifies to: 𝝉𝑰,𝒊 = 𝐵 − (⌈Γn⌉ − 1)𝜏∗(⌈Γn⌉) + 1 
Therefore, the incumbent utility maximising action with full disclosure is to offer the following 
vector of payments: 
𝜏𝑖,𝐼 = {𝐵 − (⌈Γn⌉ − 2)𝜏∗(⌈Γn⌉) + 1 𝑡𝑜⌈Γ∗n⌉ 𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑙𝑒𝑡𝑠 𝑖𝑓 ⌈Γn⌉ + ⌈Γ∗n⌉ = 𝑛 + 1 𝐵 − (⌈Γn⌉ − 1)𝜏∗(⌈Γn⌉) + 1 𝑡𝑜⌈Γ∗n⌉ 𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑙𝑒𝑡𝑠 𝑖𝑓 ⌈Γn⌉ + ⌈Γ∗n⌉ = 𝑛0 𝑡𝑜 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡   
However, in order for this strategy to be feasible, it is required that:  𝐵 − ⌈Γ∗n⌉(𝐵 − (⌈Γn⌉ − 1)𝜏∗(⌈Γn⌉) + 1) > 0 
Or equivalently: ⌈Γ∗n⌉(⌈Γn⌉ − 1)𝜏∗(⌈Γn⌉) > 𝐵(⌈Γ∗n⌉ − 1) + ⌈Γ∗n⌉ ⌈Γ∗n⌉(⌈Γn⌉ − 1)𝜏∗(⌈Γn⌉) > 𝐵(⌈Γ∗n⌉ − 1) + 𝐵 − 𝐵 + ⌈Γ∗n⌉ ⌈Γ∗n⌉(⌈Γn⌉ − 1)𝜏∗(⌈Γn⌉) > 𝐵(⌈Γ∗n⌉) − 𝐵 + ⌈Γ∗n⌉ 
(⌈Γn⌉ − 1)𝜏∗(⌈Γn⌉) > 𝐵 − 𝐵⌈Γ∗n⌉ + 1 
𝜏∗(⌈Γn⌉) > 𝐵⌈Γ∗n⌉ − 1 
To arrive at the equilibrium strategy for the incumbent, compare incumbent utility under full 
disclosure and media suppression. In the latter case, his utility maximising action is: 
𝜏𝑖,𝐼 = {𝜏∗(𝑛) + (𝑙 + 𝑘)𝜏∗(𝑛)⌈Γ∗n⌉ 0 𝑡𝑜 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡  𝑡𝑜⌈Γ∗n⌉ 𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑙𝑒𝑡𝑠  
And therefore, his utility in the first period is:  
𝑈𝐼 = 𝐵 − ⌈Γ∗n⌉(𝜏∗(𝑛) + (𝑙 + 𝑘)𝜏∗(𝑛)⌈Γ∗n⌉ ) 
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𝑈𝐼 = 𝜏∗(𝑛)⌈Γ∗n⌉ + (𝑙 + 𝑘)𝜏∗(𝑛) 𝑈𝐼 = 𝜇, μ < τ∗(n) 
Under full disclosure, the incumbent’s utility in the first period is given by: 
𝑈𝐼 = {𝐵 − ⌈Γ∗n⌉(𝐵 − (⌈Γn⌉ − 2)𝜏∗(⌈Γn⌉) + 1 ) 𝑖𝑓 ⌈Γn⌉ + ⌈Γ∗n⌉ = 𝑛 + 1𝐵 − ⌈Γ∗n⌉(𝐵 − (⌈Γn⌉ − 1)𝜏∗(⌈Γn⌉) + 1 ) 𝑖𝑓 ⌈Γn⌉ + ⌈Γ∗n⌉ = 𝑛  
Beginning with the incumbent utility under full disclosure if ⌈Γn⌉ + ⌈Γ∗n⌉ = 𝑛, we show that 
full disclosure is always a suboptimal strategy.  𝐵 − ⌈Γ∗n⌉(𝐵 − (⌈Γn⌉ − 1)𝜏∗(⌈Γn⌉) + 1 ) <  𝜇 𝐵(1 − ⌈Γ∗n⌉) + ⌈Γ∗n⌉(⌈Γn⌉ − 1)𝜏∗(⌈Γn⌉) − ⌈Γ∗n⌉  <  𝜇 ⌈Γ∗n⌉(⌈Γn⌉ − 1)𝜏∗(⌈Γn⌉) <  𝜇 + ⌈Γ∗n⌉ + 𝐵(⌈Γ∗n⌉ − 1) 
(⌈Γn⌉ − 1)𝜏∗(⌈Γn⌉) < 𝜇⌈Γ∗n⌉ + 1 + 𝐵 − 𝐵⌈Γ∗n⌉ 
(⌈Γn⌉ − 1)𝜏∗(⌈Γn⌉) − 𝐵 + 𝐵⌈Γ∗n⌉ − 1 < 𝜇⌈Γ∗n⌉ 
Affordability implies (⌈Γn⌉ − 1)𝜏∗(⌈Γn⌉) − 𝐵 < 0 and full disclosure feasibility implies: 
𝜏∗(⌈Γn⌉) > 𝐵⌈Γ∗n⌉ − 1 → 
(⌈Γn⌉ − 1)𝜏∗(⌈Γn⌉) − 𝐵 + 𝐵⌈Γ∗n⌉ − 1 < (⌈Γn⌉)𝜏∗(⌈Γn⌉) − 𝐵 ≤ 0 
On the right-hand side, both 𝜇 and ⌈Γ∗n⌉ are positive by construction. 
Using similar calculations for the case when ⌈Γn⌉ + ⌈Γ∗n⌉ = 𝑛 + 1, full disclosure if a 
suboptimal strategy if 
(⌈Γn⌉ − 2)𝜏∗(⌈Γn⌉) − 𝐵 + 𝐵⌈Γ∗n⌉ − 1 < 𝜇⌈Γ∗n⌉ 
Which also always holds for the same reasons. This concludes the proof. 𝑸𝑬𝑫 𝑳𝒆𝒎𝒎𝒂 𝟔. 𝟏∎ 
Therefore, the equilibrium strategy for the incumbent is  
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𝜏𝑖,𝐼 = {𝜏∗(𝑛) + (𝑙 + 𝑘)𝜏∗(𝑛)⌈Γ∗n⌉ 0 𝑡𝑜 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡  𝑡𝑜⌈Γ∗n⌉ 𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑙𝑒𝑡𝑠  
if 𝐵 ≥ ⌈Γn⌉𝜏∗(𝑛).  
If 𝐵 ∈ [⌈Γ∗n⌉𝜏∗(𝑛), ⌈Γn⌉𝜏∗(𝑛)), the incumbent can still afford enough media suppression to 
allow his victory, but the challenger is unable to afford meaningful media intervention. 
Therefore, the equilibrium strategy of the incumbent becomes: 
𝜏𝑖,𝐼 = {𝜏∗(𝑛) 𝑡𝑜⌈Γ∗n⌉ 𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑙𝑒𝑡𝑠 0 𝑡𝑜 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡  
If 𝐵 ∈ [⌈Γ∗n⌉𝜏∗(⌈Γ∗n⌉), ⌈Γ∗n⌉𝜏∗(𝑛)), the incumbent is still able to afford meaningful media 
suppression and his equilibrium strategy becomes: 
𝜏𝑖,𝐼 = {𝜏∗(⌈Γ∗n⌉) 𝑡𝑜⌈Γ∗n⌉ 𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑙𝑒𝑡𝑠 0 𝑡𝑜 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡  
Finally, if 𝐵 < ⌈Γ∗n⌉𝜏∗(⌈Γ∗n⌉), neither politician can afford meaningful media suppression and 
their equilibrium strategies are 𝜏𝑖,𝐼 = 𝜏𝑖,𝐶 = 0 
For any vector of payments from the incumbent other than the ones outlined above, 
there exists a corresponding vector for the challenger which allows him to win. Let 𝜏𝐼 denote 
a vector of incumbent payments below the optimal one described above. 
Let x denote the number of outlets for which 𝜏𝐼,𝑖=0 and order the remaining outlets ascendingly. 
Then if:  
1) x≥⌈Γn⌉ or  
2) x<⌈Γn⌉ and  
𝐵 − 𝑥𝜏∗(𝑛) ≥ ∑ 𝜏𝐼,𝑗 + (⌈Γn⌉ − x)⌈Γn⌉𝑗=𝑥+1  
𝜏𝐶,𝑖 = { 𝜏∗(𝑛) 𝑡𝑜min(𝑥, ⌈𝛤𝑛⌉)  𝑡𝑜 𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑙𝑒𝑡𝑠 𝑠. 𝑡 𝜏𝐼,𝑖 = 0𝜏𝐼,𝑖 + 1 𝑡𝑜 the first max(⌈𝛤𝑛⌉ − 𝑥, 0)  𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑑 𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑙𝑒𝑡𝑠0 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒  
Otherwise 𝝉𝑪,𝒊 = 0 
229 
 
If the minimal acceptable vector of bribes for the challenger is not affordable, then the 
best response of the incumbent is to offer 𝜏𝐼,𝑖 = 0 to 𝑎𝑙𝑙 outlets. This is the minimum cost at 
which the incumbent can guarantee he wins as the challenger lacks the funds to implement a 
media intervention strategy that would allow him to win. Since the challenger is not able to 
afford any media market intervention which would allow him to win, he will not deviate.  
From the perspective of the media outlets, their optimal strategy is to report 
honestly, b𝐼b𝐶, if they receive no offer higher than 𝜏∗(𝑛) or if 𝜏𝑗 ≥ 𝜏∗(𝑛) and 𝜏−𝑗 ≥ 𝜏∗∗(𝜏𝑗). 
Otherwise, they accept the higher offer, and they report Φ𝐼b𝐶 or b𝐼Φ𝐶 depending on the origin 
of the offer. According to Lemma 7, voters prefer the incumbent if they observe b𝐼b𝐶, 
therefore, the incumbent wins the election. 
Second Equilibrium 
A second equilibrium occurs if 𝛼 ≥ 0.5. In this case, more than half of the voters are 
informed voters, in which case the game becomes a two-politician extension of Besley and Prat 
(2006). The crucial difference with respect to the first two cases is that a bad politician needs 
to suppress all the outlets in the market. If at least one outlet remains ‘free’ the informed voters 
find out about the bad politician and thus ensuring his loss unless he is the incumbent and the 







Φ𝐼Φ𝐶 Φ𝐼𝑏𝐶 𝑏𝐼Φ𝐶 𝑏𝐼𝑏𝐶 Beliefs  
Prior 
Probability 
𝛾2 + 2(1 − 𝛾)𝛾𝑞+ (1 − 𝛾)2(1− 𝑞)2 
𝛾(1 − 𝛾)𝑞+ (1 − 𝛾)2𝑞(1− 𝑞) 
𝛾(1 − 𝛾)𝑞 + (1 − 𝛾)2𝑞(1 − 𝑞) (1 − 𝛾)2𝑞2  
Agents and 
strategies 
     
Incumbent 𝝉𝑰,𝒊 = 0, ∀𝑖, ∀𝐵, ∀ 𝐸(𝜏𝐶) 𝝉𝑰,𝒊 = 0, ∀𝑖, ∀𝐵, ∀ 𝐸(𝜏𝐶) 𝝉𝑰,𝒊 = 0, ∀𝑖 ∀𝐵, 𝑎𝑛𝑑  ∀ 𝐸(𝜏𝐶) 𝑠𝑢𝑐ℎ 𝑡ℎ𝑎𝑡 ∀𝝉𝑪,𝒊 ≥𝜏∗∗(𝝉𝑰,𝒊) 
Otherwise, a) if 𝐵 ≥⌈Γn⌉𝜏∗(𝑛) 𝝉𝑰,𝒊 = 𝜏∗(𝑛) 𝑡𝑜 𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑙𝑒𝑡𝑠 
b) if 𝐵 <⌈Γn⌉𝜏∗(𝑛),then 𝜏𝐼,𝑖 = 0, ∀𝑖 
𝜏𝐼,𝑖 = 𝐵 − (𝑛 − 2)𝜏∗(𝑛) to 1 outlet, 
zero otherwise ∀ 𝐸(𝜏𝐶) if B≥n𝜏∗(𝑛) 





good if they 
observe Φ𝐼Φ𝐶 




Challenger  𝝉𝑪,𝒊 = 0, ∀𝑖, ∀𝐵, ∀ 𝜏𝐼  𝝉𝑪,𝒊 = 0, ∀𝑖, ∀𝐵, ∀ 𝜏𝐼 If 𝜏𝐼,𝑖 < 𝜏∗(𝑛) for 𝑛 − 1 outlets, then 𝝉𝑪,𝒊 = 0, ∀𝑖 ∀𝐵.  𝜏𝐶,𝑖 = 0, ∀𝑖 if 𝐵 < 𝑛𝜏∗(𝑛) 
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If 𝜏𝐼,𝑖 ≥ 𝜏∗(𝑛) for 𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑛 outlets, pick 
the outlet with the smallest 𝜏𝐼,𝑖 and 
offer 𝜏𝐶,𝑖 = 𝜏∗∗(𝝉𝑰,𝒊) 
If 𝐵 ≥ 𝑛𝜏∗(𝑛), let x denote the number 
of outlets for which 𝜏𝐼,𝑖=0 and order the 
remaining outlets ascendingly. Then if 
1) x=n or  
2) x<n and  
𝐵 − 𝑥𝜏∗(𝑛) ≥ ∑ 𝜏𝐼,𝑗 + (n − x)n𝑗=𝑥+1  𝜏𝐶,𝑖= { 𝜏∗(𝑛) 𝑡𝑜 𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑠. 𝑡 𝜏𝐼,𝑖 = 0𝜏𝐼,𝑖 + 1 𝑡𝑜 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑙𝑒𝑡𝑠 









bad if they 
observe b𝐼b𝐶 











Result Incumbent wins Incumbent wins Challenger wins Incumbent wins 
Media Agents Report 
honestly,Φ𝐼Φ𝐶, 
for ∀ 𝜏𝐼 𝑎𝑛𝑑 ∀ 𝜏𝐶. If 
Report honestly Φ𝐼b𝐶 if 𝜏𝐶,𝑖 <𝜏∗(𝑥), ∀ 𝜏𝐼  
Report honestly b𝐼Φ𝐶 unless 
 {𝜏𝐼,𝑖 ≥ 𝜏∗(𝑥) 𝐚𝐧𝐝𝜏𝐶,𝑖 < 𝜏∗∗(𝝉𝑰,𝒊)   




𝜏𝑖,𝐼 ≠ 0 and 
or 𝜏𝐶,𝑖 ≠ 0, they 
would accept the 
higher offer and 
still report 
honestly 
Or if 𝜏𝐶,𝑖 ≥𝜏∗(𝑥) and 𝜏𝐼 ≥𝜏∗∗(𝝉𝑪,𝒊) 
Report Φ𝐼Φ𝐶 if 𝜏𝐶,𝑖 ≥ 𝜏∗(𝑥) 
and 𝜏𝐼 <𝜏∗∗(𝝉𝑪,𝒊(𝒙)) 
 
then report Φ𝐼Φ𝐶 𝜏𝐼,𝑖 < 𝜏∗(𝑥)𝐚𝐧𝐝 𝜏𝐶,𝑖 < 𝜏∗(𝑥) 𝑶𝑹𝜏𝐼,𝑗 > 𝜏∗(𝑥) 𝒂𝒏𝒅 𝜏𝐼,−𝑗 > 𝜏∗∗(𝜏∗(𝑥)) 
For 𝑗 ∈ {𝐼, 𝐶} 
Report Φ𝐼b𝐶 if 𝜏𝐼,𝑖 ≥ 𝜏∗(𝑥)𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝜏𝐼,𝑖 ≥𝜏𝐶,𝑖 
Report b𝐼Φ𝐶 if 𝜏𝐶,𝑖 ≥ 𝜏∗(𝑥)𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝜏𝐼,𝑖 <𝜏𝐶,𝑖  




good if they 
observe Φ𝐼Φ𝐶 


















in the media 
Vote challenger if they observe b𝐼Φ𝐶 
in the media. Vote incumbent if they 
observe Φ𝐼Φ𝐶 in the media 
Vote challenger if they observe b𝐼Φ𝐶 in 
the media. Vote incumbent if they 






from their outlet 
Vote incumbent 
unless observe B𝐼Φ𝐶 from their 
outlet 
Vote challenger if they observe b𝐼Φ𝐶 
from their outlet. Vote incumbent if 
they observe Φ𝐼Φ𝐶 from their outlet 
Vote challenger if they observe b𝐼Φ𝐶 
from their outlet. Vote incumbent if 





Case 1: 𝒈𝑰𝒈𝑪  
This can occur if both politicians are good or if either politician is bad and no signal is 
received by the media. In the absence of a signal, the media outlets are unable to report anything 
and therefore media framing is impossible and the best response of all outlets is to report 
honestly, even if they receive a transfer from either politician. Both sets of voters observe Φ𝐼Φ𝐶 
and their posterior beliefs the politicians are good are both higher than 𝛾. As shown in Lemma 
7, they both prefer the incumbent. For both politicians, strictly positive transfers do not change 
the result of the election and reduce utility and hence their equilibrium actions will be to 
set 𝜏𝐼,𝑖 = 𝜏𝐶,𝑖 = 0. From the perspective of media outlets, their reporting strategy can only be 
honest even in the presence of positive transfers from the politicians, and therefore would 
accept any positive transfer, if offered. The incumbent wins and obtains utility 2B, the 
challenger 0 and all media outlets report honestly. These equilibrium strategies and beliefs are 
consistent for all realisations of B, n 𝛿 and 𝛼. 
Case 2: 𝒈𝑰𝒃𝑪 
This can occur if the challenger is bad and discovered with probability γ (1-γ)q or if 
both politicians are bad and only the challenger is discovered, with probability (1 − γ)2𝑞(1 −𝑞). With probability γ (1-γ)(1-q) the incumbent is good, while the challenger is bad and 
undiscovered, in which case equilibrium actions are as outlined in 𝒈𝑰𝒈𝑪. From the voters’ 
perspective, this is the posterior belief induced if they observe Φ𝐼b𝐶 in the media or from their 
preferred outlet. The bad challenger may attempt to silence all media outlets, in which case no 
voters, informed or otherwise, observe the bad signal about the challenger. However, upon 
seeing no signal about neither politician, following Lemma 7, both types of voters prefer the 
incumbent. Since media persuasion is both costly and ineffective, it is a strictly suboptimal 
strategy. Therefore 𝝉𝑪,𝒊 = 0, ∀𝑖 and the best response of the incumbent is to also set 𝝉𝑰,𝒊 = 0, ∀i. 
Should they receive an offer larger or at least as large as 𝜏∗(𝑛) 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝜏𝐼 < 𝜏∗∗(𝝉𝑪,𝒊), the media 
outlets would decide to report Φ𝐼Φ𝐶 . The incumbent wins and obtains utility 2B, while the 
challenger obtains 0. A special case where the challenger can suppress the media completely 
exists, but it is a strictly suboptimal strategy to do so. These equilibrium strategies and beliefs 
are consistent for all realisations of B, 𝑛, 𝛿 and 𝛼 > 0.5. 
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Case 3: 𝒈𝑪𝒃𝑰 
This can occur if the incumbent is bad and discovered with probability γ (1-γ)q or if 
both politicians are bad and only the incumbent is discovered, with probability (1 − γ)2𝑞(1 −𝑞).With probability γ (1-γ)(1-q) the challenger is good, while the incumbent is bad and 
undiscovered, in which case equilibrium actions are as outlined in 𝒈𝑰𝒈𝑪. From the voters’ 
perspective, this is the posterior belief induced if they observe b𝐼Φ𝐶 in the media or from their 
preferred outlet. 
As above, the condition for market suppression is given by: 𝐵 ≥ [𝜋(𝑛𝑜 𝑏𝑟𝑖𝑏𝑒|𝜎−𝑖) − 𝜋(𝑏𝑟𝑖𝑏𝑒|𝜎−𝑖)]𝑛 
𝐵 ≥ [[(1 − 𝛼𝑛 + 𝛼)𝛿 − (1 − 𝛼𝑛 )𝛿] + 𝜆∑ 1(𝑛 − 𝑖)𝛿 𝑥! 𝜆𝑖(1 − 𝜆)𝑥−𝑖𝑖! (𝑥 − 𝑖)!𝑥𝑖=0 + 𝜀]  𝑛 
while the minimal acceptable bribe from the incumbent is given by:  
𝜏∗(𝑥) = [(1−𝛼𝑛 + 𝛼)𝛿 − (1−𝛼𝑛 )𝛿] + 𝜆∑ 1(𝑛−𝑖)𝛿 𝑥!𝜆𝑖(1−𝜆)𝑥−𝑖𝑖!(𝑥−𝑖)!𝑥𝑖=0 + 𝜀. 
We know that since at least half of the voters are informed in this scenario, the bad 
politician needs to manipulate all media outlets in order to avoid certain defeat in the election. 
Consequently, the challenger only needs to ensure at least 1 outlet remains ‘free’ and reports 
that the incumbent is bad. 
In this case, the incumbent has B- (𝑛 − 1)𝜏∗(𝑛) revenue leftover from attempting to 
manipulate (𝑛 − 1) outlets, which is the maximum budget available to persuade the final outlet. 
Because the challenger is good, as before, he is able to persuade that outlet to report honestly 
at lower cost. By construction, an offer of 𝜏∗∗(𝜏∗(𝑛))is acceptable from challenger and 
preferable to 𝜏∗(𝑛) from the incumbent. Since 𝜏∗∗(𝜏∗(𝑛)) < 𝜏∗(𝑛), an offer of B- (𝑛 − 1)𝜏∗∗ 
from the challenger is also affordable for the politician. To ensure that one outlet strictly prefers 
to report honestly and he wins the election, the challenger can offer B- (𝑛 − 1)𝜏∗∗(𝜏∗) to one 
outlet as the incumbent is unable to afford suppressing the final outlet. It is therefore a 
suboptimal strategy for the incumbent to attempt media persuasion since it is strictly utility 
reducing and ineffective. The resulting equilibrium is for the incumbent to offer 𝜏𝐼,𝑖 = 0, ∀I, 
and the corresponding best response from the challenger is 𝜏𝐶,𝑖 = 0, ∀𝑖. The incumbent would 
not deviate from this strategy since any spending will never lead to electoral victory, ensuring 
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the incumbent’s utility is less than B. The challenger will not deviate given the action of the 
incumbent since he already wins the election. Both politicians obtain utility B in the first period. 
The media outlets report honestly. These equilibrium strategies and beliefs are consistent for 
all realisations of B such that l≥ 𝑛, n, 𝛿 and 𝛼 > 0.5. 
If the realisation of B is such that the incumbent is unable to afford any meaningful 
media interference, the equilibrium strategies remain unchanged. Therefore, the equilibrium 
strategy for the incumbent and the challenger is 𝜏𝐼,𝑖 = 𝜏𝐶,𝑖 = 0 ∀𝑖 and any realisation of B. 
Case 4: 𝒃𝑰𝒃𝑪 
With probability (1 − 𝑞)2 neither politician is discovered as bad and the analysis 
collapses to that observed in case 𝒈𝑰𝒈𝑪. With probability 1-q the challenger is not discovered 
as bad and the analysis collapses to that observed in case 𝒃𝑰𝒈𝑪 and with probability 1-q the 
incumbent is not discovered and the analysis collapses to that observed in case 𝒈𝑰𝒃𝑪.With 
probability 𝑞2 both politicians are discovered as bad. The challenger needs to capture all the 
outlets in the market to ensure his victory whereas the incumbent only needs to prevent one 
outlet from being captured. 
As above, the condition for market suppression is given by:  𝐵 ≥ [𝜋(𝑛𝑜 𝑏𝑟𝑖𝑏𝑒|𝜎−𝑖) − 𝜋(𝑏𝑟𝑖𝑏𝑒|𝜎−𝑖)]𝑛 
𝐵 ≥ [[(1 − 𝛼𝑛 + 𝛼)𝛿 − (1 − 𝛼𝑛 )𝛿] + 𝜆∑ 1(𝑛 − 𝑖)𝛿 𝑥! 𝜆𝑖(1 − 𝜆)𝑥−𝑖𝑖! (𝑥 − 𝑖)!𝑥𝑖=0 + 𝜀]  𝑛 
while the minimal acceptable bribe if x outlets are ‘suppressed’ from either politician is given 
by: 
𝜏∗(𝑥) = [(1 − 𝛼𝑛 + 𝛼)𝛿 − (1 − 𝛼𝑛 )𝛿] + 𝜆∑ 1(𝑛 − 𝑖)𝛿 𝑥! 𝜆𝑖(1 − 𝜆)𝑥−𝑖𝑖! (𝑥 − 𝑖)!𝑥𝑖=0 + 𝜀 
As outlined above, the challenger needs to persuade all outlets to misreport his state for 
him to win the election. Consequently, the incumbent only needs to persuade one outlet to 
report the state of the challenger honestly. In this case, the challenger would have B- (𝑛 −1)𝜏∗(𝑛) revenue leftover from attempting to manipulate (𝑛 − 1) outlets, which is the 
maximum budget available to persuade the final outlet. The incumbent can then achieve 
electoral victory in two ways: full disclosure or media suppression. Under the latter, the 
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incumbent would ‘silence’ enough outlets such that enough rationally inattentive voters do not 
observe that his type is bad. 
Under full disclosure, the incumbent can achieve electoral victory by ensuring enough 
outlets know the challenger is bad, rather than suppressing news about his own type. Should 
either type of voter observe that both politicians are bad, they would both prefer the incumbent. 
If both signals are released across the media outlets, the incumbent would obtain 𝛼 votes from 
informed voters and a share of rationally inattentive voters proportional to the number of outlets 
that report honestly. If the incumbent were to offer 𝝉𝑰,𝒊 ≥ 𝜏∗∗(𝝉𝑪,𝒊) for a given challenger offer 𝝉𝑪,𝒊, he could induce the outlet to report honestly the status of both politicians even if 𝝉𝑪,𝒊 is 
acceptable, i. e. 𝝉𝑪,𝒊 > 𝜏∗(𝑛). As in 𝒈𝑪𝒃𝑰, the outlet does not risk losing second period revenue 
since the resulting reporting strategy is sincere. As a result, it is a best response for any outlet 
to accept such an offer for a given 𝝉𝑪,𝒊 and report honestly 𝒃𝑰𝒃𝑪. Under full disclosure, the 
equilibrium strategy for the challenger is to offer 𝝉𝑪,𝒊 = 𝟎, ∀𝒊 which means that neither 
politician attempts any media suppression. If feasible neither politician would attempt signal 
suppression and all media outlets report honestly. 
The incumbent is then able to ensure one outlet reports Φ𝐼b𝐶 by offering any outlet B- (𝑛 − 1)𝜏∗(𝑛). Since B- (𝑛 − 1)𝜏∗(𝑛) < 𝐵, this offer is affordable and results in the 
incumbent winning the election. Under full disclosure, the incumbent can ensure that enough 
voters know both politicians are bad, i.e. b𝐼b𝐶 by offering one outlet 𝝉𝑰,𝒊 = 𝜏∗∗(B − (𝑛 − 1)𝜏∗(𝑛)), which is also affordable, as: 𝜏∗∗(B − (𝑛 − 1)𝜏∗(𝑛)) = B − (𝑛 − 2)𝜏∗(𝑛) + 1 < B − (𝑛 − 1)𝜏∗(𝑛) < 𝐵 
Full disclosure is an optimal strategy for the incumbent. He will not deviate and spend 
lower since it will allow the challenger to achieve total media suppression. The incumbent will 
not spend more since he gains strictly lower utility if he does so. Given the actions of the 
incumbent, the best response of the challenger is to set 𝜏𝐶,𝑖 = 0, ∀𝑖. He will not deviate since 
he will be unable to achieve total market suppression. The incumbent obtains revenue equal to 2𝐵 − 𝜏∗∗(B − (𝑛 − 1)𝜏∗(𝑛)), while the challenger obtains 0. The equilibrium in the media 
market is that all outlets report honestly, b𝐼b𝐶. 
These equilibrium strategies and beliefs are consistent for all realisations of B≥n𝜏∗, n, 𝛿 and 𝛼 > 0.5. 
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As in Trombetta and Rossignoli (2020) the equilibrium beliefs and strategies depend 
on the realisations of 𝛼, which can lead to heterogeneous levels of capture required to win the 
election, which is consistent with those observed empirically. However, a key difference is that 
the results indicate that in pure strategy Perfect Bayesian equilibria media and political 
competition and electoral standards ensure that the true state of politicians is always revealed 
to a subset of the electorate. This implies that if at least one of the politicians is not revealed as 
bad, he will win the election as the choice voters face is either between politician they know 
with certainty to be bad and one which is good with some strictly positive probability or two 
politicians of the latter type. This further implies that a good politician always wins the election 
whenever he is present. The assumption that bad signals cannot be fabricated is crucial to this 
result. When both politicians are revealed as bad, the assumptions about incumbency advantage 
result in the incumbent being able to win the election, while still allowing a subset of the 
electorate to be correctly informed. 
Interestingly, in this equilibrium, full disclosure is optimal both in the media market 
and from the winning politician’s perspective, if and only if the share of informed voters is at 
least half. This arises due to the presence of political competition with constant budgets when 
the ‘bad’ politician needs to capture the entirety of the media whereas his opponent only has to 
ensure one outlet remains honest. If the share of informed voters is less than half, even when 
media market capture is rational full media capture is suboptimal as victory can be achieved 
with fewer funds and fewer captured outlets. 
The equilibrium in the media market suggests that irrespective of the share of informed 
voters, whenever at least one politician is not revealed as bad, we observe all outlets reporting 
honestly. The same strategies are observed when both politicians are bad, and the share of 
informed voters is at least half. This result is in line with previous literature where supply side 
bias is diminished by increased media market competition. The results on voter welfare suggest 
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